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VABSTRACT
This study describes a comprehensive theoretical framework for
Open Education based upon the epistemological, psychological, and
philosophical premises of John Dewey and Jean Piaget. It assumes
that Open Education requires for itself a more rigorous understand-
ing of the psychological notions and their philosophical implications
than currently seem to inform Open pedagogy. It also assumes that
Open Education, like the Progressive Movement in education before it,
faces as its major task that of getting beyond the phase of self-
advocacy through polemical rhetoric and sentimental theorizing,
so as to evolve a consistent and workable body of pedagogical prescrip-
tions for elementary teachers.
Following an Introduction, the second chapter describes this
initial phase, and its tendency to couch arguments for educational
reform in ideological terms. It contends that while an educational
reform movement may be carried along initially by the efforts of
persuasive critics writing in times of social ferment, and by the
examples of a few conspicuously successful experiments in progressive
schooling, it must ultimately define itself through its manifest
ability to sponsor total development in individual children, and
in particular, the development of an active and resourceful intelli-
gence.
Chapter three sketches out a theoretical position from which
prescriptions for Open classroom practice may be logically inferred.
The theory described here is derived largely from the
developmental
ideas of John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and to a lesser extent,
Lawrence
vi
Kohlberg and other developmental psychologists. It focuses on
Dewey and Piaget's notions of the development of logical thinking,
3nd the dynamics of this development.
Chapter four establishes criteria for the classroom "environ-
ment that are implied by the dynamics of development. Strategies
for provisioning and organizing the Open classroom are discussed
with respect to responsive environmental conditions, and the need
for opportunities to act and reflect, and to experience cognitive
conflict situations. These strategies are informed by the teacher's
assessment of environmental possibilities, and of the student's
capacity for logical thinking.
Chapter five follows with a discussion of curriculum implica-
tions. The dynamics of cognitive development suggest that curriculum
essentially be thought of as problem-solving activity. This activity
varies according to how the problem is identified, and to the kind
of outcome that represents an adequate encounter with the problem.
Curriculum that sponsors problem-solving, inquiry behavior requires
subject matter that is cognitively challenging, and capable of
engaging the learner's interests over a substantial period of time.
Chapter six examines theoretical implications for the teacher-
pupil relationship. It concludes that the "humanistic" trend in
current educational reform, emphasizing the importance of the "help-
ing relationship" for classroom learning and teaching, needs to
involve an understanding of developmental psychology and epistemology.
The final chapter points to the need for further research and study
in the areas of ego psychology and developmental theory, and on
vii
teacher training that reflects an awareness of the implications of
developmental theory.
vili
CONTENTS
Ch
. 1 Introduction
^
Ch. II The Ideological Temper of Progressive Educational
Reform in. America
^
Pt. 1: Social Criticism and the Schools 19
Pt . 2: Reform Pedagogy 24
The humanistic approach 25
The social meliorist approach 29
Pt. 3: Responses to Reform 37
Pt. 4: Ideology and Orthodoxy 43
Ch. Ill A Cognitive-Developmental Framework for Open
Educational Theory 50
Cognition, Affect, and Ego Development 54
Theory of Knowledge 57
Stage Theory 58
Unevenness 01 stage development 61
Development and motive 62
Development and learning 63
Structural Change: Assimilation and Accommodation 64
Equilibration 65
Disequilibrium 66
Open periods for stage advance 68
Ch. IV Implications of Developmental Theory for Setting
an Optimal Educational Environment in the Open Classroom 70
ix
Ch. IV (continued)
Organizing the Open Classroom 71
Provisioning 73
Scheduling 73
Responsive environments 74
Providing for Active Learning 75
Discovery learning 76
Social learning 79
Role-taking 81
Providing for role-taking activity 84
Role-taking and grouping 85
Role-taking and reflection 86
Providing for Appropriate Match: Instruction and
Development 89
Cognitive match and optimal disparity 89
Diagnosing the child 91
Diagnosing the environment 93
Confidence 94
Ch. V Implications for Curriculum in the Open Classroom 99
Curriculum Objectives and Genetic Epistemology 100
Curriculum and the Teaching of Concepts 106
Curriculum for Development 108
Subject matter HO
Problem-solving, Creative Thinking, and Inquiry 115
Curriculum strategies to facilitate
creative thinking
Curriculum models
XCh. V (continued)
Dewey's "occupations" curriculum 120
Evaluation of Curriculum 122
Ch. VI Implications for Teacher Intervention in the
Open Classroom 125
Autonomy, Independence, and Development 126
The Teacher as Authority in the Open Classroom 129
"Humaneness" and the Helping Relationship 131
Teacher Intervention 134
Questioning 136
Direct instruction 137
Feedback 139
Ch. VII Summary and Implications 142
Summary 142
Directions for Further Research and Development
of Theory 143
Directions for Further Research in Progressive
Innovation 148
Implications for Teacher Training and Professional
Growth 150
List of Works Consulted 155
1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
If there is an open education movement, it is surely
a loosely defined one. There is no detailed theory of
child development or of pedagogy or of social systems
which creates consensus among all those who are now
involved in open education. . . . Instead, any movement
which exists has grown more from the day-to-day activi-
ties of teachers in English infant schools than from the
thinking of educational theorists. The definition of
informal education exists most fully in the perceptions
of teachers who know a good classroom when they see one,
but who would be hard put to explain precisely what is
good about it.
(Bane, 1972, p. 273)
Open education will defy definition as a discrete
concept. It will remain a multi-dimensional ideology
like progressive education. Educators in the United
States have collected under the label of open education
a number of "best existing practices" and imbued them
with the aura of an ideology.
(Myers and Duke, 1972, p. 14)
Some of this characteristic vagueness about definition
can be explained: the movement is young (in spirit, if
not historically). British practitioners seem reluctant
to put much in writing for fear of being misinterpreted
or 'copied' too precisely or too superficially; the
essence of this environment is its flexibility, and many
of its practices are therefore difficult to define.
Practice, in this particular educational movement, has
precluded theory, and, as yet, the theorists have not
"caught up." . . • But all these reasons notwithstand-
ing, the time has surely come for more exact specification
of open education's educational objectives, both psycho-
emotional and intellectual.
(Rathbone, 1972, p. 539)
2Open Education, as a body of teaching practices and theoretical
assumptions about learning, teaching, and the role of schooling in
society, has not yet articulated for itself a coherent rationale--a
philosophy consistent with a psychology. At present, theoretical
foundations for Open, "integrated day" practice in the United States
seem rather eclectic. Psychological theory comprises a disjointed
and sometimes contradictory mix of cognit ive-deve lopmentalism, "per-
ceptual" theory, and therapeutic technique. There is a resemblance
here to the rather fluid theoretical foundations of the Progressive
Movement in education. Unfortunately, Open Education has so far
shown a conspicuous disregard for historical precedents that might
offer some valuable lessons on the subject of educational change.
If Open Education is to avoid the waywardness and lack of
intellectual integrity that characterized the evolution of the
Progressive Education Movement, then it requires of and for itself
a more rigorous understanding of the psychological principles and
their philosophical implications that seem at present to guide the
best examples of Open practice. Open Education needs prescriptive
as well as descriptive theory, drawn from research and inferred from
practice. It requires theory to consolidate and direct present
practice, insure intelligent and informed extension, and be conducive
to the effective preparation of new teachers. Such theory also needs
to be sufficiently comprehensible, and persuasive in a non-doctrinaire
way, as to enable parents to fairly assess and appraise its
real
educational goals and their appropriateness for children.
3The intent of this dissertation is to work towards such theory.
More specifically, the dissertation will* attempt to bring together
and examine critically a body of psychological, philosophical, and
ethical positions that could comprise a suitable theoretical basis
for Open pedagogy in the United States. The underlying assumption
of this attempt is that a conceptual framework--a comprehensive and
consistent theory that derives implications for practice from epistemo-
logical, psychological, and ethical principles---is necessary to the
development and maintenance of good informal schooling. In fields
like education, avers David Hawkins (1972),
it is often believed that theory is a sort of idle
luxury or even a fraud, purporting to lay down encompas-
sing generalizations which in fact have not been
'empirically established.' On the contrary, it is in
just such fields as ours that theory is of the greatest
importance, though much neglected. For we do in fact
already know a great deal about education and develop-
ment; the problem is rather to marshal that knowledge in
a coherent usable form. Empirical investigations con-
ceived within such a framework of theory can react upon,
can modify or extend knowledge. They cannot amount to
much without it. (p . 288)
Charles Silberman (1971) has remarked that American teachers,
and American education in general, have traditionally suffered from
lack of a clear and coherent sense of purpose to guide practice.
Joseph Featherstone (1972b) also sees this as a contemporary problem.
"What is clear," he argues in an article on Open Education, is that
theory has to be re-united with practice. Without a solid grounding
in children's development, much American informal teaching will be
gimmickry; and without a sound base in actual practice in classrooms,
theory will remain useless" (p • 100).
4In considering the relationship of theory to practice in the
more successful British schools he visited, Featherstone (1971b)
noted that theory was of "practical use" to teachers because it had
either been derived from, or coincided with, a significant body of
good practice already in existence. "Piaget is fortunate in that
much of the British teachers' practical work intersects with his
theoretical concerns" (pp. 5-6). While it might be argued that this
practice was by no means nonderivative itself (the influence of John
Dewey, among others, is frequently mentioned), the fact remains that
theory and practice must grow hand in hand.
This dissertation will therefore seek to define theory for Open
Education as comprising pragmatic philosophical ideas that are consis-
tent with defensible psychological, epistemological and ethical
precepts. The aim will constantly be to identify related principles
that are true to the nature of the classroom teaching experience, and
both intelligible and useful to those entrusted to teach there. David
Hawkins' remarks on theory can again help to elaborate on this charge.
theorizing has its own norms— of self-consistency, of
completeness, of definition and organization, of adequacy
to subject matter, of fruitfulness. Because of these
requirements a good theory outruns the hard evidence
available to support it and if it does not, it is not a
good theory. But the basic postulates of theory are not
therefore to be taken as mere assumptions. They are
supported by the kind and degree of organization they
induce, by the new phenomena they lead to or highlight.
(1972, p. 288)
The new phenomena in elementary schooling that we
are gathering
under the label Open Education have indeed been richly
highlighted
and widely showcased. Efforts to define Open
Education are legion.
5They range from the succinct and general statement by Silberman
(1971.) Open Education is a 'set of shared attitudes and convictions
about the nature of childhood, learning and schooling" (p. 208) --to
the comprehensive and itemized list of characteristics reported by
Walberg and Thomas (1971) . Open Education : A Sourcebook for Parents
and Teachers (Nyquist and Hawes, 1972), Open Education : The Informal
Classroom (Rathbone, 1971c), and The Open C
l
assrcom Reader (Silberman,
1973) contain some of the most noteworthy definitional literature.
The following passage is by Nyquist (1972), and serves as a concise,
representative conception of Open Education and its objectives.
The purpose of open education is to provide a format
whereby children are free to learn at their own pace and
in their own way. The teacher serves as a facilitator of
learning, providing an invitingly arranged environment,
materials, motivation, guidance, and assistance. She
works with individuals and small groups helping to set
goals and achieve them, raising questions, intervening
when necessary, observing children, and assessing their
progress. Children's growth is evaluated on an individual
basis with the teacher in terms of strengths and weaknesses
and for the purpose of diagnosis and planning. (p. 84)
Two young educators in particular have become strongly linked
with the articulation of Open pedagogy: Roland Barth and Charles
Rathbone. They have attempted, in several articles and books, to
set down the fundamental principles or assumptions that seem to
underlie Open Education. What is at once both attractive yet sli Dhtiv
suspect-- in their writing is its dogmatic quality. There is an impli-
cit faith in the common sense and moral correctness of the
premises
they put forward, justified, no doubt, by the feeling that they are
only codifying what is already a working reality.
Interestingly,
Barth's list of "Assumptions About Learning" (1971) reads
a lot like
6John Dewey's "My Pedagogic Creed" (1897b). It will only be noted
here that creeds, by definition, are to be taken more on faith than
on objective evidence. Indeed, Barth (1971) admits that "the state
of thought surrounding open education is still primitive. The . . .
assumptions about learning are hunches, based largely upon impres-
sions, gut feelings, emotional responses, and informal observations
in classrooms. Collectively, the assumptions do not constitute a
coherent system or philosophy. There are inconsistencies and voids;
there is little supporting research" (p. 134).
The thesis to be supported is that there has been sufficient
research, as well as a substantial body of related philosophical
thought and educational experiment (some of it by no means recent)
,
to justify an attempt at piecing together a coherent system of theory
for Open Education. The plan I intend to follow has six. parts, each
to be treated as a chapter. The first tries to establish a histori-
cal context for the current ideology of informal education. It also
represents an attempt to do some sorting out of those founding
assumptions" already ascribed to Open Education. The ensuing four
chapters will be concerned to identify a body of descriptive and
prescriptive theory that meets the standards suggested earlier by
David Hawkins. Chapter III describes an integrated theory of
intelligence and learning. Chapter IV then considers the
implications
of that theory for setting an educational environment.
Chapter V
examines its implications for curriculum, and
Chapter VI, the impli-
cations for the teacher- learner relationship.
These chapters will
be followed by a summary, and a look at some
directions for professional
7growth of practitioners, as well as for further research and develop-
ment of theory. Below is a more detailed discussion of this plan.
Chapter II: The Ideological Temper of
Progressive Educational Reform in America
One of the salient characteristics of educational "movements"
is that they are often borne along more by popular ideals and politi-
cal convictions than by critical thinking and professional insight.
Thus it has been noted of the current trend towards informal school-
ing that its so-called philosophical aims are often no more than
libertarian assertions and romantic notions of child development.^
A first step this dissertation will take will be to look at the
American Open classroom movement in the context of the radical reform
currents of the 1960's and early 1970's.
In many respects these reform trends are not entirely new. For
example, strong resemblances exist between the rhetoric of contemporary
school critics like Silberman, Holt, and Dennison, and that of certain
turn-of- the-century counterparts. These resemblances will be examined
with an intent to sift out the political from the pedagogical, and
the romantic from the practicable. Comparisons will then be drawn
between educational practices that grew out of these similar climates,
notably those of the Progressive and the Open Education Movements.
Again, the aim will be to consider trends towards informal schooling
as part of larger political and cultural phenomena. This kind of
lA good example of such criticism is found in R. S. Peters^, "'A
Recognizable Philosophy of Education'
1
: A Constructive Critique" (19b9) .
8critical historical perspective might yield certain categorical judg-
ments of educational "principles" that can make ensuing value judg-
ments more informed and useful.
Some important sociological observations made by Dewey and
Featherstone will also be examined. Allegations that informal school-
^^8 produces anti- inte 1 lectua lism and elitism will be touched on here,
in the context of our broader inquiry into the nature of liberal
educational reform: who promotes it, in whose name is it promoted,
and for whom is it actually most beneficial.
Chapter III: A Cognitive-Developmental Framework
for Open Educational Theory
My contention in this dissertation will be that theory for Open
Education can and should be developed on sounder, less "trendy"
premises than those which accounted for much of its initial, as well
as current, popularity. The third chapter will be concerned with
identifying and describing an epistemology and a theory of cognitive
development that might serve as an authoritative foundation for Open
pedagogy. This effort, while emphasizing developmental theory,
implicitly reflects those ethical assumptions commonly identified
with Open Education.
Featherstone (1972b) has stated that if "the current interest
in informal teaching leads to cumulative change," it will depend on
two factors in particular. One is improved teacher support. The
other is "whether enough people can come to understand the essentially
different outlook on children's intellectual development which good
9informal work must be based on" (p . 100). This different outlook,
as perceived in exemplary classrooms on both sides of the Atlantic,
emanates largely from the research initiated by Jean Piaget. Expon-
ents and interpreters of Piaget's work assert that it provides
universal criteria for the types of experiences which can lead to
the development of intelligence. In the United States, cognitive-
developmental psychology for educators has been articulated most
notably by Jerome Bruner, and more recently by Lawrence Kohlberg.
The implications this research holds for Open Education will be
explored here, along with similar conclusions reached by John Dewey.
Dewey was also an epistemologist and, in his way
,
a learning
psychologist; his theory invites comparison with that of more recent
vintage
.
Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) have argued convincingly for a Piaget-
Dewey entente to provide the body of theory upon which education for
intellectual and moral development can be based. Such theory
describes a constructionist and interactionist view of development.
It measures growth in terms of the ability to understand problems and
reach decisions. Kohlberg has shown elsewhere (1971, pp. 171-174)
that his stage conception of the development of moral reasoning is
culturally universal. He has also made a case (1971) for the pnilo-
sophical validity of deriving "ought statements' from empirically-
based notions of cognitive maturation. A question like, "Why is a
role-taking, problem-solving approach to education inherently valuable
and desirable?" is tentatively answered within the logic of his
argu-
ment . This dissertation accepts Kohlberg' s position, and will
not
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be occupied with defending it. Kohlberg and Mayer's definition of
a progressive model for education serves as a touchstone for this
chapter, and its influence pervades the dissertation.
Chapter IV: Implications of Developmental Theory
for Setting an Optimal Environment in the Open Classroom
The dynamic of growth embodied in this theory relies on such
factors as cognitive conflict, structural match between subject
matter and learner, and opportunities for role-taking and for "testing
things out." Open classrooms, insofar as they encourage active and
individual confrontation of learning problems, as well as constructive
social interaction, would seem to have a natural potential to imple-
ment development. Chapter IV will therefore prescribe some optimal
environmental conditions for classroom learning implied by cognitive-
developmental theory. In particular, I will be discussing here impli-
cations for diagnosis, provisioning for learning, and organizing the
Open classroom, as well as examining such terms as "active" and
"discovery" learning.
Chapter V: Implications for Curriculum
in the Open Classroom
Curriculum innovation for informal schooling in both Britain
and the United States seems to have concentrated more in the early
grades, where, according to a Piagetian developmental schedule, the
concrete mode of intellectual operations dominates learning. One of
the contributions a comprehensive theory for Open Education can make
11
is to provide guidelines for curriculum design throughout all the
developmental stages. This chapter will begin by addressing the
problem of curriculum objectives that are stated too narrowly, both
in terms of grade range and of learning outcomes. Curriculum for
facilitating development must provide a variety of contexts for learn-
ing, and must define learning outcomes in several ways.
The dynamics of cognitive growth suggest that curriculum essen-
tially be thought of as problem-solving activity. This activity
varies according to how the problem is identified, and to the kind
of outcome that represents an adequate encounter with the problem.
Curriculum that sponsors problem-solving, inquiry behavior requires
subject matter that is cognitively challenging, and capable of engag-
ing the learner's interests over a substantial period bf time. Dewey's
ideas for an "occupations" curriculum acknowledges these requirements,
while linking them to a broad theme of social purpose. The latter
part of Chapter V will examine those ideas, as well as considering
some implications for evaluating curriculum.
Chapter VI: Implications for Teacher
Intervention in the Open Classroom
The interactionist aspect of developmental theory also suggests
certain optimal conditions for learning that involve the quality and
quantity of personal exchange, and in particular, of teacher-student
relationships in the classroom. There is already a body of
psychologi-
cal literature that speaks directly to this relationship,
and which
is frequently referred to by Open educators. Carl
Rogers is the leading
12
exponent of this so-called humanistic psychology, and terms like
"humanistic teaching" and "the helping relationship" have gained
wide currency through interest in the writing of Rogers and Arthur
Combs. The sixth chapter of this dissertation will seek to explore
the implications of our epistemological and psychological theory for
the teacher- learner relationship.
I will suggest here that Rogers' advocacy of non-directive
teaching is especially conducive to misinterpretation of the teacher-
learner relationship as a function of development. Perhaps more than
any other contributor to existing theory for Open Education, the
humanistic psychologist needs to be read critically and unsentimentally
His valuable suggestions for teacher practice, I will hold, can be
taken best advantage of within the framework of theory outlined earlier
The facilitation of learning is a crucial concept for Open educators,
and it needs to be defied in a broader context than that of psycho-
therapy and normative social psychology.
This thesis will rely heavily on the pedagogical writings of John
Dewey. The breadth and consistency of Dewey's thinking, taken as a
whole, can provide a consolidating and unifying perspective for the
theoretical foundations of contemporary Open Education. Far from
being obsolete in the light of more recent research findings that are
influencing Open educators, Dewey's notions of developmental stage
psychology, and his epistemology and learning theory, are now
increas-
ingly confirmed by the work of Piaget, Kohlberg, and others.
Like-
wise, Dewey's philosophical ideas, together with his
interpretations
13
of the social problems endemic to urban, bureaucratized society, are
still cogent and seminal to contemporary, liberal positions.
Dewey's field of inquiry was always broader than that of the
academics and professionals of today. Psychology and sociology were
only beginning to be considered as separate disciplines, apart from
philosophy, when Dewey developed his theories as a student and then
as a teacher. Furthermore, Dewey was not only a theorist but an
active and long-term critic of educational practice in the United
States and abroad. As he continued to elaborate and rearticulate
his philosophy of education, he was, at the same time, responding to
the problems he witnessed in implementing theory.
Dewey's vision had always been what we would today call a
holistic one. But the challenge to professionals and parents alike
who are attracted to Open Education demands this kind of vision.
There is also a great need here for a more uniform vocabulary--for
a greater evenness and substantive dialog among the various strains
of psychology that describe learning and teaching in an Open class-
room. While Dewey's prose style is sometimes cumbersome, his termin-
ology seldom mystifies, and he might serve us well in this capacity.
Several leading advocates of Open Education have had frequent
recourse to Dewey's writings for statements of theory in support of
their arguments. ^ Others who do not mention Dewey still manage to
sound surprisingly like him, though they lack his comprehensive vision
2E
.
g
. ,
Silberman (1971) and (1973); Nyquist (1972); Featherstone
(1971b); and Dennison (1969).
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if not his sophistication and incisiveness. Yet in the history of
American education, Dewey is more often associated with a movement
that never achieved its potential, and seemed, in so many instances,
to be ill-defined and unworkable. If Open Education is to embrace
theory that has in the past failed to produce the cumulative change
and sustained improvement that was hoped from it, it is imperative
for us to clearly identify and understand the reasons why a Deweyan
philosophy of education is any more suitable and practicable now
than it was before.
15
CHAPTER II
THE IDEOLOGICAL TEMPER OF
PROGRESSIVE EDUCATIONAL REFORM IN AMERICA
. . . everything begins in sentiment and assumption
and finds its issue in political action and institu-
tions. The converse is also true: just as sentiments
become ideas, ideas eventually establish themselves
as sentiments.
(Trilling, 1950, p. ix)
We cannot escape, then, the major task of our time--a
task which we have helped to shape--namely
,
that of
participating in historical actuality more consciously
and thus responsibly than have the generations before
us
.
(Erikson, 1964, p. 211)
Where the historian could be helpful, in my opinion, is
not by deeper but still inconclusive research into the
past, but by projecting alternative scenarios for the
future
.
(Lynd, 1968, p. 104)
To observe the Open Education movement, as an historical
phenomenon is to see it in an ideological context. Open Educa-
tion in America is a manifest part of the liberal politics and
the radical rhetoric that define an era in our recent history.
Open Education "arrived" in this country in the late 1960’s. As
methodology
,
it was primarily an import from England, known widely
as the Leicestershire model, or the Integrated Day, or just the
British Infant School. A series of articles in The New Republ ic
by Joseph Featherstone ably publicized these innovative
practices,
and educators like Lillian Weber made notable efforts to
analyze
16
and adapt them to American settings. 1 As ideology
, however, Open
Education did not need to cross the Atlantic for inspiration. The
Featherstone articles, and the signal interest in British schooling
that followed, were themselves preceded by a rash of criticism of our
own public education system, which uniformly called for more libertari-
an and egalitarian practices in the schools. There was already,
then, an atmosphere of reform ideology that easily embraced the
concept of an open, informal classroom where children might fulfill
their natural potential, instead of being stunted and alienated.
Open Education became a movement during a period of notable
social criticism and public activism. Educational critics were
calling for radical changes in the school's attitudes towards children
at a time when anti-war demonstrators, consumer advocates, and
ecology -minded citizens everywhere were loudly clamoring for changes
in governmental and industrial attitudes toward all living things.
As such, progressive reform in education has seemed inextricably
allied, both ideologically and politically, to the prevailing
energies of a broad movement in social reform. A remarkably similar
set of circumstances has been observed at least once before in this
country. During the two decades or so flanking the turn of the
century, Americans were also vitally concerned with consumer advocacy
^Joseph Feathers tone ' s articles appeared in The New Republic
numbers of August 19, September 2, and September 9, 1967, and were
later included in his book Schools Where Ch i Idr
e
n Learn (1971) . Lil -
lian Weber's contributions include a scholarly study, The English In-
fant School and Informal Education (1971), and her leadership in the
"Open Corridor" Program, described in Arthur J. Tobier et al., Learn-
in the Open Corridor" (1973).
^See Richard Hofstadter (1955, pp. 171-173).
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and conservation 3 (today termed ecology), as well as with education.
Historian Richard Hofstadter (1955) has spoken of this critical
period as a time when disillusionment with "progress" was formed
by an increasing awareness (made more acute by an economic depres-
sion) of social injustice. "The generation that went Progressive
was the generation that came of age in the nineties.
. . . William
Allen White remembered them in his autobiography as the 'hundreds
of thousands of young men in their twenties, thirties, and early
forties' whose 'quickening sense of the inequities, injustices, and
fundamental wrongs' of American society provided the motive power of
reform" (pp . 166-167). Reform in education seemed especially crucial.
"Progressive Education," explains Lawrence Cremin (1961)
,
"began
as part and parcel of that broader program of social and political
reform called the Progressive Movement. . . . The idea had its
origin during the quarter-century before World War I in an effort
to cast the school as a fundamental lever of social and political
regeneration. It began as a many-sided protest against a restricted
view of the school, but it was always more than this; for essentially
it viewed education as an adjunct to politics in realizing the promise
of American life" (p . 88).
A major contention of this chapter is that the manner in which
founding ideas for informal education evolve historically can pro-
foundly influence the practicability of these ideas, and their reception
3See Christopher Lasch (1965, pp. 162-163).
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by American school communities. Our propensity, in times of radical
protest and dissent, to propose "political solutions for cultural
problems and cultural solutions for political problems" (Lasch, 1965,
p. 163) makes it difficult to thoughtfully fashion educational
improvement that transcends partisan ideology and sentiment. In
this chapter I intend to present what appears to me to have constitu-
ted a four-part scenario for the phenomenon of progressive^ reform
movements in American education. One objective of this presentation
is to identify those aspects of progressive reform--of advocacy for
open, informal methods of schooling-- that are ultimately unproductive
and detrimental to the development of sound, acceptable pedagogy.
Basically, I will be examining how reform efforts have come about,
and what kind of thinking has contributed to reform ideology.
I think it is important to add two related thoughts here. In
the first place, the discussion that follows is not meant as an
exercise in second-guessing history. That is to say, it is my con-
tention that for improvement in the direction of informal schooling
to be realized it is necessary that we have "progressive movements"
—
for all the confusion and hostility, and the uneven, superficial
theorizing they engender. But what is also necessary is that some
consistent, informed, and pragmatic theoretical guidelines emerge
after the initial energies of reform movements succeed in establishing
^The word "progressive" here appears in lower case to denote a
generic kind of educational reform ethic, as opposed to the proper
noun denoting the name of a historical phenomenon, the Progressive
Movement
.
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a beachhead for change. I will be attempting, therefore, to identify
those factors in the historical development of reform ideology that
tend to preclude the emergence of viable and useful pedagogical
theory
.
Part 1: Social Criticism and the Schools
Educator James McDonald (1970) has claimed that "The concept of
an open school as a moral stance existed prior to the American
Progressive Education period, and it has continued on with the demise
of the leaders of progressivism" (p. 26). "Progressive education,
then or now, was and is a fundamentally ethical movement. . . .
The concept of an open school as the bridge for then and now, is a
moral statement. That is to say, it is unlikely that one would arrive
at this concept without overriding ethical concerns as one attempts
to construct social situations and technical conditions" (p. 24).
To be aware of the essentially moral quality of progressive education
is crucial to an understanding of both how such an educational move-
ment is ushered onto the public scene, and in what terms it is
defined.
When American institutions are perceived to be particularly
unresponsive- -and morally irresponsibl.e--social critics and would-be
social engineers converge on the schools. The school system has
always been the most accessible public institution in the United
States. Its life and operation are open to parents and community
they choose to be attentive), while almost anyone can presume to
speak
and be listened to about school issues. For the
progressive intellectual
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m particular, education can represent the ideal forum for sounding
off against the system, and for sounding out utopian ideas. The
typical line of progressive reasoning is that by instituting demo-
cratic school procedures, by cultivating the uncorrupted energies of
children, and by training them to become resourceful and ethical,
the school might turn out a new breed of citizen whose autonomy and
moral responsibility could make democracy more of a working reality.
Naturally this opportunity to criticize and suggest becomes more of
an imperative during times of perceived anomie.
Theodore Brameld (1965) has thus argued that during a period of
cultural crisis, "the second of the two major roles of education,
the role of modifying, or innovating /.the other being one of trans-
mitting/, becomes stronger. There is greater concern with the
causes and corrections of the dislocations that are chronic to crisis.
Simultaneously, education becomes both more diagnostic and prognostic,
in ways that remind us of medicine as it becomes involved in the
diagnosis and prognosis of a disease. A crisis is a time when, as
it were, the body politic becomes diseased. Education then becomes
concerned with its therapeutic functions to a much greater degree
than in normal times" (p. 13). While this argument represents no
more than an extension of John Dewey's "school-as-embryonic-community"
concept, the rhetoric is indicative of the way many contemporary
discussions of education are weighted.
The impetus for the essentially ethical tendencies in educational
reform trends has traditionally been a prevailing sense of social
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crisis. Lillian Weber (1971) has observed that we Americans are
only moved to review our public educational practice during "periods
of great social pressures--from the unemployed, from immigrants,
from 'cold war' competitive tensions, or as today from our racial
minorities
.
. (p . 234) . In all but one of these instances (the
effect of sputnik on American curriculum priorities), it was the
social pressures from disenfranchised or victimized populations that
prompted, in the name of freedom and equality, a call to overhaul
the educational system of the country. Large-scale immigration after
the Civil War necessitated more humane as well as efficient insti-
tutional means to accommodate a rapidly growing urban population.
The energies of the early Progressive educators, including John Dewey,
were explicitly directed to this problem. The Progressives of the
thirties responded to another dimension of inequality, and demanded
of the schools a greater effort towards democratizing society. It
is not surprising, then, that the issue of racial injustice which
has confronted Americans so dramatically in the sixties and seventies
also spawned an acute concern for changes in education.
The harbingers of ethical reform trends during the sixties were,
for the most part, critics of direct (and indirect) racial discrimina-
tion in urban public schools. It might be said, in fact, that the
ground for the ideological foundations of Open Education was dug by
a group of fairly young men—without much educational experience
who entered the schools, were repelled by the situation they found,
and wrote books about it. The titles tended towards the sensational,
but the message was the same: Our Children Are Dy_ing, Death at. fill
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JiiLr.ly, Age, How Children Fail , Crisis in the Classroom
. Nat Hentoff
(1966), Jonathan Kozol (1967), John Holt (1964)--as well as George
Dennison (1969) and James Herndon (1968) —all contributed valuable
spadework- -and Charles Silberman (1971) then drove in with a bulldozer.
The achievement of these critics was largely a journalistic
one, with the emphasis on first-hand reporting and common sense
analysis rather than systematic research and scholarship. What
bothered them most was the lack of sensitivity and justice that
characterized the attitudes towards children. All of these books
were best-sellers; Crisis in the Classroom
,
the one title that did
contain considerable documentation and research, as well as being the
bulkiest of the lot, was even a Book- of - the -Month Club selection.
Their cumulative effect was to sound an alarm, to broadcast a picture
of overwhe lming tedium, mechanical rigidity, narrow-minded or sense-
less directives, and authoritarian cruelty that prevailed in many
American classrooms. They also prompted a substantial number of lay-
men and professionals to look for ways to cure these ills.
The closest counterpart to these critics during the decade of
the nineties was probably Joseph Mayer Rice. Rice, as Lawrence
Cremin relates (1961, pp . 3-7), was a young pediatrician who had
become interested in innovative pedagogy. After publishing a few
opinionated pieces on public schooling in New York City, he was hired
by a magazine to write a series of articles appraising American public
education. Just as Charles Silberman was to do seventy-seven years
later, Rice made an exhaustive survey of the public schools, and
came to the conclusion that they were, for the most part,
woerully
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deficient and backward. Furthermore, Rice also scored the mechanical,
unthinking, and oftentimes harsh qualities of classroom practice.
Cremin reports that, as with Silberman and the others, Rice's opin-
ions were widely read and had substantial public impact. So too
did the opinions about education of contemporaries like Jane Addams
and journalist Randolph Bourne.'’ Indeed, as Richard Hofstadter
(1955) has pointed out, "to an extraordinary degree, the work of the
Progressive movement rested upon its journalism. The fundamental
critical achievement of American Progressivism was the business of
exposure, and journalism was the chief occupational source of its
creative writers. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the
Progressive mind was characteristically a journalistic mind, and
that its characteristic contribution was that of the socially
responsible reporter-reformer" (p . 186).
It would seem that the school critics of the 1960's are very
much the inheritors of this tradition, and have had some notably
similar effects on educational developments that followed in the
wake of their findings. But it must be noted that the task these
individuals undertook-- that of creating a climate of awareness and
receptivity to ideas for change--often conduces more to being
exhortative and compelling than hard-headed and thorough-minded.
In this respect, the tone characterizing efforts at exposure has been
^See Jane Addams, Democracy and Social E thics (1902) , and Ran-
dolph S. Bourne, Youth and Life (1913); also Lasch (1963) and
Cremin
(1961) on the impact of their writings.
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typically one of civic indignation and moral urgency, as the follow-
ing opinion, given not by a "reporter-reformer" but by a leading
professional exponent of Open Education, bears vivid witness to:
"It is easy enough to be dispassionate in considering broad social
and cultural influences upon our schools. It is not so easy to be
restrained when one is closely familiar with what certain practices
mean in the lives of individual children who become the victims of
their parents' and their teachers' ambitions. When the exploitation
becomes institutionalized
. .
." (Hull, 1971, p. 56). A highly
charged polemical approach to problem analysis, while necessary to
overcome the inertia of apathy, can adversely influence the degree
of tact and thoughtfulness with which positions are formulated and
programs organized. The work of the socially responsible reporter-
reformer in both eras has led to exciting new concepts for public
education, but has also helped set some unfortunate precedents for the
manner in which these concepts are explored and implemented. For, as
we shall see, the achievement of the initial phase of the educational
reform phenomenon has been in part to commit constructive energies
to an ideology of reaction, and to a program founded on antithesis.
Part 2: Reform Pedagogy
The second phase of the phenomenon involves the promulgation of
new principles upon which change will be based. While my rhetorical
strategy here might imply a strict chronology for these "phases, in
fact they are often coterminous. My point is that while ideas for
changing educational practices are continually afloat during such
times, significant receptivity to them is determined by a certain
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momentum of ideological conviction and public sentiment. I have
suggested that the role of critical journalism, during a period of
social disquiet, is precisely to create such momentum. In reality,
one can see throughout the reform phenomenon— from the onset of
criticism and exposure, to the restatement of educational objectives,
their reception, and the inevitable tendency towards orthodoxy--a
sequence of causality that is characterized more by sheer impetus
than by a logical and well-considered continuity.
The humanistic approach . Typically, advocates of progressive
reform argue from two basic and related standpoints: a humanistic,
child-centered approach, and a social-meliorist approach. Jane
Addams (1902) took a typically humanistic position in stating "We
are impatient with the schools which lay all the stress on reading
and writing, suspecting them to rest upon the assumption that the
ordinary experience of life is worth little, and that all knowledge
and interest must be brought to the children through the medium of
books. Such an assumption fails to give the children any clew to
the life about him, or any power to usefully or intelligently connect
himself with it" (pp . 180-181). Her contemporary, Joseph Rice (1893),
hammered out a distinction between old-fashioned, ineffective "mechani-
cal" schools, and the innovative "scientific" schools that produced
startling results in the teaching of reading and writing--because
they attended to "the laws of mental development" and treated chil-
dren more humanely (p. 21). ^ "While the aim of the old education,
6 In the next chapter I will claim that the laws of mental develop-
ment are of signal importance to educators. But I would draw a
crucial
distinction between the substantiating research available to Rice,
and
that available at present.
26
Rice argued, "is mainly to give the child a certain amount of informa-
tion, the aim of the new- education is to lead the child to observe,
to reason, and to acquire manual dexterity as well as to memorize
facts--in a word, to develop the child naturally in all his faculties,
intellectual, moral, and physical.
. .
.
_/i/n these schools the
teacher is guided in her work by the nature of the child mind . . ."
(p. 95). Randolph Bourne, the well-known social critic for the New
Republic
,
abetted the cause somewhat later with opinions on the ideal
relationship of educators to children like this one: "The best
thing they can do for /the children/ is to feed their curiosity, and
provide them with all the materials that will stimulate their varied
interests. They can then leave the 'influence' to take care of itself"
(Lasch, 1965, p. 89).
It is significant that none of the three critics were, strictly
speaking, educators--or even psychologists. Contemporary educators
like Dewey and Francis Parker had, to be sure, more balanced and
sophisticated notions on the role of curiosity and self- initiative
in education, and we will have occasion to refer to some of them in
subsequent chapters. But Parker and his pioneering school in Quincy,
Massachusetts, were rendered to the reading public largely through
the pen of journalists like Rice, just as Bourne and others served
importantly as publicists for Deweyan ideas. Hofstadter and Cremin
observe also that even the professionals directly involved with
pedagogical research often employed a heavy-handed rhetoric that was
just as tendentious as that of their journalist advocates. Gathering
evidence from the writing of Parker, psychologist G. Stanley Hall,
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and Dewey ("My Pedagogic Creed"), Hofstadter (1966) concludes that
the new education was presented to the world not simply as an
instrumentality but as a creed, which went beyond the hope of this
or that strictly educational result to promise some kind of ultimate
salvation for individuals or for the race" (pp. 366-367).
While there is not present today such an evangelical climate
underlying the efforts of proponents for reform, Open Education has
been ushered onto the American scene in much the same way: with a
wave of declamations for the rightness, if not the righteousness, of
discovery learning and curricula based on children's needs. And
all too frequently, terms like "need," "interest," and "freedom" are
used with no more exactitude than is necessary to affirm essentially
libertarian sentiments. John Holt has perhaps become one of the most
widely recognized propagandists for radical school reform, and his
mission seems to be to point out the general absurdity of school
curriculum and the dishonesty inherent in schools themselves (1964,
pp. 170-181). Subject matter and didactic teaching, Holt has argued,
actually preclude opportunities for a child to be "learning naturally,
following his curiosity where it leads him, adding to his mental
model of reality whatever he needs and can find a place for, and
rejecting without fear or guilt what he does not need. . . .' (p. 178).
In a similar vein, educator Charles Rathbone (1971) suggests
that "the child learns best when given freedom to explore the world
around him, with a minimum of direction from others" (p . 100). Thus,
he contends that practitioners of Open education should reject «_he
traditional notion of 'coverage' as it affects school curriculum,
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along with the implication that "there exists some inherently
indispensable body of knowledge that every single child should know.
Both these implications they reject" (p. 103).
It would be unfair to Holt and Rathbone not to allow the legi-
timacy of their criticism regarding the decidedly arbitrary and often
artificial ways that curriculum is organized in public schools. Fur-
ther, I would agree that "coverage," taken by itself, is hardly an
adequate goal for instruction. Yet an antithesis between prescribed
curriculum content and idiosyncratic development is clearly implied
in both arguments, while no justifications are offered save for a
tacit assumption that such claims are self-evident. To argue that
children can learn only that which seems to them relevant, however,
or learn "best" when given their heads, is simply to ignore one's
own varied experience as a learner, and all that we know and have
found interesting only because circumstances pressed us to examine
or study it.^ In fact, these statements about children and learning
recall the arguments of Randolph Bourne and the other early advocates
of informal schooling, toward which Hofstadter (1966) directed the
following criticism: "the concept of individual growth became a
hostage in the hands of educational thinkers who were obsessed with
the chi Id- centered school." For it "invited educational thinkers to
set up an invidious contrast between self-determining, self -directing
growth from within, which was good, and molding from without, which
^The issue of school-set curriculum objectives will be discussed
at greater length in Chapter 5.
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was bad" (p. 373).
Hofstadter saw the issue as essentially romantic, setting up "an
antithesis between the development of the individua l--his sensibility,
the scope of his fancy, the urgency of his personal growth--and the
imperatives of the social order, with its demand for specified bodies
of knowledge, prescribed manners and morals, and a personal equipment
suited to traditions and institutions. Theirs /the Progressives//
was a commitment to the natural child against artificial society"
(p . 368). Most arguments for change presented by progressive apolo-
gists conform to this mold: schools that impose physical and social
restraints (desks in rows, no talking), rely heavily on a prepared
curriculum, and mediate learning exclusively through the teacher and
the textbook, are oppressive and ineffective, and need to be replaced
by those that encourage freedom to talk and move about, sponsor a
need-oriented and experience-based curriculum, and emphasize discovery
learning. While there are indeed important implications contained
within this assessment, the tendency for educational reform theory
is to stop short of a rigorous application of psychological research
and philosophical method. Instead, we often find examples of "over-
simplification from inadequate knowledge," usually in defense of a
learning process which, as one reviewer has alleged, a "romantic
educational reformer" like John Holt mistakenly confuses with educa-
tion (McCracken, 1970, p. 46).
The social meliorist approach . If the humanistic position
states
an oversimplified case for progressive reform with
respect to child
development, there is another approach to reform
that has also generated
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considerable reductionist thinking. I allude here to the perspective
that sees the problems in public schooling as stemming from a pre-
vailing sense of reason, scientific method, and rational purpose in
the management of social institutions. This perspective describes
education as much from a societal point of view as from an individual
libertarian standpoint, and focuses on the level of institutional
needs moreso than upon psychological ones. Critics who maintain such
a focus are often regarded as rather utopian "social engineers;"
ideologically, however, they are more frequently liberal (like a
Charles Silberman) than radical (like a Paul Goodman).
John Dewey (1928) provides a definitive argument from this
social-meliorist orientation: "if one conceives that a social order
different in quality and direction from the present is desirable and
that schools should strive to educate with social change in view by
producing individuals not complacent about what already exists, and
equipped with desires and abilities to assist in transforming it,
quite a different method and content /than in a 'static educational
system// is indicated for educational science" (p. 119). During the
early Progressive period, this conviction was shared by a significant
sector of the business and industrial community, as well as by aca-
demics and journalists. Historian Joel Spring (1970) points out that
such individuals "had in common the vision of a corporate society
dependent upon specialization and cooperation" (p. 54). What such a
vision meant for the reform-minded was that "traditional notions of
rugged and independent individualism had to be replaced with the ideal
of the socialized, cooperative man who worked for the good of the whole
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society," and who could contribute his special skill within the
increasingly bureaucratic organization of corporate enterprise (p.
54). The first goal of the educators and the social reformers who
adopted this vision of the well ordered society was to change the
/presumed/ basis of human motivation from desire for economic gain
to unselfish interest in working for the good of society" (p. 55).
Since the mid 20th century, complacency and apathy have been
perceived to be at least as vitiating as unscrupulous economic
behavior. But we should nonetheless recognize in those early Pro-
gressive reform sentiments strong resemblances to the liberal rhetoric
of President Kennedy's Inaugural Address, and the Great Society
plans of the Johnson administration. Charles Silberman's important
study (1971) was in large part an outgrowth of the latter, and it
is to Silberman's conclusions regarding the conditions necessary for
change in education, and to certain tendencies in liberal reform
thought in general, that I should now like to turn.
Along with his exposure of incompetence in the public schools,
Silberman made (as did Rice before him) significant efforts to des-
cribe what good schooling might be like. He visited several schools
where children seemed happy and attentive, and where he found some
dramatic results in learning achievement. Joseph Rice had assumed
that inefficient and oppressive teaching traditions could be corrected
if the schools would embrace scientific laws of child development--a
more reasoned, enlightened approach to education. The core of Charles
Silberman's critique of public education many years later follows a
similar logic. If the problem is mindlessness, Silberman suggests
32
that "the solution must lie in infusing the schools, and the other
educating institutions, with purpose--more important, with thought
about purpose, and about the ways in which techniques, content, and
organization fulfill or alter purpose" (1971, p. 379).
Open Education has already demonstrated how techniques, content,
and organization may fulfill or alter purpose. One role of theory
for Open Education can be to articulate, in forms that are communica-
ble and inherently meaningful, how this process might be understood,
and thence be transferred and implemented elsewhere. Here, then, I
believe Silberman* s advice is fairly well-taken. But what about
the injunction to infuse schools with purpose, and with thought about
purpose? How, in fact, do we inject mindfulness into education? Has
this not been an enduring goal of educators since Socrates, and is
it not therefore rather idle to propose nothing more instructive
than this? "The public school system is generally harmful and destruc-
tive, as Silberman says. But," as Allen Graubard (1972) asserts, his
analysis of causes— that people have forgotten to think about the
purposes of education (apparently waiting for Charles Silberman,
backed by $300,000 of Carnegie money, to remind them to think) . . .
/is/ totally inadequate" (pp. 256-257).
Lionel Trilling (1950) has observed that "It is one of the
tendencies of liberalism to simplify, and this tendency is natural m
view of the effort which liberalism makes to organize the
elements of
life in a rational way" (p . xii) . Both Dewey and Silberman
shared
this trait, but their persistently clearheaded explanations
of the
mechanics of social melioration (as through the schools,
for example)
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led them to blanket diagnoses of "the problem" that were too reductive
and abstracted. As Joseph Featherstone (1972) points out, Dewey
vaguely and misleadingly" identified the common social pursuit as
'"the method of intelligence'" (p. 31). While I will argue in the
next chapter that an appreciation of Dewey's conception of the method
of intelligence is indeed essential to the improvement of schooling
methods, Featherstone s point is still well-taken. For such a commen-
tary on the dynamic of social progress as Dewey's is in actuality no
more he lp fu
1
than Silberman's theory of mindlessness.
As I suggested earlier, the tendency to locate the source of
institutional failings in a condition of inconsistent purpose and
unreasoned behavior has not been uncommon to American social criticism.
Liberal intellectuals have long observed the waste and the injustice
that accrue from ill-reasoned and arbitrary methods of institutional
management. But the liberal's faith in the efficacy of scientifically-
informed, purposeful planning to accomplish constructive social change
has often revealed two faults. One is an indifference to the dictates
of bureaucratic politics; the other, an insensitivity to potential
class antagonisms and conflict of interest.
In their enthusiasm for and commitment to social engineering,
liberal intellectuals have often betrayed a kind of cause-and-ef feet
logic that relies more on a sense of the moral rightness of their posi-
O
tions than on historical and political acumen. Richard Kofstadter
8In point of fact, social reformers like Addatns and Dewey had
often shown themselves quite skillful in playing at politics to secure
continued support for their respective ventures.
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(1966) remarked, apropos of the Progressive Education Movement, that
what is important in a practical sphere like education is very often
not so much the character of a philosophy or creedal commitment as
certain questions of emphasis and proportion which arise in trying
to execute it; and there is no automatic way of deriving a sense of
proportion from a body of ideas. For example, the early spokesmen
of the new education demanded that the child be respected, but it was
difficult to say where respect might end and a kind of bathetic
reverence might begin" (p . 368). Hofstadter's argument implicitly
recommends the pragmatic approach to the problems of educational
reform that characterized Dewey's work at the Laboratory School of
the University of Chicago. Yet it would seem, judging from the
ideologically authoritarian tone of several current apologists for
informal schooling (all their disclaimers to the contrary ) , that we
are ignoring the experiences of the past, and merely repeating the
mistakes born of zeal.
One other significant characteristic of progressive reform
schemes (both past and present) has been the tendency to expect too
much from any one public institution, or cultural event, tnat the
liberal intellectual feels can be manipulated to the advantage of
libertarian and egalitarian causes. Ethical concerns in Ameiican
educational reform have often led to some rather doctrinaire theoriz-
ing, especially when the schools have been looked upon as levers for
^E.g., the rhetorical strategy of Barth (1971, 1972) and Rath-
bone (1971a, 1971b) of claiming to speak for the culled professional
opinions of the best Open classroom teachers.
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social change. Allen Graubard’s commentary (1972) on libertarian
theory for free schools applies, I believe, to a much broader context
of educational reform phenomena. "The theory itself," he insists,
depends too much on a rhetoric that projects unrealistic expectations.
The social and psychological penetration of the theory is often
shallow. What I mean is that, as with the spirit of educational
reform thinkinking in general, there is an overemphasis on the school,
whether good or bad, as a shaper of attitudes and behavior" (p. 163).
A perspective like this," he adds later, "can generate a mood which
can be seriously misleading. It misconceives the nature of culture
by implying that a new one can be willed into existence by a small,
well-meaning group of good people . . ." (p. 165). Richard Hofstadter
(1966) maintained the same opinion with regard to the Progressive
Education movement: "The notion that the authoritative classroom
would of necessity produce the conformist mind and that sociable
learning would produce the ideally socialized personality is at first
appealing, but there is about it a kind of rigid rationality of the
sort that life constantly eludes. ... To expect that education
would so simply produce a hoped-for personal type was to expect more
than past experience warranted" (p. 385).
The principle achievement of liberal thought with respect to
educational reform has probably been to impose some critical clarity
on situations that have grown muddled and counter-productive. Its
shortcomings are related to its tendency to polarize issues and its
penchant for antagonistic rhetoric. Dewey, in fact, frequently felt
obliged to caution against concentrating the energies of reform
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pedagogy agai nst "traditional” schooling. It is a telling comment
that ten years after he had admonished the Progressive Education
movement to develop a positive, prescriptive, and consistent pedagogy
(1928, pp. 113-120), we find him observing, in Experience and Educa -
^ion (1938a), that "there is always the danger in a new movement that
in rejecting the aims and methods of that which it would supplant,
it may develop its principles negatively rather than positively and
constructively. Then it takes its clew in practice from that which
is rejected instead of from the constructive development of its own
philosophy" (p . 20).
Unfortunately, Charles Silberman's assessment of fairly recent
educational reform strategies attests to just this kind of behavior.
Silberman contends that because of their "failure to study educational
history, particularly the history of progressivism' s successes and
failures, . . . contemporary reformers repeated one of the fundamental
errors of the progressive movement; they perpetuated the false dicho-
tomy that the schools must be either child-centered or subject-
centered" (1971, p. 180). Education, for all its impressive beginnings,
would seem to be courting the same kinds of results, judging from some
of the statements cited earlier by influential figures like Holt and
v
Rathbone .
^
*'°Not only does ideological sides-taking seem endemic to the
educational reform phenomenon, but there is also a tendency to justify
partisan arguments with intuitive truths, or a sometimes spurious kind
of reasoning. A widely published list of philosophical premises for
Open Education like Roland Barth's "Assumptions" (in Barth, 1972), ior
instance, provides an instructive example of the former. While Barth
himself is suitably modest and tentative about the validity of these
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Part 3: Responses to Reform
Just as they are susceptible to polemicism, vagueness, senti-
mentality, and political ingenuousness, liberal efforts to establish
new directions for pedagogical theory are also hampered--and at times
sabotaged-
-by a class-specific way of setting down educational objectives
for all of American society. For example, when Charles Silberman
(1971) observes that "Our concept of education reflects our concept
of the good life, the good man, and the good society . .
. (p. 389),
his contention is quite vaiid--but unless it is developed in the
context of a plurality of value-orientations, it is empty of much
meaning. For there are, of course, many different visions of the
good life, just as there are different economic stations from which
such visions emanate.
Joseph Featherstone (1971a) has addressed this issue cogently,
and I shall begin my discussion of the third aspect of the reform
phenomenon- -the ways in which the curious mixture of progressive
educational theory and rhetoric is received and interpreted--by quot-
ing him at some length.
The American milieu is polarized culturally and politically;
this polarization conditions American responses to accounts
of informal teaching. The responses tend to fall into the
appealing premises (he does, after all, call them only assumptions),
the emphatic, almost dogmatic tone in which they are couched and the
format in which they are presented--rather like geometric axioms--
augurs a somewhat less discerning approach than Charles Rathbone,
sounding much like Dewey, wisely suggests we take. Mr. Bai.th s
reflections," Rathbone cautions, " . • • point out the need for
ther systematic analysis of the theories underlying this
educational
movement" (editor's preface to Barth, 1971, p. 116).
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stereotyped categories of a cultural cold war raging between
the hip, emancipated upper middle class and the straight
middle and working class. It is a class and cultural con-
flict, and it takes the form of battles between those who
see life as essentially a matter of scarcity--and defend
the virtues of a scarce order, such as thrift, discipline,
hard work--and those who see life as essentially abundant--
and preach newer virtues, such as openness, the cultivation
of feelings, and spontaneity. Hip people like the idea of
open classrooms
; because they seem to give children freedom;
straight people fear the absence of order, discipline, and
adult authority, (p. 22)
Historically, there has probably always been such a tension in
the formulation of educational goals for America. Up to the turn
of the century, as Oscar Handlin points out (1959), reform-minded
educators confronted a situation where "the culture communicated
through the school was unrelated to the life of its students" (p.
32) . Handlin alludes to the manners and attitudes that distinguished
"gentility and quality"--imp lying that class discrimination was
indeed institutionalized in the schools, and that gentlemanly virtues
were passed off as proper educational goals for everyone. The efforts
of the early Progressives were in large part aimed at moving educa-
tional objectives in line with economic and social realities.
Interestingly, this action was supported by significant repre-
sentation from the industrial sector, and not just for charitable
purposes. Joel Spring (1970) notes that "the vision of a corporate
society dependent, upon specialization and cooperation was a common
ground for both educator and industrialist. "Large corporate business
men and labor leaders supported this progressive movement because it
rationalized the social and economic system and assured the recognition
of their place in society" (p. 54). To be sure, for many Progressive
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educational leaders whose motives for reform were primarily ethical,
the goal of "specialization" was not a paramount one. In the Dewey
School, for example, children were encouraged not to specialize but
to experience skill-development in complete and natural ways, and to
develop a variety of skills. Cohen and Lazerson (1972) argue that
Dewey had in fact "contended that work in an industrial society,
'especially in cities,' was 'anti-educational,' because it took
its definition from the needs of the economy, rather than individual
or social needs" (p. 60).
'*''*
But such change in cultural attitudes, even when advanced for
economic reasons as well as for moral and ethical ones, has to be
accomplished in the arena of conflict that Featherstone spoke to.
And progressive reform, no matter how egalitarian it has claimed to
be, has always been criticized as being in reality more suited to
the life and learning styles of the middle and upper-middle classes.
Thus, while the early Progressive Movement had contributed substan-
tially to reorienting educational objectives in the name of democracy
^Nonetheless
,
the connection between libertarian and humanistic
rhetoric and the changing requirements of the economy needs to be con-
sidered as a countervailing force amidst the generally antagonistic
thrust of progressive reform movements. Cohen and Lazerson argue, for
instance, that the current emphasis on play as legitimate classroom
activity is tied to "the changing character of productive activity.
The increasingly technological nature of production has created a
demand for a more highly trained and differentiated labor force, en-
gaged not only in goods production, but also in the production of cul-
ture, socialization, and welfare. Among the new strata of workers,
labor has become more technological, cerebral, and mobile, and has
created more room for leisure. Not only must the training period of
such a labor force be extended, but the kind of training must be
changed. An emphasis on 'creativity' replaces a pure emphasis on
discipline" (p. 62).
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and science, by the 1920 's Progressive schools had already been
criticized for being elitist. One of the critics was John Dewey.
"Upon the whole," Dewey would summarize in 1930,
progressive schools have been most successful in furthering
creativeness’ in the arts--in music, drawing and picture
making, dramatics and literary composition, including
poetry. This achievement is well worth while; it ought to
assist in producing a generation esthetically more sensi-
tive and alive than the older one. But it is not enough.
Taken by itself it will do something to further the private
appreciations of, say, the upper section of a middle class.
But it will not serve to meet even the esthetic needs and
defaultings of contemporary industrial society in its
prevailing external expressions. (pp. 222-223)
Whether or not advocates of Open Education consider their
ideas for innovation in the schools appropriate to some groups more
than others, most American communities probably still reflect ambi-
valent attitudes about the role of education. And it does not really
matter then, as Roland Barth implied it might, that once you explain
that your "reasons" for changing the schools are not radical in
either a political or a cultural sense, you can go on to sell your
new methods. Barth (1972) argued that "Whereas the methods employed
in some free schools and the methods advocated by open educators may
frequently intersect, the reasoning through which these methods evolved
is quite different. Free schools have usually been established to
provide an alternative to the cultural setting characterizing most
public schools" (p . 12).
While this may be true enough, Barth's outlook was somewhat
naive, and it begged the questions that Featherstone raised. For the
fact that Open Education's methods have always been integrally connected
(by Roland Barth among others) to philosophical, epistemological and
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psychological premises that are no less radical than those of most
free schools suggests that the distinction is far from being a hard
one. Indeed, the terms liberal and radical, as applied to educational
reform positions, are often difficult to distinguish.^ Dewey, for
example, considered himself a political liberal with an avowed faith
in measured, organic change, to be achieved within existing institu-
tional frameworks. Yet at bottom his ideas for democratizing the
schools, and fostering self-reliance and autonomy in the thinking of
students, were part of a distinct tradition of radical American
thought. Most American communities were decidedly not ready for a
full dose of the Deweyan remedy for educational problems, and the
history of the Progressive Movement in education is an account of how
the dosage was continually diluted and contaminated.
The conclusion reached by hard-headed critics of informal educa-
tion must be that "to the extent that schools are symbols, open
schools are not for all communities" (Bane, 1972, p. 280). And if
a school is conceived and managed in such a way as to call attention
^Actually, current educational radicals like Goodman and Holt
show a certain populist strain (as opposed to the more urbanized Pro-
gressive tendency towards centralization and organization) in their
advocacy of free, neighborhood schools, and decentralization as a
policy that automatically improves things by breaking away from un-
wieldy, as well as unresponsive, bureaucratic institutions. Here,
criticisms of schooling practices may be seen as an attack on the
drift towards a perceived cultural totalitarianism that corporate
politics in an advanced technological society can create. The indi-
vidual's autonomy, traditionally a basic cultural value in America,
is now seen to be threatened by dehumanized institutions, repressive
bureaucratic constraints, and the tyranny of mediated public opinion
and tastes. Although this view has historical roots in the social
analysis of Thorstein Veblen, a contemporary and colleague of Dewey
at the University of Chicago, the main tenor of liberal Progressive
reform in eduation was somewhat different.
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to its symbolic characteristics, while perhaps obscuring its commit-
ment to more commonly held goals of learning achievement, that school
will succeed in generating at least some hostility and friction in
almost any community. Unfortunately, the symbolic quality in pro-
gressive reform efforts is engendered at the outset--in the inflated
rhetoric of liberal journalists and radical critics. Thereafter, it
is perpetuated by the tendency, on the part of professionals and lay-
men alike, to reduce often complicated and sophisticated concepts to
cliches and dogma. I have suggested that this tendency is inevitable,
given the basically antithetical cast to the formulation and promul-
gation of founding principles for progressive reform.
In Open Education and the American School (1972)
,
Roland Barth
echoed the cautionary remarks of both Featherstone and Dewey in some
comments that speak to reform couched in antagonistic rhetoric. Such
expression, Barth observed, "frequently results in a polarization of
issues, practices, and people, forcing teachers, parents, administra-
tors, and children to 'choose up sides.' . . . _/T/he idea of choosing
between two extremes inhibits flexibility, maximizes threat, and cre-
ates political and personal tensions which can only impede efforts
to move toward more informal classrooms" (p . 216). When a progressive
philosophy of education (or its statements of principle) is presented
in manifesto style, it is inevitably leading too aggressively with
its chin.
Writing in 1952 about the mounting attacks on Progressive Educa-
tion, Dewey put the movement in a much warranted social-historical
perspective. "The educational system is part of the common life
and
43
cannot escape suffering the consequences that flow from the condi-
tions prevailing outside the school building. When repressive and
reactionary forces are increasing in strength in all our other insti-
tutions economic, social and political— it would be folly to expect
the school to get off free" (p . 129). To an important extent it is,
as Dewey testifies, impossible to isolate the study of education and
the challenge to improve its practice from the social milieu and the
course of events. It is, however, also difficult to ascertain, from
this statement of Dewey's, how clearly his hindsight enabled him to
understand those ways in which the Progressive Movement in education
itself made it more difficult "to get off free."
Part 4: Ideology and Orthodoxy
There is, as several educators have noted, a tendency for
reform programs to harden into orthodoxies. Such a development can
have unfortunate consequences for extended professional growth and
self-examination, and when it occurs in the cause of informal educa-
tion, the irony is especially grating. "Commitment to orthodoxies,
asserts Robert Goldhammer (1969) ,
is well documented by the metaphorical pendulum that is
known to thrash back and forth through educational
theory. The most familiar contemporary example of how
an orthodoxy was formed and of the chaos it produced
exists in the educators' adoption of John Dewey's think-
ing and of the travesties of PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION that
followed. The pattern is for a fervent commitment to a
body of theory to arise, for simple elements of the
theory (that seem to make sense) to be isolated, and for
practices to be innovated around such elements which
inevitably bear no sensible relationship to the parent
theory, (p. 32)
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The pattern Goldhammer alludes to is an illustration of how
the rhetorical climate of educational reform can serve to pose and
prioritize the problems to be dealt with- in terms less precise and
less studied than are necessary to be truly useful. Goldhammer has
put his finger on a process of interpretation and implementation in
which some elegant theorizing can be reduced or prostituted, under
circumstances that mitigate vital ideas through pressures from popu-
lar causes and the need to be innovative. As Christopher Lasch
(1965) remarked, "The sentimentality that ran through so much of the
progressive world view ... is never more apparent than at such
moments as . . . when the 'quest for adventure' that Jane Addams and
others invested with such complicated and subtle meaning seemed
finally to dissolve into the cliches which the phrase itself so
readily calls to mind" (p . 244).
Roland Barth, who had initially appeared as a leading advocate
and codifier of founding principles for Open Education, then as
a wiser-for-wear practitioner telling us to tone down our tactics,
most recently takes the stance that good informal practice is more
intuitive than anything else, that the greatest hindrance to Open
Education is precisely its identity as a movement, and therefore we
need to "forget about open education." Barth feels that we have
a lready created an orthodoxy of Open EduCation--"one more rigid
formula for reform that can be imposed on the schools from outside.
This," he adds philosophically, "is educational reform the American
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way" ( 1973 , p. 58). 13
Barth s point is a trenchant one, for it alludes not only to
the ideological nature of American educational reform, but also to
our propensity to standardize process so as to make it more a pro-
duct--which then can be reproduced and marketed by the textbook and
school supplies industry. The American Open classroom is modelled
too much upon what it sees in British infant schools (e.g., learning
centers, manipulable materials for math and science, rugs on the
floor, etc.), and "explained" too frequently with a kind of Madison
Avenue superficiality. Barth concludes that "To the extent that we
are preoccupied with the English model or our own orthodoxy regard-
ing education, we neglect students in the classrooms. Trying to
identify, adopt, adapt, or simulate open classrooms is the easy and
less promising road to educational reform, and it is one that relieves
us of the responsibility of hard work, precision, scrutiny, and
autonomous decision making" (p . 59 ).
Some of Barth's advice to eschew the movement syndrome in
American education may be overstated--the result of disappointed ex-
pectations where plans had been too hopefully formulated, and too
ingenuously implemented. The way for schools to embrace the best
approaches to good informal methods and more effective curricula is
not by turning inwards, or by studiously ignoring the implications of
research that did not occur in classroom situations. Barth s concern
13Compare with Dewey's advice that "those who are looking ahead
to a new movement in education . . . should think in terms of Educa-
tion itself rather than in terms of some 'ism about education, even
such an 'ism as ' progressivism'" (1938a, p. 6).
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is most properly focused on the disposition of teachers and other
educational professionals to a kind of functional subservience-be
it to teacher's manuals, prescribed curriculum, or the dictates of
a new orthodoxy. The danger inherent in the latter, as Barth the
school principal knows, is manifested in a staff of anxious teachers
wondering if they're teaching the "open" way.
The other latent danger in educational orthodoxies is that they
contain, within their own terminology, the means for self-deception
and complacency on the part of practitioners. I have argued at some
length that progressive reform is in large part a language--a rhetoric--
with a high investment in persuasion. And as Richard Poirier (1971)
observes, "The confidence ... in labels reveals how the form of
an argument can deny the realities that need to be confronted" (p . x) .
We have witnessed how Progressive Education failed, over the long
run, to evolve viable and enduring forms of informal practice,
foundering eventually in the shallow depths of its undeveloped in-
sights and applications. What remains most conspicuously from the
Progressive Movement in education is the collection of appealing
cliches that initially expressed the promise of important change (and
which now, somewhat ominously, seem to have a renewed currency with
Open educators) . Unfortunately, then, it would seem that the progres-
sive rhetorical tendency is to deny history as a teacher. But pro-
gressivism must transcend rhetoric, for rhetorically-based movements
have proven either politically vulnerable, or too easily flattened
and contained. As Marcuse (1968) suggests, the task for progressive
reform must involve "the translation of values into technical tasks
(p. 232).
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This chapter has reviewed some essential aspects of the pro-
gressive educational reform phenomenon: its beginnings, its
attempts to define itself, and some conditions it creates for it-
self. At the start, I noted that essentially ethically-motivated
reform trends usually appear as politicized concerns to many Ameri-
cans, and that during times of social "crisis"--as the late 1890' s and
the late I960' s-through-early-1970' s are generally perceived to be--
ethical concerns are often expressed polemically. When the impetus
for change is created and sustained in an atmosphere of tendentious
rhetoric and sentimental philosophizing, it is difficult to establish
effective theoretical guidelines for practicable school reform.
Contemporary reformers like Holt, Barth and Rathbone have
shown themselves to be typically astute observers of children, and
fairly knowledgeable students of learning psychology. It is the kind
of inferences they often draw from basically sound observations that
needs to be received critically, for advocates of informal schooling
frequently make unjustified leaps from observations to prescriptions--
from how children fail to how children learn, and from intuitions
about learning to theories about schooling. Such uneven theorizing
is liable to the kind of criticism R. S. Peters (1969) levied on the
implicit ideology of the "Plowden R.eport," the frequently cited
statement recommending informal education in British primary schools.
"My contention," states Peters, "is that this summary of a 'recogniz-
able educational philosophy' proliferates in important half-truths
that are paraded as educational panaceas" (p . 3).
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In John Dewey's case, to be sure, there was from the start a
lack of substantial research in cognitive development to support his
theories of experimental learning, as well as any significant prece-
dent in informal schooling through which theory could be tested,
refined, and extended. The United States in the 1970's presents a
different potential for progressive educational reform, if only for
the fact that those two supporting conditions Deweyan progressives
had lacked are now effective: namely, fifty years of notable research
in the development of intelligence in children, and the examples of
the British primary schools and their scattered American counterparts.
The question is whether or not efforts to develop and extend informal
schooling at present will adhere to the same patterns as before, and
become so strongly identified with ideological (rather than pedagogi-
cal) notions as to render them vulnerable to shifts in political mood,
if net to backlash from the effects of cultural tensions that "liberat-
ing trends" so easily aggravate. So far, as Barth has observed, "If
'open classroom' has been the banner that rallied advocates of a more
humane, informal, and productive educational experience for children,
it has also become a red flag" (1973, p. 59).
Two broad imperatives d_o appear clear for the future success
of progressive educational reform efforts. The first refers to the
disposition for sides-taking, and suggests the necessity to work
towards avoiding invidious comparisons and politically-charged labels,
and evolving directions for practice that are not founded solely on a
standard of contrasts. There is a corresponding need to transcend
creedal commitments and to guard against doctrinaire and arbitraiy
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policy-making for reform. It is the intention of this dissertation
to suggest theoretical guidelines, based on a model of development,
that are responsive to both these imperatives.
In 1930 John Dewey issued what was both a warning and a challenge
to progressive educational reform. My feeling is that Dewey's comments
are just as appropriate, and just as noteworthy, for Open Education
today. If, he argued, progressive schools become complacent with
existing accomplishments, unaware of the slight foundation of know-
ledge upon which they rest, and careless regarding the amount of
study of the laws of growth that remains to be done, a reaction
against them is sure to take place" (p. 222). The potential for ad-
verse reaction to informal schooling is certainly with us now, as it
should be. It will become increasingly realized as educators delay,
or simply fail, to translate into sensible and viable classroom prac-
tice the theoretical foundations that do now exist, but are too often
misconstrued, or ignored. The next chapter, therefore, will attempt
a selective study of "the laws of growth" in intelligence that may
be instrumental in guiding practice for informal classrooms. I have
chosen, in this dissertation, to emphasize ontogenetic theory--rather
than social and political ideas--as the most appropriate focus for
the growth of Open Education. That is, Open pedagogy, having been
conceived largely in ethical terms, now requires a deeper, more pro-
foundly psychological foundation to make its ethical bias a coherent
part of a larger understanding of how education may best serve demo-
cratic purposes.
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CHAPTER III
A COGNITIVE
-DEVELOPMENTAL FRAMEWORK FOR
OPEN EDUCATIONAL THEORY
. . . the existing evils in pedagogy, the prevalence
of merely vague principles upon one side and of altogether
too specific and detailed methods (expedients) upon the
other, are really due to failure to ask what psychology
is called upon to do, and upon failure to present it in
such a form as will give it undoubted value in practical
applications
.
(Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 205)
To the educator, therefore, the only solid ground of
assurance that he is not setting up impossible or arti-
ficial aims, that he is not using ineffective and pervert-
ing methods, is a clear and definite knowledge of the
normal end and the normal forms of mental action. . . .
Briefly, only psychology and ethics can take education
out of its purely empirical and rule-of-thumb stage.
(Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 198)
. . . the struggle for truth ... is the essentially
human project. If man has learned to see and know what
really _ij3, he will act in accordance with truth. Epis-
temology is in itself ethics, and ethics is epistemology.
(Marcuse, 1968, p. 125)
This chapter proposes to describe a body of theory in the areas
of genetic epistemology and cognitive-developmental psychology that
provides a framework for Open elementary education programs. The
advantages of such a conceptual framework to elementary education in
general would be its contributions of coherence, logic and integrity
in a profession that typically constructs its practice disconnectedly,
and its rationales for practice retroactively-- if at all. For Open
Education, such a framework would serve to clarify, validate, and
correlate the various assumptions about knowledge and learning that
Open practitioners attempt to translate into pedagogical applications.
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Any conceptual framework for educational theory cannot be
value-neutral Insofar as It posits desirable end-conditions for its
objectives. Cognitive-developmental stage theory derived from the
research of Piaget and others describes a hierarchical pattern of
development, with each succeeding stage in an Invariant sequence
of stages deemed more functionally adequate than those it succeeds.
Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) explain that "development is not just any
behavior change, but a change toward greater differentiation, inte-
grat ion, and adaptation. Cognitive-developmental psychological
theory postulates fthe existence of an?
. . . 'internal standard
of adequacy'" that leads individuals, especially children, to prefer
thinking on higher--but accessible--levels, or stages (pp. 483-484).'*'
If functional adequacy is the standard by which cognitive develop-
ment is to be measured, and such traits as open-mindedness and
intellectual autonomy are seen as "end-points" to this development,
then we are of course implying that development as the general aim
of education can only be acceptable in a culture that values open-
mindedness and autonomous thinking.
Kohlberg (1971) states that "a developmental definition seeks
to isolate a function, like moral judgment or intelligence, and to
define it by a progressive developmental clarification of the func-
tion" (p. 217). Thus, in describing theory for the development of
moral reasoning, he contends that "our 'claims of superiority' for
higher stages are not claims for a system of grading the moral worth
of individual persons, but are claims for the greater adequacy of one
form of moral thinking over another. In our view, the basic referent
of the term 'moral' is a type of judgment or a type of decision -
making process
,
not a type of behavior, emotion, or social institu-
tion" (p. 215) .
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Ibe philosophical positions assumed by exponents of Open school-
ing are in fact quite congenial to such an aim for education. But
it is not readily seen, within their published statements of princi-
ple, and their assumptions about children and the processes of learn-
ing, how intellectual development is integrally connected with
ethics, motivation, and personal identity-all important categories
of Open Education beliefs. Given the need to justify assumptions
that predicate children's rights to make decisions, a human climate
of openness and warmth, curriculum that relies heavily on intrinsic
motivation, and instruction that acknowledges individual styles of
learning as well as individualized pacing--the Open educator can
often offer no more instructive an argument than "that is what I
believe in, and I've seen it work in my classroom." While such
justification may be valid enough for him, it might fail to convince
others because of its apparent subjectivity and arbitrariness.
Ultimately such a manner of rationalizing the precepts of Open Educa-
tion serves only to limit the number of communities whose sensibility
can accommodate them.
If the philosophical and the psychological assumptions characteriz
ing Open Education are seen as separate domains, they are vulnerable,
each in its turn, to inevitable criticism from the point of view of
the other. Thus, the philosopher may challenge the logic of a
hierarchical developmental model as being relativistic, and ethically
arbitrary, while the psychologist can question tne validity of
ethical principles that claim to influence the effectiveness of
learning. Historically, as noted in Cremin's The Transformation ojc
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the Schools (196 1)^ educational programs that did not clearly establish
a comprehensive and unified theoretical framework were easily prone
to fragmentation and distortion usually through an emphasis on one
aspect of theory and a neglect of the others.
For an informal pedagogy to be truly useful and transferable,
its various founding principles must logica 1 ly and demonstrably cohere
and support each other. With such an inner consistency, Open Educa-
tion might be better able to justify itself as something more than
just an ideological posture, or an approach to educational practice
catering to a special kind of student. Furthermore, a unified
conceptual framework would contribute both to an informed extension
of imaginative practice into the upper elementary grades (and into
a wider variety of social and cultural settings), and to more appro-
priate and systematic strategies for training professional educators
at all levels.
Congruent with most of the characteristic assumptions of Open
Education (and instructively contrary to some others) is the Piagetian-
Deweyan theory of cognitive development that Kohlberg and Mayer (1972)
set forth in their article on development as the aim of education.
They argue that "the distinctive feature of the developmental-
philosophic approach is that a philosophic conception of adequate
principles is coordinated with a psychological theory of development
and with the fact of development." This is important, because
"philosophical principles cannot be stated as ends of education until
they can be stated psychologically. This means translating them into
statements about a more adequate state of development" (pp. 484-485).
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Cognition, Affect and Ego Development
Before proceeding with a review of this developmental theory,
and a particularized examination of its implications for learning,
I would like to deal briefly with another matter. This is the
question of how appropriate it is for a theory of intelligence to
serve as a basis for approaching human development in all its aspects,
but especially those aspects of affect and motive, and of ego and
identity. It is unfortunate that the efforts to be more efficient
in the delineation of educational objectives have, for conveniency,
effectively distinguished the cognitive aspect of human functioning
from the affective, describing them as two separate "domains." On
several levels of educational practice, this dichotomizing has led
to essentially unproductive and misleading ideas about curriculum and
instruction. It has also contributed to a further disjunction of the
student's experience as a learner, insofar as learning can be said
to break down into separate compartments--each with its own distinct
set of conditions. Hirst and Peters (1971) have thus claimed that
"the tendency to disregard the importance of cognition in this area
/of the emotion^/ has led to the neglect of the specific features of
interpersonal understanding as a mode of experience which is of
manifest importance in the recognition of emotions and motives in
oneself and others. . . . The separation of intellectual from
affective development is as untenable as the study of emotional
development without stress on the role of cognition" (p. 50).
Cognitive-developmental theory elaborated by Piaget and Kohlberg
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emphasizes the interconnectedness of cognitive and affective modes
of functioning. It suggests that situations in which emotion is
aroused have first to be defined by the cognitive faculty. Kohlberg
(1969) extends this logic to development, observing that developmental
change in motives and affects "is largely mediated by changes in
thought patterns" (p. 390).
Piaget and Inhelder (1969) have argued that "there is no behavior
pattern, however intellectual, which does not involve affective
factors as motives; but, reciprocally, there can be no affective
states without the intervention of perceptions or comprehensions
which constitute their cognitive structure. Behavior is therefore of
a piece. . . . The two aspects, affective and cognitive, are at the
same time inseparable and irreducible" (p. 158). For Kohlberg and
Mayer (1972)
,
then, "the progressive or cognitive-developmental view
attempts to integrate both behavior and internal states in a functional
epistemology of mind" (p . 461). The theory of development that will
be discussed in this chapter is therefore based on a notion of the
unity of experience. This is, of course, a preeminently Deweyan
notion, for Dewey was always concerned to explore the ways in which
thought directs action, and, in a larger sense, how logical forms
2
organize and differentiate experience.
Less easily ascertained is the nature of the relation of cognitive
2Like Piaget, Dewey (1938b) was also committed to the "intellect-
ual responsibility of indicating how the logical may be connected
with the biological in a process of continuous development" (p. 25).
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development to ego development. Kohlberg and Mayer have remarked
that "much recent research demonstrates that the development of the
ego, as attitudes and beliefs about the self, involves step-by-step
parallel development of attitudes and beliefs about the physical and
social world. Further, it indicates definite stages of ego-develop-
ment
. .
. which imply step-by-step parallels to Piaget's cognitive
stages, although they include more social emotional content" (1972,
p. 491). Kohlberg (1969) has also argued that "cognitive advance is
the more basic or causal factor in this parallelism" (p . 464), al-
though it would seem that such a contention needs to be supported by
additional research on the correlation of cognitive development and
ego development. Loevinger and Wessler's statement that "the
search for coherent meanings in experience is the essence of the ego
or ego functioning" (1970, I, p. 8) does suggest an integral similarity
3between these two facets of development.
Education should be primarily concerned with the dynamic of
development--that is, how growth of intelligence and identity forma-
tion occur. In this regard, there do seem to be some clear parallels
between cognitive and ego development. Kohlberg and Mayer noted
above that attitudes and beliefs about the self are functions of
3Elkind (1970a) has argued that "A consideration of ego-centrism
. . . would seem to be a useful starting point for any attempt to
reconcile cognitive structure and the dynamics of personality" (p. 71).
He points out, for example, that "the presence of structures which
enable the adolescent to construct multiple alternatives ]_and hence,
to display thinking and behavior that is "decentered_/ sets the stage
for characteristic conflicts between young people and their parents
as well as for the increased dependence upon the peer group for final
decision-making" (p. 78).
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both developmental modes. Kohlberg has elsewhere (1969) summarized
ear^er studies that suggest "the self-concept is largely a concept
of shared self, or a self like other selves. The child cannot have
a self-concept without having concepts of other selves" (p. 394).
Thus, activities like role-taking and empathizing, which will be dis-
cussed at some length later in this chapter, have educational impli-
cations for both modes of development. Similarly, since identity
formation (as Erikson describes it) is a phenomenon of integration
and continuity of sequential stages, it resembles the cognitive
process of equilibration that lies at the heart of Piagetian develop-
mental theory. Piaget and Inhelder (1969) have remarked, in fact,
how aspects of personality "unquestionably involve conflicts or
crises and reequilibrations, for the formation of personality is
dominated by the search for a coherence and an organization of values
that will prevent internal conflicts (or seek them, but for the sake
of new systematic perspectives such as 'ambiguity' and other subjec-
tive syntheses" (p. 158) . Equilibration and its relation to learning
will also be examined in the following pages.
The plan for the rest of this chapter is to review the epistemo-
logy, stage theory, and concept of equilibration that Piagetians
basically hold in common with Dewey, and which represent the founda-
tion for a theory of pedagogy that has development as its aim.
Theory of Knowledge
The Deweyan and Piagetian concept of mind and knowledge is
des-
cribed from a "transactional" point of view. Mind functions
as an
expression of interaction between the individual and his
world. "To
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know an object, to know an event, is," according to Piaget (1964b),
not simply to look at it and make a mental copy, or image, of it.
To know an object is to act on it. To know is to modify, to trans-
form the object, and to understand the process of this transforma-
tion, and as a consequence to understand the way the object is
constructed" (p . 8). This process of the mind Piaget terms an
"operation." "An operation is thus the essence of knowledge; it is
an interiorised action which modifies the object of knowledge . . .
/
,
/ a particular type of action which makes up logical structures"
(p. 8). An operation may be an act of classifying, or ordering, or
measuring, but its essential, quality is that of interior ized construc-
tion of reality--hence
,
of reconstruction.
Deweyan and Piagetian epistemology posits the existence of
logical structures to describe general forms of operational intelli-
gence, or knowledge. "Above all," says Piaget, "an operation is
never isolated. It is always linked to other operations, and as a
result it is always a part of a total structure. For instance, a
logical class does not exist in isolation; what exists is the total
structure of classification" (1964b, p. 8). Dewey (1938b) discusses
this structural aspect of knowledge in a chapter on the pattern of
inquiry. "Logical forms," he asserts, "originate out of experiential
material, and when constituted introduce new ways of operating with
prior materials, which ways modify the material out of which they
develop" (p. 103).
Stage Theory
The notion of structures as organizing principles that
inform
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the functioning of intelligence contributes to a theory of stage
development, since the various logical structures that are operative
with any given individual mind seem to share a fairly common level
in their potential for differentiated and coordinated thinking. In
Dewey's words, "the mind at every stage of growth has its own logic"
(1933, p. 83). Piaget's hiararchical stage model--like Dewey' s--
identifies several levels of cognitive functioning along a continuum
of "decentering"--or moving away from a highly subjective, egocentric
mode of understanding toward greater objectivity and a capacity to
think in more complex ways. David Hunt (1966) has described cognitive
stage differences according to the "degree of abstractness" that
characterizes thinking. Citing the conclusion of Harvey, Hunt and
Schroder, Hunt argues that "greater abstractness is associated with
'lower stereotypy and greater flexibility in the face of complex and
changing problem situations, toward greater creativity, exploration
behavior, tolerance of stress, etc.' ... At a more interpersonal
level, more abstract systems are associated with greater self-under-
standing and empathic awareness of others" (pp. 278-279).
Piaget has designated the several sequential stages that comprise
his model of cognitive development in such a way as to describe a
progression toward more complex and abstract reasoning abilities. It
is incorrect, however, to read from the nomenclature of developmental
stage theory an interpretation such as the following, which represents
a not uncommon generalization made by informal educators: "Intellectual
growth and development take place through a sequence of concrete
experiences followed by abstraction^ (Barth, 1971, p. 1^8) . In tl
first place, development is probably being wrongly equated
with
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learning in such a statement, for development is a more complicated
and gradual affair than indicated in this simple formula (see section
on Development and Learning" below)
. Furthermore, it is also
incorrect to infer from Piagetian theory that learning can be reduced
to an invariant sequence of concrete experiences followed by abstrac-
tions. Dewey once remarked that "the notion that we have only to
put physical objects before the senses in order to impress ideas
upon the mind amounts almost to a superstition" (1933, p. 225).^
What cognitive stage theory does suggest is that at certain
levels of cognitive functioning, verbally transmitted information is
not alone sufficient to induce structural change, and that some
concrete referent, or some experience in which the individual acts
on the material to be assimilated, is required for learning to take
place. Open Education's contention that "premature conceptualization
based upon inadequate direct experience leads to lack of real under-
standing" (Walberg and Thomas, 1971, p. D-10) is quite consistent
with developmental theory, but we must not infer that some sort of
"direct experience" needs to be always freshly provided as a first
step in the learning process. Dewey's sound advice on this matter
is that to '"begin with the concrete' signifies that we should, at
the outset of any new experience in learning, make much of what is
already familiar, and if possible connect the new topics and principles
^Dewey argued further that "Things and sensations develop the
child, indeed, but only when he uses them in mastering his body
and
coordinating his actions" (1933, p. 225).
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with the pursuit of an end in some active occupation" (1933, p. 224)
Unevenness of sta^e development
. Piaget's stage theory does not
hold that the dimension of abstractness, or differentiation, of
cognitive structures occurs as an even, across-the-board progression
in development. Rather, there are often chronological gaps dividing
the acquisition of different operations that characterize the same
stage of reasoning ability. Cognitive-developmental psychologists
have observed a certain degree of heterogeneity, or "stage mix,"
obtaining within the system of mental schemata that constitutes
individual intelligence. Piaget refers to this condition as a "hori-
zontal decalage . " "The concept of horizontal decalage , " notes
Flavell, "represents the fact that, whereas it may be useful to think
of an individual as being generally characterized by a given cognitive
structure, he will not necessarily be able to perform with in that
structure for all tasks" (1963, p. 23)
.
5 Dewey's notion of continuity
of experience assumed this condition. Development, as Dewey realized,
was a process wherein the acquisition of one particular cognitive
•’Flavell (1963) explains the implication of vertical decalage
as seeming to be "quite the opposite. In effect, vertical cecalages
express a hidden uniformity within the apparent difference between
one stage and another. There seems to be little in common between
the spatial perambulations of the toddler and a map-making project
in which a fifth-grader participates. Yet there are structural
similarities buried in the obvious differences, and it is this re-
currence which defines vertical decalage" (p. 23). Both Kcnlberg
and Mayer (1972) and Athey and Rubadeau ( 1970 ) have indicated an
apparent correlation between vertical decalage in cognitive function-
ing, and the observations made by Erikson in the study of ego develop-
ment. Athey and Rubadeau note that "Vertical decalage refers to the
fact that a problem with similar content is approached at different
stages with a completely different level of functioning. In the
social-emotional realm, Erikson has drawn attention to the different
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operation makes that of another possible, while for development to
take place, the individual has to see the relatedness of similar
operat ions
.
Development and mot ive . Dewey's broad epistemological theory
differs from Piaget's primarily insofar as Dewey incorporates more
explicitly an element of motive into his scheme of the development
of intelligence. His model of stage development, as elaborated in
•Essays
-iQ Experimental Logic (1916b), assumed that "thought is to be
interpreted as a doubt- inquiry function" and that "various stages
of thinking could be marked out according to the amount of play
which they give to doubt, and the. consequent sincerity with which
thinking is identified with free inquiry" (p . 216). Dewey's theory
here resembles that of Harvey, Hunt and Schroder (cited earlier) in
its inclusion of certain behavioral traits as indicators of develop-
mental stage.
Development for Dewey follows a course from inability (and
unwillingness) to doubt the literalness of "facts," to an inclination
to initiate inquiry and seek out areas of uncertainty that comple-
ments the "more elaborate and systematized methods of investigation"
which obtain at this stage (1916b, pp . 184-185). Interestingly,
Dewey's stage theory is quite similar to Kohlberg's sequential model
levels of approach at various ages to lifelong problems such as main-
taining a balance between trust and mistrust, or establishing one's
autonomy with respect to others. The difference in these levels is
undoubtedly related to development of cognitive functioning" (p . xv) .
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of the development of moral reasoning, expressed through the aspects
of choice ("Mechanisms of resolving or denying awareness of conflicts")
and rules ("The ways in which rules are conceptualized, applied, and
generalized. The basis of the validity of a rule.") (1969, p. 378).
It also anticipates efforts to combine psycho-emotional factors with
a cognitive-developmental model (such as Kohlberg's above) to explain
predispositions to ignore data that seems discrepant or inconsistent.
This issue will be discussed later in a section on "Disequilibrium."
Development and learning . For Dewey and Piaget, stage develop-
ment is continuous, characterized by a process of integration rather
than mere substitution of a more adequate concept for a less adequate
£
one, or addition of new mental operations onto the old repertoire.
Substitution or addition of new concepts and skills is more character-
istic of what we refer to commonly as learning. Piaget has described
learning as "the accord of thought with things," and the process of
development as "the accord of thought with itself" (Smedslund, 1964,
p. 94). In effect, he is distinguishing between two processes, one
of which might be said to subsume the other. Piaget (1964a) argues
that
The development of knowledge is a spontaneous process, tied
to the whole process of embryogenesis . . . . Learning
presents the opposite case. In general, learning is pro-
voked by situations- -provoked by a psychological experimenter;
or by a teacher, with respect to some didactic point; or by
an external situation. It is provoked, in general, as opposed
to spontaneous. In addition, it is a limited process limited
&For a discussion of structural change as integration, see
Pinard and Laurendeau (1969, p. 127).
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to a s_ingie problem, or to a single structure.
_/Thus_j_/ development explains learning,
. .
. contrary to
the widely held opinion that development is a sum of dis-
crete learning experiences. ... In reality, development
is the essential process and each element of learning
occurs as a function of total development, rather than
being an element which explains development, (p. 8)
While a symptom of development might be the replacement of one
means of explanation by another more sophisticated one, the develop-
mental change has constituted a reconstruction, so that a new way
of making sense of experience can be coordinated within a consistent
and integrated model of reality. Old ideas are not really thrown
away, so much as they are revalued in the context of new structural
organizations. In the domain of moral reasoning, Kohlberg and his
colleagues have argued that stage advance represents changes in judg-
mental thinking that reflect more differentiated rationales for
moral judgment. Movement to the next higher stage therefore "involves
internal cognitive reorganization rather than the mere addition of
more difficult content from the outside" (1971, p. 194).
Structural Change: Assimilation and Accommodation
In cognitive-developmental theory, mental structures change
because the nature of the process of thinking is such that while
thinking acts to modify the object of thought, its own scheme of
reference- - it s way of processing the o'bject--can be altered too.
For Dewey (1934)
,
this phenomenon of operational intelligence was a
"prolonged interaction of something issuing from the self with
objective conditions, a process in which both of them /self and
object/ acquire a form and order they did not at first possess (p . 65).
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Piaget (1967) describes "this fundamental interaction between
internal and external factors" as "an assimilation of reality to
prior schemata
. .
.
/and/ at the same time an accommodation of
these schemata to the actual situation" (p. 103). Accommodation
to new situations leads to the reconstruction of a previous schemata,
or structure, and thus to the emergence of new structures. Dewey
(1938b) points out, consistent with Piaget, that "restoration of
integration can be effected only by operations which actually modify
existing conditions" (p . 106).
Equilibration
. Development occurs, according to Dewey and
Piaget, as a continuous seeking of equilibrium between individual
mind and outer reality. Dewey (1938b) has noted that in a larger
biological sense, "The greater the differentiation of structures
and their corresponding activities becomes, the more difficult it
is to keep the balance. Indeed, living may be regarded as a
continual rhythm of disequilibrations and recoveries of equilibrium.
The 'higher' the organism, the more serious become the disturbances
and the more energetic (and often more prolonged) are the efforts
necessary for its reestablishment" (p . 27). Situations of cognitive
and affective disequilibrium are regularly incurred under conditions
determined by factors of heredity, and of ' experience with the physical
and social world. Dewey calls these situations "indeterminate;"
they are resolved to the extent that new organizations can be formed
to restore integration of experience. Thus for Dewey the dual process
of accommodation and assimilation is the process of inquiry, the
controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation
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into one that j_s so determinate in its constituent distinctions and
relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into
a unified who le" (1938b, pp. 104-105). Dewey's notion of "the pattern
of inquiry is in fact an equilibration phenomenon--a process of
cognition described in existential, or situational, terms.
Disequilibrium
. Disequilibrium may be regarded as the source
of momentum for development. The clear implication of this idea is
that a person's mode of thinking will only change if he feels some-
thing is wrong with the way he presently explains reality. Further-
more, it is important to note that disequilibrium refers to an
affective state as well as a cognitive one, and that both are probably
necessary to the phenomenon of developmental change. As Piaget (1967)
observes, "affectivity is always the incentive for the actions that
ensue at each new stage of this progressive ascent, since affectivity
assigns value to activities and distributes energy to them" (p. 69).
Implicit in Dewey's theory of stage development is the idea
that certain individuals may either ignore the symptoms of disequilib-
rium, or resist the encroachment of such stimuli that might challenge
and disrupt the closely guarded "mental equilibrium known as assurance
or knowledge" (1916b, p. 216). Dewey's definition of development
as related to inquiry assumes, therefore, a condition of willingness
to inquire as prerequisite to change. "Organic interaction becomes
inquiry when existential consequences are anticipated; when environ-
ing conditions are examined with reference to their potentialities,
and when responsive activities are selected and ordered with reference
to actualization of some of the potentialities, rather than others,
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in a final existential situation" (1938b, p. 107).
Elkind (1970b) has pointed out that stimulus seeking "only
occurs to its maximum in emotionally secure children. Intellectual
growth is never independent of the child's emotional involvements
with the world, and the insecure child is less likely to seek out
challenging stimulation than is the child who feels secure in his
interpersonal relations" (pp . 20-21). Such a statement is congruent
with recent conclusions of ego development theorists, who posit that
identity and self-concept are aspects of a "self-system" that func-
tions to minimize anxiety in dealings with the world. Loevinger
and Wessler (1969) explain that "This is accomplished by selective
inattention to observations discordant with current, however erroneous
or limited, conceptions of self and others. Opening of the self-
system to new and corrective observations is unusual. Normally, it
occurs to some extent at each developmental threshold, in response
to newly maturing needs . . ." (I, p. 113).
In Dewey's doubt-inquiry continuum, "successive stations or
arrests constitute stages of thinking" (1916b, pp. 183-184). This
conception relates well to ego development theory, since it acknow-
ledges that the tendency to inquire after other explanations or other
points of view--to be able to entertain uncertainty--requires a kind
of tolerance or strength as well as cognitive sophistication. Dewey s
idea of equilibration is that "just in the degree that what has been
accepted as fact--the object of assurance-- loses stable equilibrium,
the tension involved in the questioning attitude increases, until a
readjustment gives a new and less easily shaken equilibrium (191ob,
68
p. 184). However, observes Dewey, "The natural tendency of man is
not to press home a doubt, but to cut inquiry as short as possible"
(p. 184).
Ojsen p e riods .for stage advance . Recent research in cognitive
development has discovered certain factors that seem to influence
when, and under what organizational conditions, disequilibrium can
best be handled by the individual to facilitate developmental pro-
gress--to move forward from a "station or arrest." Kohlberg and
Mayer (1972) have suggested that
there is what approaches an optimal period for movement
from one stage to the next. . . . When a child has just
attained a given stage, he is unlikely to respond to
stimulation toward movement to the next stage. In addi-
tion, after a long period of use of a given stage of
thought, a child tends to "stabilize" at that stage and
develops screening mechanisms for contradictory stimula-
tion. Accordingly, it has been found that both very
young and very old children at a given stage (compared
to the age-norm for that stage) are less responsive or less
able to assimilate stimulation at the next higher stage
than children at the age-norm for that stage. The notion
of an "open period" is not age-specific, it is individual.
. . . Nevertheless, gross age periods may be defined
which are "open periods" for movement from one stage to
the next. Avoidance of retardation as an educational
aim means presenting stimulation in these periods where
the possibility for development is still open, (p . 490)
Turiel (1969)
,
a colleague of Kohlberg, adds another dimension to
the notion of an "open period" in his observation that "The child
whose functioning is mainly on one stage, but who uses other stages
as well, will more readily perceive contradictions and thus experi-
ence conflict more frequently. In other words, stage mixture serves
to facilitate the perception of contradictions, making the individual
more susceptible to disequilibrium and consequently more likely to
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progress developments lly" (p . 130). The implications of this
research for diagnosis and setting the environment in an Open class-
room will be taken up in the next chapter.
This chapter has tried to present a general theoretical frame-
work that might elucidate and coordinate the various ideas about
learning and teaching held by most Open educators. It is based on
the philosophical premise that development should be the aim of
education, and owes much of its definition to the epistemological
ideas of Jean Piaget.
A second goal of the chapter was to demonstrate how John Dewey's
epistemological and psychological theories were essentially similar
to those of Piaget. Given this similarity, an earnest (and more
knowing) reconsideration of Dewey's prescriptions for education--
derivative from his philosophical and psychological theory--would
seem to be in order, especially for Open educators who desire to
effectively develop and extend the ideas that presently inform the
best examples of progressive practice in America.
Paying particular attention therefore to Dewey's pedagogy, the
following three chapters will explore how a coherent theory of
development can suggest guidelines for provisioning and organizing
the Open classroom, and diagnosing for optimal match (Chapter IV),
for curriculum design (Chapter V) ; and for teacher intervention in
the learning process (Chapter VI)
.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPLICATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY FOR SETTING AN
OPTIMAL EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE OPEN CLASSROOM
. . . the general principles of the new education do not
of themselves solve any of the problems of the actual or
practical conduct and management of progressive schools.
Rather, they set new problems which have to be worked out
on the basis of a new philosophy of experience.
(Dewey, 1938, pp. 21-22)
/The teacher/ needs to be a student of the conditions
that modify for better or worse the directions in which
individual powers habitually express themselves. He
needs to recognize that method covers not only what he
intentionally devises and employs for the purpose of
mental training, but also what he does without any con-
scious reference to it--anything in the atmosphere and
conduct of the school that reacts in any way upon the
curiosity, the responsiveness, and the orderly activity
of children.
(Dewey, 1933, p. 57)
/We need to clear ujg/ the confusion of "open" used as a
developed and perfected organizational form, existing in
itself, with "open" as a new floor of possib/lity for
further development of better /instructional/ match.
(Weber, 1972, p. 65)
Open educators set high priority on such educational objectives
as self-motivation, learning how to learn, and the development of
confidence, autonomous thinking skills, and a feeling of self-worth.
These are clearly long-term objectives, and can be viewed intelli-
gently only within psychological perspectives that comprehend the
development of intellect and ego. In this chapter, as well as in
the. next two, I should like to suggest some prescriptive theory for
realizing such objectives. Chapter IV will consider wnat might
constitute an ideal educational environment for facilitating develop-
ment in the elementary classroom, while Chapters V and VI will
treat
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curriculum building and the role of the teacher in supporting
developmental learning, respectively.
Organizing the Open Classroom
Provisioning . Stocking a room with an abundance of diverse
books and materials, but with little knowledge or intuition as to
how these things might be used by students to discover new relation-
ships and new meanings, would represent, of course, an incomplete
and irresponsible kind of provisioning. On the other hand, a
rigidly orthodox Montessori approach of delimiting the learning
potential in the environment by assigning specific learning tasks
to specific materials, while discouraging any divergent use of them,
is also undesirable.^- Open Education does recognize the importance
of unprogrammed interaction with the environment. It also acknow-
ledges the responsibility of the teacher to modify "the content and
arrangement of the classroom based upon diagnosis and evaluation of
the children's needs and interests and their use of materials and
space" (Walberg and Thomas, 1971, pp. D 4-5).
Open classrooms are typically characterized by a rich variety
of materials, and the "subject matter" of the lower elementary
grades especially is in large part an environment of manipulable and
exp lorable stuff. Thus, Rathbone (1972) can observe that " 'organization
of instruction' becomes 'organization of learning materials ' --that
distinction is implied here which acknowledges that many
Montessori schools, particularly in America, are considerably more
flexible
.
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is, investigation of the selection, arrangement, and assignment of
specific items of instructional equipment within the classroom" (p.
531) . Hasset.t and Weisberg (1972) add that instruction in the Open
classroom ought to center around subject matter "found frequently
within the child's environment," or teacher- introduced "'turn-on'
agents--that is, sources of motivation with many possibilities for
educative projects" (p. 6).
Open Education has not yet, however, really articulated cogent
rationales for its provisioning strategies. It needs to confront
questions like "What are the psychological criteria for organizing
learning materials, and for ensuring that encounters with them will
be educative?" Aside from a realization that common, familiar
materials often hold more potential for increasing understanding,
and that provisioning should aim to create learning situations that
are flexible and open-ended, and capable of sustaining extended
exploration, Open educators have usually failed to draw the necessary
inferences from developmental psychology that could suggest optimal
conditions for developmental learning.
One interesting reason for provisioning a classroom with a range
and variety of possibilities for problem-solving and random explora-
tion is suggested by the research of Turiel (1969) . Turiel contends
that "A complex heterogeneous environment that presents a variety of
contradictions is more likely to facilitate the equilibration process
than a more homogeneous environment. Children in the complex environ-
ment would have greater stage mixture, and children with high stage
mixture are more likely to perceive higher stage structural
contradictions
in the environment" (p. 130).
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S cheduling
. The integrated day plan of scheduling in the Open
classroom, allowing for individuated activity of flexible duration,
is meant to complement the richness and variety of the physical
environment. Dewey (1928) has provided a typical developmental
rationale for the integrated day in this statement: "A child's
individuality cannot be found in what he does or in what he consciously
likes at a given moment; it can be found only in the connected course
of his actions. Consciousness of desire and purpose can be genuinely
attained only toward the close of some fairly prolonged sequence of
activities. Consequently some organization of subject-matter
reached through a serial or consecutive course of doings, held to-
gether within the unity of a progressively growing occupation or
project, is the only means which corresponds to real individuality"
(p . 121). The implications this statement holds for curriculum will
be addressed in the next chapter.
In a classroom situation organized to facilitate individuated
activity, the developmental goal of greater integration in under-
standing is also being implemented. The Open classroom sponsors a
significant degree of learner control over the forces affecting what
happens to him in school. Presumably, the higher the degree of
learner control, the more individualized, or self-directed, the
learner's classroom activity will be. Eiseman (1973) has suggested,
apropos of a study of classroom learning environments, that "the
more individuated the activity, the more likely it is that the
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individual's behavior will be highly integrated" (p. 21) ,2 since he
is more aware of the activity in all its aspects, having played a
larger role in its definition. This in turn suggests the potential
for more integrated understanding of classroom learning experience.
Responsive environments
. As I argued in the previous chapter,
Piaget s epistemological and developmental theories hold some obvious
implications for what, when, and how classroom experience can be most
conducive to the development of intelligence. Essentially these
theories suggest that "Good pedagogy must involve presenting the
child with situations in which he himself experiments. /The child
may be said to experiment
_i/n the broadest sense of that term--trying
things out to see what happens, manipulating things, manipulating
symbols, posing questions and seeking his own answers, reconciling
what he finds one time with what he finds at another, comparing his
findings with those of other children" (Duckworth, 1964, p. 2).
To maximize the developmental potential of such experience, the
school environment must be "responsive" to the child's experimenting.
Eiseman (1973) suggests that such an environment would comprise
materials and situations "from which the child receives information
regarding his own immediately previous behavior either through sensing
any of the social or physical object's reactions or through recogniz-
ing any resulting changes in the social or physical configuration'
^Eiseman then cites findings indicating that "high integration
ratings are far more frequently associated with learner control than
with teacher control" (p. 22).
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(p. 20). Dewey (1899) saw the matter of provisioning and organizing
in similar psychological terms: as
the affording of an environment in which the child acts,
which stimulates him adequately with sufficient variety
and yet with coherence so that the various stimuli serve
to cooperate with each other, and an environment of
sufficient content, sufficient wealth of its own, so
that when the child acts in it, his return wave of
consciousness, his income, his impressions, may be valu-
able and sufficiently orderly, (p . 309)
Providing for Active Learning
Open educators frequently use the phrase "active learning" when
articulating their philosophy of instruction. Active learning can
be defined, in accordance with an epistemological theory that des-
cribes knowing as constructionist and interactionist
,
in a twofold
manner: it refers to learning as a function of thinking
,
and as
activity between the individual and the total environment. The notion
of active learning points to a need for the child to "have in his
own personal and vital experience a varied background of contact and
acquaintance with realities, social and physical. This is necessary
to prevent symbols from becoming a purely second-hand and conventional
substitute for reality" (Dewey, 1915, p. 112). In this section, I
would like to examine briefly how the idea of activity as a mode of
learning is sometimes considered by Open educators. As a focal point,
I will refer to Bruner's concept of "discovery learning," which seems
to reflect many of Open Education's assumptions about how meaningful
learning takes place. After this, I will discuss how an understanding
of active learning environments needs to be expanded to include a
more
significant social dimension.
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Discovery, l earning
. Bruner (1964, 1966) has argued that learn-
ing is meaningful and useful primarily when it represents a "finding-
out-for-onese If" proposition, a product of "autonomous and self-
propelled thinking hence, an "act of discovery." Discovery learn-
ing takes place as an independent data processing activity, best
facilitated when the learner is allowed to explore on his own terms,
and to make his own construction of reality. Discovery can represent
either the recognition of some new relationship, or the "invention"
of some sort of logical connection in the environment. Bruner (1964)
states that the act of discovery "is in its essence a matter of
rearranging or transforming evidence in such a way that one is
enabled to go beyond the evidence so reassembled to additional new
insights" (p. 83). This definition is similar to Dewey's conception
of discovery as a term which expresses the way in which "all thinking
is original" that constitutes "a projection of considerations which
have not been previously apprehended" (1916a, p. 159).
Some dangers exist, however, when Open practitioners proceed to
organize their programs for discovery learning with only a vague idea
about how curiosity and exploratory behavior function in the develop-
ment of intelligence, and about the conditions necessary for structural
change to occur. This kind of awareness is necessaiy, for example,
to guard against simplistic inferences of "learning by doing formulas.
Just as Bruner's idea of discovery does not imply that learning is
merely a process of disclosure or revelation, the notion of active,
discovery learning should not be reduced to the suggestion that
learning simply follows from activity--from some concrete experience--
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as if the learning were in the act of doing. As Dewey (1916a)
reminded us, experience "is not primarily cognitive. But . .
. the
-
—sure of the value of experience lies in the perception of relation-
ships or continuities to which it leads up. It includes cognition in
the degree in which it . . . amounts to something, or has meaning"
(p. 140).
Another danger is the tendency to infer from discovery learning
arguments that this kind of learning experience is inherently more
effective than "verbal reception" learning, and that consequently
the teacher's traditional functions of lecturing and direct instruc-
tion are somehow illegitimate. While I argue in this dissertation
that the elementary school needs to provide opportunities for students
to act on their total environment (and to reflect upon their actions)
,
such a directive does not exclude didactic teaching from having a most
important role in structuring, clarifying, and extending the student's
own active inquiry (see Chapter V) . Ausubel (1963) explains that
Discovery learning is a psychologically more involved
process than reception learning because it presupposes a
problem-solving stage that precedes the emergence of
meaning and the interiorization of information. But
reception learning, on the whole, appears later develop-
mentally and, in most instances, implies a greater degree
of cognitive maturity. The young child learns most new
concepts and propositions inductively through autonomous
discovery, although self-discovery is not essential if
concrete-empirical props are available. Reception learn-
ing, however, although occurring earlier, is not really
prominent until the child is both capable of internal
mental operations and can comprehend verbally presented
propositions in the absence of current concrete-empirical
experience .... (p. 17)
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of discovery learning
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arguments is their contention that meaningful learning is accomplished
only when the learner's involvement in his activity is based on
intrinsic motivation. Such motivation occurs when the learner pur-
sues an activity that finds its source in "the natural energies that
sustain spontaneous learning--curiosity
,
a desire for competence,
aspiration to emulate a model, and a deep-sensed commitment to the
web of social reciprocity" (Bruner, 1966, p. 127). Bruner suggests
therefore that "to the degree that one is able to approach learning
as a task of discovering something rather than 'learning about' it,
to that degree will there be a tendency for the child to carry out
his learning activities with the autonomy of self-reward or, more
properly, by reward that is discovery itself" (1964, p. 88). For
when "the child comes to manipulate his environment more actively,"
he "achieves his gratification from coping with problems" (p. 92).
Open educators must be aware, however, that curiosity and
natural exploratory tendencies in children need to function within
3
a responsive environment in order for them to be "self-perpetuating."
Furthermore, curiosity needs to be stimulated, and the motive to
explore needs to be challenged and guided (see section on "Providing
Appropriate Match" below). As Lillian Weber (1971) has pointed out,
"Bruner starts with the will to learn and assumes the necessary
curiosity" (p . 193). Bruner has perhaps, therefore, merely hypothesized
^Viz. the Open Education assumption that "children's innate
curiosity and self-perpetuating exploratory behavior should form
the basis of their learning in school" (Walberg and Thomas, 1971,
p . D 10) .
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on what might occur, given certain optimal or ideal conditions for
learning.
Social learning
. The assumptions about the social aspect of
learning held by Open Education constitute a weak and psychologically
unsophisticated link in the composite beliefs about children’s learn-
ing that inform its pedagogy. Aside from some obvious contentions
that children like to collaborate and play together, and to share
their achievements, there is relatively little indication given as
to how the social nature of experience contributes to the individual's
classroom learning, and to his overall development. And in most of
the literature on Open Education, the social environment is usually
mentioned in essentially non-cognitive terms.
I have already noted that while Open educators acknowledge the
implications of the constructionist premise of Piagetian epistemology,
they seem to neglect the implications of Piaget's view that cognitive
development is a function of interaction. This tendency probably
derives in part from Bruner's lack of emphasis on the social context
in the process of cognitive growth.^ Another possible explanation
is that the Open classroom has primarily been an infant classroom,
^"For Bruner, the learner is to be seen as a cognitive, develop-
mental, individual psyche, somewhat influenced by and inf luencing Jiis
environment, but primarily as independently following a program of
cognition which is its own, which is directed by its own self-contained
logic. For Dewey, the effect of habit and the social nature of
language put, irrevocably, the individual psyche within the orbit of
the social, and the effects of individual thought, if they are to
be
meaningful, at work in the classroom, or the group, or the society
(Fox, 1969
,
p . 69)
.
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where interaction in the epistemological sense might be seen to
focus more dramatically on the physical environment than on the
social. For both Dewey and Piaget, however, active involvement with
the environment was in no way one-dimensional. Dewey (1899)
realized that "there is no contact with things excepting through
the medium of people. The things themselves are saturated with
the particular values which are put into them, not only by what
people say about them, but more by what they do about them and
with them" (p. 47). For Dewey, the psychology of mind is a social
psychology, since cognitive development is essentially an interaction-
al process.
Congruent with this idea is the cognitive-developmental notion
that growth is a function of interaction with things and people.
"When I say 'active,'" Piaget explains, "I mean it in two senses.
One is acting on material things. But the other means doing things
in social collaboration, in a group effort. This leads to a
critical frame of mind, where children must communicate with each
other. This is an essential factor in intellectual development.
Cooperation is indeed co-operation" (Duckworth, 1964, p. 4). In his
research, Piaget (1967) has thus observed that among school-age
children, "there is progress in two directions: individual concentra-
tion when the subject is working by himself and effective collabora-
tion in the group. These two aspects of the behavior that starts at
around seven years are in reality complementary and derive from the
same source. They are, in fact, so intimately linked that one is hard
put to say whether the child has become capable of a certain degree
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of reflection because he has learned to cooperate with others or
vice versa" (p. 39).
Cooperation and collaboration are therefore terms that are
meaningful in a developmental sense because of the way in which
they facilitate and determine the growth of intelligence. "As far
as intelligence is concerned," Piaget (1967) has argued, "co-operation
is thus an objectively conducted discussion (out of which arises
internalized discussion, i.e. deliberation or reflection), collabora-
tion in work, exchange of ideas, mutual control . .
.
,
etc. It is
therefore clear that co-operation is the first of a series of forms
of behavior which are important for the constitution aid development
of logic" (p . 162). Like Dewey, Piaget contends that logic in fact
"expresses itself as a complex of states of awareness, intellectual
feelings and responses, all of which are characterized by certain
obligations whose social character is difficult to deny, be it
primary or derived" (p. 163).
^
Role-taking . Cognitive-developmental theorists discuss matur-
ing states of awareness in children in terms of role taking-ability.
Role-taking is described as the disposition of the individual to
discern role attributes of others, and to understand them vis-a-vis
his own role behavior. According to Kohlberg (1971) therefore,
"The primarv meaning of the word 'social' is the distinctively human
lkind (1970a) has remarked how Piaget's notions of reflection
and internal discussion are parallel to those of George Herbert Mead,
the American sociologist. But Mead in turn was indebted to Dewey for
his opinions on the social nature of reflection and reasoning.
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structuring of action and thought by role-taking, by the tendency
to react to others as like the self, and to react to the self's
behavior from the other's point of view" (p. 190). Role-taking is
preeminently an activity of cognition, with reference to a social
context.
Flavell (1968) has subsumed under role-taking more conventional
terms like empathy, sympathy, imitation, introjection, identification,
and projection (p. 227), while distinguishing role-taking from role
playing, or role enactment; in role-taking, the "subject seeks out
the other's role attributes, not to p lay out his role, but to under -
stand it" (p. 7). Selman (1974) suggests that role-taking develop-
ment plays a part in such social behaviors as "A) children's general
social problem-solving ability (e.g., playing cooperative or competi-
tive games, playing hide-and-seek, etc.), B) children's communicative
and persuasive abilities, C) children's understanding of feelings
of others (sympathy, empathy) and D) children's understanding of
fairness and justice, and the development of moral reasoning" (p . 8).
Role-taking skill is 'Embedded in a complex network of causes and
effects" (Flavell, 1968, p. 200), implying its integral relationship
with the development of logical thinking. Because "cognition and
feelings about the self and others are inseparable" (Selman, 1974,
p. 47), role-taking also links logical thinking to moral and emotional
functioning. To assume the perspectives of others involves trying
to comprehend not only their motives and opinions but their feelings
as well. Role-taking increasingly becomes a conscious effort to
improve understanding of human ecology. Flavell (1968) has concluded
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that "The eventual incorporation of an effective regimen of role-
taking training into the school curriculum
. . . would constitute a
most defensible form of Dewey's 'education for life"' (p. 200).
Role-taking is related to cooperation then in the sense that
all effective social behavior necessitates the ability to perceive
role expectations for a given situation. As Dewey (1916a) remarked,
Social perceptions and interests can be developed only in a genuine-
ly social medium- -one where there is give. and take in the building
up of a common experience. Informational statements about things
can be acquired in relative isolation by anyone who previously has
had enough intercourse with others to have learned language. But
realization of the meaning of the linguistic signs . . . involves a
context of work and play in association with others /'intercourse,
communication, and cooperation, --all extending the perception of
connections//" (p . 358). The significance, therefore, of social
role behavior for cognitive development rests on the conceptualiza -
tion of social interaction, as a result of reflecting on role
behavior .
^
fi
"Piaget had suggested that the child sharpens his role-taking
and communicative skills through actual exchanges with others,
especially peers. But," as Flavell observes in Development of Role -
Taking and Communicat ion Skil Is in Children (19o8) , "it may be that
they are also sharpened through covert (or overt, as in solitary play)
activities when the child is by himself, in between social exchanges.
He may not only practice adult social roles, later to be enacted
overtly, but also role-taking activities of the residual variety, for
example, those involved in competitive or cooperative social enter-
prises, or in communication. That is, he may rehearse past or antici
pated interchanges with others, mentally recoding when an imagined
interlocutor fails to understand or to be persuaded, covertly readjust-
ing his actions in the fact of new behavior by an imagined other
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Role-taking development occurs as the individual continually
reassesses role expectations and his own role perception, in order
to arrive at a more differentiated state of social awareness. It
entails a task of cognitive decentering, and depends upon the
opportunity to engage in and reflect upon personally significant
social behavior, including group participation and decision-making.
Kohlberg (1971) has noted that "opportunities to role-take are
opportunities to experience conflict or discrepancy between one's own
actions and evaluations and the actions and evaluations of others"
(p. 194). This aspect of development seems crucial to a more informed
understanding of active and social learning, as these terms are
employed in Open pedagogy. Active learning that conduces to develop-
ment in the domains of moral reasoning and social awareness in
particular must involve role-taking opportunities. Role-taking
development would of course seem more readily forthcoming in a class-
room where children were encouraged to negotiate for themselves, so
far as suitable, their own learning experience (in Rathbone’s words,
to be "active agents" in their own learning)
.
Providing for role-taking activity . Dewey (1899) emphasized
that the school environment be designed with an aim to "organizing
and enlarging" the student's "tendency to act, and to learn through
his acting" (p. 306). An awareness of the learner’s tendency to
occupying some complementary role, etc." (p . 23). Susan Issacs re-
marked in Intellectual Growth in Young Children (1930, p. 104) a simi-
lar kind of reflective activity in instances of children's imaginative
play, and noted the child's growing ability to hypothesize past and
future as a factor in dealing more adequately with his emotional and
intellectual needs of the present.
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assume role behaviors, and of the benefits of role-taking to develop-
ment, should lead the Open teacher to organize for role-taking
activity as a routine part of the school experience. An environment
responsive to role-taking activity would be one onto which the
learner could project his own values, or intimations of value, and
have a sense of the purpose of his efforts towards inquiry and study.
This idea has been fundamental to progressive pedagogy. Dewey (1899)
,
for one, frequently asserted the importance of the learner's having
a sense of what he is doing," of finding "a sufficient sense of
value of what he is doing, so that the development of the side of
intelligence, of meaning, shall keep pace all the time with the
growth of the power itself . . ." (p. 62). If learning is to contri-
bute to total development, it must occur in ways that illustrate
and emphasize the continuity of experience.
Since role-taking is primarily activity in a social context
(real or imagined)
,
the teacher must also provide opportunities for
purposeful social interaction. Dewey (1934) has said that "Communica-
tion is the process of creating participation" (p . 244). In this
respect, social interaction needs to be organized so that individuals
assume genuine responsibility for making judgments and decisions.
Social role-taking opportunities need to afford students real
decision-making power, and occasions to experience the consequences
of their actions.
Role- taking and grouping . Kohlberg and his colleagues have done
some important research on the potential for group interaction to
contribute towards the development of moral reasoning. Their findings
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point to the relevance of the classroom peer group for moral educa-
tion, given the likelihood that within any grade level of school
children, there exists a variety of cognitive stage functioning.
Since children at certain ages are sometimes more likely to be
influenced by the reasoning of their peers than by their teachers,
and since examples of cognitively novel and challenging moral opin-
ion have the capability of inducing intellectual restructuring and
growth, the teacher can provision for learning by the way she organ-
izes groups and suggests topics.
Most Open educators are against homogeneous grouping, or
streaming, on the grounds that is is undemocratic, and demeaning
and discouraging to slower learners. The foregoing findings of
cognitive-developmental research would seem to provide another, more
cogent rationale for exposure to a variety of levels of reasoning
within a group setting. In addition to demonstrating the importance
of social interaction among peers, developmental psychologists also
"emphasize the possible heuristic value of interchanges with certain
non-peers: with parents and other tutor-socializers on the one
hand, and with younger children on the other" (Flavell, 1968, p. 222).
The common incidence of peer teaching, often in vertically grouped
classrooms, gives evidence of Open Education's implicit awareness
of these benefits.
Role- takirvg and reflection . The development of role-taking and
other social-cognitive skills requires opportunity to reflect upon
the meaning and significance of transactional activity. "Experience
is educative to the extent that it involves thinking about what one
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is doing, why he is doing it, the general significance, usefulness,
and applicability of the methods he is using in doing it" (Thelen,
1967, p. 67). It is necessary, therefore, that class procedures
and routines be flexible to allow for "the time it takes to inter-
iorize actions as thought" (Piaget, 1972, p. 31). Dewey (1933)
frequently observed that teachers have a tendendy to deny the student’s
developmental need for systematic reflection. "More often than the
teacher is aware," he pointed out, "his mind carries and supplies
the background of unity of meaning against which pupils project
isolated scraps" (pp. 245-246). ^ Whereas Open classrooms presumably
sponsor extended opportunities to explore problems, there is still
the danger that frequent interruption of such activity to check up
on comprehension, as well as forcibly directing the student's "com-
prehension" toward some pre-determined concept or end-point, will
actually interfere with learning. Bussis and Chittenden (1973)
caution that the teacher must know when to refrain from obtaining diag-
nostic and evaluative information. "The meaning that is derived from
valuable experience (by adult or child) takes time in evolving; and
Dewey has argued in School and Society (1915) that "It is
hardly too much to say that in the traditional education so much
stress has been laid upon the presentation to the child of ready-
made material (books, object-lessons, teacher's talks, etc.), and
the child has been so almost exclusively held to bear responsibility
for reciting upon this ready-made material, that there has been only
accidental occasion and motive for developing reflective attention.
Next to no consideration has been paid to the fundamental necessity-
leading the child to realize a problem as his own, so that he is
self-induced to attend in order to find out its answer" (p . 149).
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a likely result of premature demands for evidence of learning is to
interfere with this process and cause the event to be dismissed as
' over" 1 (pp. 225-226). 8
One of Dewey's recurrent exhortations to Progressive educators
was that students be encouraged to actively consider the logical
consequences of thoughts and behaviors. Dewey's aim was to stimulate
the development of a more conscious and enlightened sense of social
responsibility. Reflection was the sine qua non for this process.
Herbert Thelen (1972) has argued that
Reflection is encouraged by five conditions: first,
keeping anxiety within bounds and translating it into
issues to be resolved; second, noninterference and
respect for the individual's privacy while he is trying
to think; third, establishment of a generally nonthreaten-
ing "climate" through the habit of listening and respond-
ing with clarification, encouragement, and the objective
definition of hard realities of all sorts; fourth, stimu-
lation through challenge and confrontation by novel situa-
tions; and fifth, encouraging and utilizing suggestions
and creative ideas ("contributions") which result from
reflection (pp. 156-157)
Open classrooms have been notable for their efforts to provide
for noninterference and respect, to define non- threatening climates
in terms of the teacher's method of interacting with children, and
to employ children's ideas and responses in the planning of further
activity. On the other hand, Open classrooms have been critized
for creating in some children unproductive levels of anxiety,
®David Hawkins (1971a) has wisely remarked that "When the mind
is evolving the abstractions that will lead to physical comprehension,
all of us must cross the line between ignorance and insight many
times before we truly understand" (p. 62).
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ostensibly due to the conditions of free choice and autonomy that
characterize activity scheduling (I will speak to the issue of free-
dom and autonomy in Chapter VI)
.
In the following section, I will outline some further develop-
mental prescriptions for establishing an optimal learning environ-
ment, wherein the student is challenged and encouraged to inquire 9
and to reflect upon the consequences of his actions.
Providing Appropriate Match:
Instruction and Development
Cognit ive match and opt ima 1 disparity
. Open educators and
developmental psychologists have each addressed the social-
psychological conditions that influence readiness for developmental
learning, and the disposition to inquire. Developmenta lists usually
cite, as the crucial ingredient for progressive change, the element
of cognitive dissonance, or disparity, between the learner's approach
to a problematic situation, and the terms by which the situation may
be effectively understood. McV. Hunt (1961) points out that in the
phase of concrete operational thinking, for example, "It is the
unexpected in concrete phenomena which can most readily arouse the
curiosity that motivates inquiry. . .
.
_/Thus_j_/ problems are
probably best posed in terms of concrete situations which present
information that is to a proper degree dissonant with the child's
systematic expectations" (p. 282).
9 . r
"inquiry" will be defined in this dissertation as a process or
purposeful, problem-solving activity with potential learning outcomes
that can lead to cognitive restructuring. Inquiry involves reflection,
and can occur as a group process as well as an individual one.
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In the domain of ethical problem solving, Kohlberg and his
colleagues have reached similar conclusions. Kohlberg (1966)
argues, therefore, that "The child will listen to what the teacher
says about moral matters only if the child first feels a genuine
sense of uncertainty as to the right answer to the situation in ques-
tion. The pat little stories in school readers in which virtue
always triumphs or in which everyone is really nice are unlikely to
have any value in the stimulation of moral development. Only the
presentation of genuine and difficult moral conflicts can have this
effect" (PP . 22-23).
10
Developmental psychologists argue that the problem of facilitat-
ing inquiry and accommodative reflection appears to be one of determin-
ing a suitable cognitive match--an optimal disparity--between persons
and environmental stimulus. 11 Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961)
point out that "the discrepancy might be so great between the sub-
ject's concept and the impinging situation that the event (another's
evaluation, say) would be interpreted as irrelevant to the issue
at hand. . .
.
/Or^/ an individual, instead of noting the discrepancy
and interpreting it as irrelevant to his own concept, may
Dewey's theory of the development of moral reasoning, like
Kohlberg' s, is based on the notion that moral conflict is prerequisite
to progressive change. Dewey argued (Dewey and Tufts, 1932) that
"Moral theory cannot emerge when there is positive belief as to what
is right and what is wrong, for then there is no occasion for reflec-
tion. It emerges when men are confronted with situations in which
different desires promise opposed goods and in which incompatible
courses of action seem to be morally justified" (p . 173).
^David Hunt (1971b) discusses other kinds of match as well:
for example, motivational orientation (preferred form of feedback
and reward); value orientation; and sensory orientation (preferred
sensory modality) (pp. 71-72).
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actually fail to note the concept-event incongruity and, at least
so far as measured effects reveal, to act as if no discrepancy
existed" (p. 53). The environment must therefore present "stimuli
which are both sufficiently incongruous as to stimulate conflict in
the child's existing stage schemata and sufficiently congruous as
to be assimilable with some accommodative effort" (Kohlberg, 1971,
p. 242). To illustrate, we might cite Kohlberg' s observation that
while children are able to understand moralizing that is talking
down beneath their level, they do not seem to accept it nearly as
much as if it is comprehensible but somewhat above their level. It
is obvious that the teacher's implementation of this principle must
start by his careful listening to the moral judgments and ideas
actually expressed by individual children" (1966, p. 25).
Diagnosing the child . Individual diagnosis is obviously a cru-
cial prerequisite to effective organization for learning in the class-
room. Walberg and Thomas (1971) have noted that Open teachers
typically acknowledge the importance of paying diagnostic attention
to "the understanding and reasoning processes which led the child to
the particular response or solution" (p. D 4). Informal plans for
organizing instruction allow the teacher frequent opportunity for
observation of individual pupils that is necessary for the gathering
of adequate diagnostic information.
Flavell and Wohlwill (1969) have suggested that extensive pre-
and post-testing are necessary to determine the level of operational
thinking in children, but effective and efficient diagnostic testing
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procedures in this area have yet to be developed for classroom use.
It is probably unrealistic, in any case, to expect that teachers will
have the time and the expertise to diagnose cognitive functioning to
the extent that optimal match conditions can be established for each
individual. Open teachers might instead develop an awareness of at
least the range of operational thinking of children in their classes
for general provisioning and curriculum design purposes. Such a
tactic, while crucial to the overall preparations a teacher would
make, would not of course preclude the gathering of as much individual
diagnostic information as he can manage, without compromising the
students needs to engage in relatively uninterrupted inquiry and
reflection.
Developmental psychologist Robert Selman has wisely argued that
"Stage analysis will best serve teachers and clinicians interested
in child development if it de-emphasizes reliance on standardized
assessment and emphasizes the professional's need to understand the
child's eye-view of his life experience and to maintain with him an
open-ended and mutual dialogue" (p. 51). This professional responsi-
bility involves particular skills--notably listening perceptively,
and recognizing common logical constructions of children at one's
grade level. Duckworth (1973) has addressed this matter nicely:
Words that people hear--and the younger the child is, the
stronger the case--are taken into some thoughts that are
already in their minds, and those thoughts may not be the
ones the speaker has in mind. ... A good listener, or
a good understander of explanations, is aware that his
first interpretation of what is being said may not be the
right one, and he keeps making guesses about what other
interpretations are possible. This ability is singularly
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undeveloped in little children but it should be highly
developed in good teachers, who try to listen to what
children are trying to say to them. (pp. 141-142)
-Diagnosing the environment
. Dewey saw (1899) the problem of
match as the "organizing function of the school," wherein the
school "selects or reduces the complexity of the forces operating
outside. Thus, The first factor in . . . the organizing of the
resources that make for growth, would be that the school pick out
those elements from the existing social conditions which are best
adapted to the child in his existing stage of growth, and which are
most necessary to him in order that a fairly conscious, uninterrupted
growth may be set up" (pp . 66-67).
Consistent with this advice, Flavell (1963) has argued that
'it will be the teacher's task, and one often demanding considerable
ingenuity, to analyze the content to be learned in terms of the
operations implicit upon it. Having done this, he will arrange the
learning materials /or social situation/ so that these operations
can actually be carried out by the student himself, and then see to
it that the student does carry them out" (p. 368). What is involved
here is a need to understand possible classroom activities as
examples of logical operations like ordering, conserving, hypothesiz-
ing, etc. (or as related to such logical operations), and to be able
to devise curriculum that contains exercise in such operations (see
next chapter) . Related to this understanding is the need for aware-
ness of the logical similarities and interrelationships that obtain
among diverse activities (e.g., the variety of activities that
involve a common logical task like classification). A third imperative
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the teacher is an ability to ascertain the approximate level of
cognitive sophistication inherent in a particular skill or field of
understanding, and to know how and when certain materials and situa-
tions might be especially appropriate.
Kohlberg has also pointed to the need for teachers to "diagnose"
their own modes of expression, so that their communication can be
effective in inducing reflection or promoting and extending
inquiry. Facilitating developmental learning is not only a matter
of matching the logical requirements of a learning task and the
cognitive capability of the learner. Particularly in schools where
cultural backgrounds of teacher and students differ markedly, there
is also a problem of matching up symbolic codes (grammars and idioms).
The problem of making effective communication is at least twofold.
"It is," as Langer (1969) suggests, "both a question of how the
organism interiorizes knowledge, and how cognition is exteriorized
by the organism and the community. . . . While the forms of know-
ledge are progressively becoming interiorized schemata, the forms
of expression are increasingly becoming exteriorized symbols. It is
this dual process which insures progressive communication" (p . 82).
Confidence . While cognitive conflict and optimal disparity are
important for inducing accommodative thinking, the disposition to
reflective activity, or to inquiry behavior, is not automatic or
universal as a response to problem s ituat ions . As Dewey (1933)
12Eiseman (1971) notes that "It does not follow, however, that
the degree of disparity that is optimally motivating is also optimal
for structural development. It might be that the degree of disparity
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remarked, "One can think reflectively only when one is willing to
endure suspense and to undergo the trouble of searching. To many
persons both suspense of judgment and intellectual search are disagree-
able, they want to get them ended as soon as possible" (p . 16). The
implications of cognitive-developmental theory for setting conditions
that support and encourage inquiry and role-taking behavior do not
usually extend to factors like trust, acceptance, and reinforcement.
Open Education's approach to classroom environmental conditions is
characterized, on the other hand, by an emphasis on "humaneness"
—
respect for each child's style of thinking and acting, and openness
to children's feelings and attempts at self-expression (Walberg and
Thomas, 1971, pp. D 7-8). Open educators need to consider how such
"humanistic" conditions contribute to development, and in particular,
how they can be instrumental in maximizing the learning potential
of cognitive conflict situations (this issue will be discussed again
in Chapter VI) . Similarly, cognitive developmental psychology must
expand its theory to address other factors that influence development.
Some steps have been taken to make these connections. Harvey,
Hunt, and Schroder have pointed out the important interrelationship
between psycho-emotional strength and intellectual functioning. David
Hunt (1966) has noted that
Although the desired state and ultimate goal /of inter-
vention/ is to increase level of abstractness, the short-term
required to coerce accommodation is greater than that which is maxi
mally motivating. On the other hand, one could argue that the high
level of structural activation that is associated with maximal motiva-
tion is the critical ingredient of the growth process" (p. 63).
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goal of inducing openness supersedes the goal of pro-gression .... /G/enerally speaking, the initialtactic for inducing openness is for the training agentto provide the optimal environment with an emphasis uponhis intrinsic acceptance of the child, a term
.
defined by us as follows: "By intrinsic acceptance we
mean that the subject is valued for himself, for what
e is rather than for what he can accomplish in relation
to some external criterion. (p. 288)
Clearly, the teacher's human relations techniques--the kind of safe,
supportive atmosphere in which he couches instruction--need to be
determined in individual cases by his perception of the degree of
openness a learner brings to various inquiry activities. Such per-
ception will obviously be aided by diagnostic information relating
to the level of a child s cognitive functioning: the logical opera-
tions he can perform, and the ways in which they contribute to his
understanding of himself and the world.
Palmer (1970) claims that
Although Piaget typically speaks of equilibrium states
in normative terms, they are clearly subjective states
of the individual. A state of disequilibrium is a state
of 'subjective dissatisfaction.' In the present inter-
pretation, equilibrium states, or levels, correspond to
levels of confidence. There may be much to gain through
following this interpretation. First, confidence may
be viewed as the resultant of all the influences, from
within and from without, which determine one's level of
equilibrium in a given circumstance. Secondly, any measure
of confidence will serve to provide an operational defini-
tion of equilibrium. (p . 20)^
Palmer hypothesizes that "all else being equal, the higher his
l^it is possible that Kohlberg's concept of an open period to
structural change (see Chapter III) could become instrumental in
determining how and when instruction might be optimally provided to
the learner. Considerably more research needs to be done, however,
before it becomes feasible for teachers to make use of this insight
for diagnostic purposes.
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confidence, the more likely he will be to terminate his search for
a solution, and the lower, the more likely he will be to persist.
. . . Theoretically, the condition of overconfidence will result
in the premature termination of the search for a solution /what
Piaget called "false accommodation//, while the condition of under-
confidence will lead to the use of redundant searching strategies"
(p. 25). 14
Factors of emotional security and coping confidence will, of
course, also have an influence on whether--and for how long--a child
will undertake a problem-solving task.'*"-’ Palmer's point is that
confidence needs to be considered in several dimensions, and that one
of them is predicated upon the individual's cognitive stage disposi-
tion, or whether or not he is in an open period (to use Kohlberg's
term), with high potential for structural change.
Paradoxically then, inducing openness seems to be a matter of
undermining overconfidence, while at the same time conveying "intrinsic
acceptance" of the child. To answer this apparent contradiction, we
need to state that in accepting the child on his own terms, the
teacher does not necessarily forfeit the right to encourage him to
Thelen (1972) has observed that just as in instances of
individual inquiry, there are also conflicting forces that influence
a group's disposition to inquire. 'In the group, the two natures in
conflict are its tendency to seek comfort through development of inter-
personal friendships and alliances and its tendency to seek out and
deal with situational realities" (p. 115).
15Loevinger and Wessler (1970) argue, with regard to the individu-
al's disposition to ignore discrepant data, and hence not "see"
the
problem, that "The ego maintains its stability, its identity,
and its
coherence by selectively gating out observations inconsistent
with its
current state" (I, p. 8).
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inquire further if his attempt at problem resolution has been
inadequate for reasons of cognitive overconfidence
. Acceptance and
support of the learner would obviously play an important part as
well in dealing with uncertainty once uncertainty has been truly
acknowledged. Here the strategy would be to help the learner dispel
underconfidence by giving credence and recognition to tentative
resolutions and attempts at understanding.
From this chapter's discussion of optimal environmental con-
ditions for fostering development, I would like to proceed to the
implications developmental theory holds for curriculum in the Open
classroom.
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CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRICULUM IN THE OPEN CLASSROOM
The heart of the educative process is a matter of
sensitively enlarging and enriching the experience of
the immature so that adequacy of meaning may be tested
in contexts of expanding comprehensiveness. As pat-
terns of meaning are reconstructed and enlarged, the
processes of formal education should increasingly bring
to the fore an understanding of the standards by which
beliefs may be grounded and judgments controlled. It
is thus that the capacity for self-education is increased.
(Hullfish and Smith, 1967, p. 75)
Utilization of consciousness to guide experience, and to
improve the constructiveness of subsequent experience,
requires that experience be seen as inquiry; and this
includes such functions as explanation, experimentation,
and test of the consequences of behavior.
(Thelen, 1967, pp. 67-68)
Progressive education must have a much larger, more
expansive and adaptable body of materials and activities,
developed through constant study of the conditions and
methods favorable to the consecutive development of
power and understanding.
(Dewey, 1930, p. 221)
I have argued earlier that statements of goal priorities for
Open Education are often reflections of a particular ideological
position. This position sometimes tends to devalue such broad
educational goals as cultural transmission and the imparting of
socially useful skills to all learners. Such educational goals,
to be sure, do not necessarily lead directly to the development of
reasoning and judgment, or to creativity and self-reliance. On
the other hand, they play an important role in the individual’s
efforts to make sense of experience, and give meaning to himself
and the world. As such, these objectives clearly do contribute to
development. Dewey has aptly remarked that the problem of education
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"is the harmonizing of individual traits with social ends and values"
(Mayhew and Edwards, 1936, p. 465). It follows, then, that any
prescriptive theory of education must recognize that either cul-
turally "organized patterns of meaning or relatively unique con-
structions
. .
.
/are/ likely, in a given case, to increase control
over the course of subsequent experience" (Hullfish and Smith, 1967,
p. 185). Before passing directly to a discussion of implications of
developmental theory for elementary curriculum, I would like to pose
the issue of seemingly conflicting curriculum objectives from the
perspective of developmental theory.
Curriculum Objectives and Genetic Epistemology
Alan Graubard (1972) has summarized the several philosophical
positions that inform radical reform pedagogy (and which also have
influenced Open Education): "that everything is learning, or that
any learning is as good as any other, or that it is only the spirit
that determines the value of learning, or that the fact that we don't
know what knowledge will be most useful in the future means we must
avoid making judgments now about the relative value of what is
learned" (p . 218). Graubard finds these positions "very dubious."
Developmenta lists would undoubtedly concur, for such a typical state-
ment as this one by John Holt (1964) --that "Schools should be a
place where children learn what they mcst want to know, instead of
what we think they ought to know" (pp. 174-175), seems both epistem-
ologically naive and socially irresponsible.
Unfortunately, an Open educator like Barth (1972) can draw
conclusions quite similar to Holt's, as evidenced in his argument that
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since knowledge is "a function of the synthesis of each individual's
experience with the world," (p. 45) there is therefore "no minimum
body of knowledge which is essential for everyone to know" (p. 46).
If intellectual development is to occur, however, and a sense of
cultural identity to, form, there needs to be transactions between
the individual and his world whose terms cannot be dictated solely
by the learner's egocentric understanding of reality. For accommo-
dation to take place, the individual needs to be confronted with
cognitively and emotionally challenging situations. The child does
not "choose" the learning that attaches to these situations, nor is
knowledge, defined in a constructionist way, something that children
or adults can always identify operationally beforehand. Furthermore,
while it may be argued that knowledge defined as information cannot
be arbitrarily prescribed as necessary for everyone's learning,
everyone needs to learn how to reason logically, and perceive reality
and assess situations with some objectivity.
Underlying the issue of subject matter and curriculum--of what
we should learn to know--is really an issue of how it is we come to
"know," and what conditions are optimally conducive to learning and
development. Dewey (1899) stated this succinctly when he argued
By the psychological formulation of the subject matter
of the curriculum, I mean a statement, a selection and
arrangement or classification, not on the basis of the
purely ob j ect ive relationship of the facts and pr inc ip 1 es
to each other, but on the basis of their most natural and
most fruitful assimilation in somebody's experience. . . .
_/T/he scientific or logical subject matter has to be
psychologized, it has to be translated over into the terms
of the experiences and mental workings of the individual
child; and it is only as it is thus translated over, so
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that it does become a part of his concrete everyday experi-
ence and is assimilated, that it does really become educa-
tive to him. (pp. 128-129)
School critics who attack the curriculum for being irrelevant,
and arbitrarily determined by educators without the active participa-
tion of students, are really remarking how schools establish certain
conditions that are either unfavorable to development, or that lead
to the creation of habits which themselves represent deterrents to
classroom learning. Thus, "relevancy"--def ined as having some
direct connection with the student's own personal experience— is not
nearly so important a criterion for curriculum as is the potential
for that curriculum to be cognitively challenging because of the
kind of problem situations it poses.
For the student to experience the curriculum as intellectually
and psychological ly relevant, he needs to be able to "operate" on
it. Ke needs, as Dewey (1933) said, "Fewer subjects and fewer facts
and more responsibility for thinking the material of these subjects
and facts through to realize what they involve" (p. 33). In this
regard, schools are probably least beneficial to development when
they deny such responsibility to students, and when they systemati-
cally prohibit a student from experiencing self -corrective learning
situations. This is done not so much through the use of fixed
curriculum content per se, but by the imposition of solutions as
well as criteria for judgment--thereby promoting "dependence on
authority, stereotyping, rigid interpersonal relations, and a dislike
for the doubt and confusion that pervades any really thoughtful
attempt to find answers" (Joyce, 1965, p. 91).
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Two important consequences detrimental to learning and develop-
ment can ensue when such conditions prevail. One concerns a "false
accommodation" to problematic solutions, wherein resolution is
effected not through some mental reconstruction--an acting on the
situation--but through some verbal formula the student has been
given. The result, according to Piaget, is "a false equilibrium
which satisfies a child by accommodating to words--to authority and
not to objects as they present themselves to him" (Duckworth, 1964,
p. 4). This in turn can lead to a situation where students "tend
to become intellectually irresponsible; they do not ask for the
meaning of what they learn, in the sense of what difference it makes
to the rest of their beliefs and to their actions" (Dewey, 1933,
p. 33).
The other consequence represents a kind of intellectual aliena-
tion from "official" classroom agendas. Dewey has aptly observed
that "there are built up detached and independent systems of school
knowledge that inertly overlay the ordinary systems of experience
instead of reacting to enlarge and refine them" (1933, p. 289). If
experience within and without the school is discontinuous, the child's
developmental need to evolve structural similarities in his under-
standing of the world is not being met. Furthermore, the "learning''
that accrues to mutually isolated experiences is probably not trans-
ferable.
Educational goals need to be flexible enough to allow for
idiosyncratic learning within a framework of univeral prerequisites
for cognitive development, and some culturally significant curriculum
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content objectives. Elliot Eisner's position that there are really
three kinds of curriculum objectives suggests a format to provide
such flexibility
. Eisner (1972) argues that learning outcomes can
differ according to the way a "problem" is identified and according
to the locus of the "solution." He distinguishes three kinds of
learning outcomes, each of which can then be restated as a generic
type of curriculum objective (pp. 580-585).
The first is called an "instructional objective," because the
learning outcome is teacher-specific" in the sense that both
problem and outcome are known beforehand, and are traditionally
mediated by the teacher. Instructional objectives would pertain to
the transmission of certain culturally significant information and
tradition, and the acquisition of skills for which there exist certain
formulas and grammars that must be memorized. Eisner calls the
second type an "expressive objective," where both problem and out-
come are open. This objective assumes that learning can occur within
a student- structured situation that is not programmed by external
agents like teachers and texts. Open educators rally around the
expressive, or student-specific, objective, while sometimes ignoring
the validity and importance of the other two. This tendency creates
some difficulties in maintaining a balanced view of instructional
priorities (with respect to developmental prerequisites), and I will
speak to it later in a discussion of Hawkins' term "messing about."
Eisner's third objective (labelled "Type III" because it only
occurred to him after he had made a case for the necessity of a
dichotomous view) describes situations where the learning outcome is
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content-specific in that the problem is stated, often in terms
inherent to materials or circumstances, but where the solution is
open. An example that conforms to this objective would be the task
of constructing a paper plane that could stay aloft for more than
ten seconds. We might add a fourth kind of objective, in which the
outcome is fixed, but the learning, or problem-solving process, is
open, allowing for individual styles of learning. This type of
objective would also be very much in keeping with the philosophy of
Open Education.
Eisner's multiple platform for stating curriculum objectives
helps to avoid the pitfalls of most traditional versus progressive
debates on whether or not curriculum can be predetermined. Within
the context of developmental theory, the only factors that are indeed
predetermined are the dynamics of cognitive growth and the direction
of stage advance. Thus, for learning to reflect the constructionist
and interactionis t nature of cognitive development, educators need
to consider how each type of curriculum objective contributes to
the reorganization of mind to more adequately understand and control
experience. For Dewey, the ends of instruction were always focal
points within activity--they could be both directive and emergent,
but were dependent upon transactional experience for their definition.
Definition of ends for developmental learning is in this sense
heuristic. As Hullfish and Smith (1967) caution us, "We must be
careful not to confuse learning with the behavior from which it is
an abductive inference. . . . From the point of view of the teacher
it should prove more fruitful to think of 'meanings' rather than
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kinds of behavior' as the products of learning" (p. 179).
Curriculum and the Teaching of Concepts
Since the early 1960's, elementary school curriculum design in
America has focused on the teaching of meanings rather than on meaning-
less skills and information. There has been an avowed emphasis on
teaching structures, or "organizing concepts," and an appeal to
the higher mental processes. Essentially, the aim of the new
curricula was to have students learning to think like historians,
mathematicians, and scientists, rather than simply learning history,
mathematics, and science as codified, inert subject matter.
As Featherstone (1971) points out, the new reformers "concen-
trated on content- -organized in the form of the standard graduate
school disciplines--and ignored the nature of children and their
ways of learning. Too often children were regarded as passive recipi-
ents of good materials, and teachers as passive conduits. The
reformers lacked a coherent vision of the school environment as a
whole, a sense of the entire curriculum and the necessary human cli-
mate for learning" (p. 22). Open classroom practitioners, while not
overly dependent on the programmed materials and packaged curricula
that 'emerged from this trend, have inevitably been influenced by it.
In focusing on the teaching of basic concepts, such reform often
merely substituted one externally determined content for another,
thus ignoring both the constructionist and interactionist aspects of
developmental learning. Whether the new curriculum objectives were
labelled as basic concepts, organizing concepts, significant ideas,
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or logical structures, so long as they constituted predetermined
curriculum content they merely continued the tradition of assuming
that education is sufficient and adequate for having processed stu-
dents through certain pre-set instructional agendas. Open Education
and developmental theory alike imply that there should be more to
education than this.
Dewey (1916a) provides what is perhaps the simplest develop-
mentalist response to the arguments for teaching concepts:
no thought, no idea /meaning an element of cognitive struc-
tural organization/, can possibly be conveyed as an idea
from one person to another. When it is told, it is, to
the one to whom it is told, another given fact, not an
idea. The communication may stimulate the other person to
realize the question for himself and to think out a like
idea, or it may smother his intellectual interest and
suppress his dawning effort at thought. But what he directly
gets cannot be an idea. Only by wrestling with the condi-
tions of the problem at first hand, seeking and finding
his own way out, does he think. ... If he cannot devise
his own solution (not of course in isolation, but in
correspondence with the teacher and other pupils) and find
his own way out he will not learn (pp. 159-160).
Dewey's point is consistent with the developmentalist notion that
logical structures exist as characteristics of the individual learner's
own cognitive capacity, and cannot be developed in a functional sense
merely by casting the mental energies of the learner in a mold sug-
gested by a discipline, or a concept. Such an approach to elementary
curriculum simply presumes too much about how understanding is formed
how knowledge-as-structure develops. While there is obviously a
structure inherent in all disciplines, it does not follow, according
to genetic epistemological theory, that a structure can be impose_d_
on knowledge as it exists dynamically for the learner. As Hullfish
and Smith (1967) point out, " thinking cannot be scheduled; it cannot
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be^ held within a rigid pattern when it occurs" (p . 220) . 1 For
elementary school children, training in disciplinary method, so as
to arrive at an understanding of a concept, can too readily result
in learning a form of ritual behavior rather than in the kind of
learning that enables them to assimilate a range of new experience.
The new curricula also failed to recognize that children func-
tioning below the level of formal reasoning could hardly be expected
to assimilate the rationales underlying mathematical equations,
scientific laws, or principles of reciprocal justice. The focus of
the new math, new science, and new social studies "was to be upon
understanding the basic logical assumptions and structure of the
discipline." But, as Kohlberg and Gilligan (1971) testify, "the new
curricula assumed formal-operational thought, rather than attempting
to develop it" (p . 1082).
Curriculum for Development
How can curriculum help to develop conceptually adequate think-
ing? Piaget suggests, apropos of the question "whether to teach the
structure, or to present the child with situations where he is active
and creates the structures himself," that "Teaching means creating
situations where structures can be discovered" (Duckworth, 1964, p. 3).
Curriculum as "situations where structures can be discovered" has been
1-These authors argue further that "In continuing the assumption
that something to be called a concept may be isolated by analysis,
the richness of the related meanings which arise during a_ conceptual
response is overlooked. The resulting so-called concept is barren, a
lonely abstracted element, shorn of the vital qualities of the experi-
ential fields in which it meaningfully appeared" (p . 160).
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a somewhat misunderstood prescription for Open educators. Interpret-
ing Piaget and others to mean that the child can only act on experience
and make discoveries when he is not following the dictates of a
particular task or assignment, they have tended to exaggerate the
relative importance of what Hawkins has called "messing about."
Rathbone (1971a) illustrates this tendency when he argues that
the child learns best when given freedom to explore the
world around him, with a minimum of direction from others.
Through messing about" with his immediate environment,
his manipulations advance from a general, nearly random
search to a more planned and specific search for . Spon-
taneity, improvisation, and serendipity mark the start
of his learning; only after prolonged exploratory contact
with an object or a concept does he begin explicit verbali-
zation about the object, his activity, or the effect of
one upon the other. (p. 100)
Such statements about learning are potentially misleading on two
counts. First, there is the implication that serendipity will
naturally lead up to more carefully considered intellectual activity.
Dewey (1933) has suggested that this is not always the case, and
that the teacher must be careful not to set out such conditions as
"occasion a mere succession of excitements which have no cumulative
effect." Instead the teacher's "province is ... to provide the
materials and the conditions by which organic curiosity will be
directed into investigations that have an aim and that produce results
in the way of increase of knowledge, and by which social inquisitive-
ness will be converted into ability to find out things known to
others, an ability to ask questions of books as well as of persons"
(p. 40).
Second, there is implied in Rathbone' s contentions an orderly
progression to the learning process he describes, in which the child
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moves from random exploration to more rational and systematic under-
standing. The danger here is that this progression might suggest
an optimal sequence for experiencing reality in a classroom. The
stimulus to developmental learning need not always come from "seren-
dipity. It can just as easily be provided by specific demands of
a problem to be solved, or directions given by a teacher or a text-
book (in this sense we can talk about provisioning a learning environ-
ment with symbols as well as with materials). Hawkins (1971b), whom
Rathbone quotes frequently, identifies three patterns or phases in
classroom learning activity which are "different from each other in
the relations they induce between children, materials of study, and
teachers" (p . 59). They include "messing about" (or free explora-
tion), "multiply programmed" activity, and whole-class discussion
and lecturing. Hawkins pointed out as well that there is no natural
or optimal sequence governing their organization in time (p. 69).
Subject Matter
Curriculum is still generally thought of in terms of diverse
subject matters. Open educators have made significant attempts to
blend elementary school subject disciplines so that children's
exploration and invention are not constrained within artificial
parameters. The Open classroom emphasizes children's inquiry and
creative expression, rather than "subjects," as the locus of educa-
tive activity. Developmental theory suggests some other reasons
why learning in the various disciplines can and should be a common,
interrelated endeavor. For Dewey, subjects were simply not so
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logically distinct that they should necessarily parcel up the experi-
ence of children in school. If intelligence consists of schemes and
structures for construing relation, probability, classification,
etc., and if development of these structures occurs in an approximately
parallel way (thus enabling developmentalists to posit a stage theory),
then the several traditional elementary curricula may be thought of
as embodying common intellective processes, and in need of ongoing
coordination according to criteria of logical sophistication, or
"developmental stage."
In order to serve as catalysts for structural change, elementary
curriculum should be built upon "exercises (questions, problems,
tasks) that require thinking (modifying, reconstructing, transform-
ing)" (Furth, 1970, p. 154). Dewey (1933) stated that "at every
stage of development, each lesson, in order to be educative, should
lead up to a certain amount of conceptualizing of impressions and
ideas. Without this conceptualizing or intellectualizing, nothing
is gained that can be carried over to the better understanding of
new experiences" (p . 153). Dewey here speaks explicitly to the busi-
ness of assimilation--interiorizing actions as thought-- that is the
essential process of knowing.
Developmentalists and educators alike have argued that tradi-
tional subjects and skill areas--mathematics
,
science, reading and
writing, social studies, art--should be regarded more in terms of
the thinking processes they involve, and the experience they provide
to organize cognition and emotion. Dewey (1928) asserted that progres-
sive teachers should be developing "organized subject-matter" that
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could serve as prototype, to be shared. Such subject matter would
differ from the material in standardized texts, and the methods of
instruction associated with them, in two respects. "In the first
place, the material would be associated with and derived from occupa-
tional activities or prolonged courses of action undertaken by the
pupils themselves. In the second place, the material presented
would not be something to be literally followed by other teachers
and students, but would be indications of the intellectual possibili-
ties of this and that course of activity-statements of carefully
directed and observed experience .... No second experience would
exactly duplicate the first" (p. 124).
The work of Piaget and his colleagues in areas like the child's
conception of number and geometry, and of physical causality, space,
time, and speed and movement, is by now fairly familiar to most
developers of mathematics and science curricula. Taken as a whole,
it suggests that these elementary school subject areas represent
manifold opportunities for the child to actively determine the
properties of objects and explore the characteristics of natural
phenomena, thereby "assuring him of extensive practice in abstracting
structural similarities and common principles from diverse material
contents or specific tasks" (Wohlwill, 1964, p. 100). Piaget (1973)
has indeed remarked that "Mathematics is nothing but logic" (p. 96),
and "the true goal of mathematical learning-- the development of the
o
deductive capabilities" (p. 100).
^Sullivan (1967) points out, however, that educators should take
care, in drawing inferences from Piaget's research, not to ignore the
validity of traditional rote learning of arithmetic. He notes, for
instance, that "A substantial correlation between number readiness
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But the logical tasks of mathematics and science--to determine
relationships of order, causality, and probability--are also common
to other school subjects, and contribute similarly to the overall
growth of intelligence. Thus geography represents, for Dewey and
McLellan (1895), "a certain grouping of facts, classified on the
basis of th_e mind 1 s attitude towards these facts . ... It is simply
some interest, some urgent need of man's activities, which discrimin-
ates the facts and unifies them under different heads" (p. 209). The
task for the student, therefore, is to discover "the fundamental
interest and purpose which underlie this classification" (p. 209).
History as curriculum for Dewey's Chicago elementary school
was likewise considered "not as an accumulation of results or
effects, a mere statement of what happened, but as a forceful, act-
ing thing. The motives /that is, the factors of causality/
. . .
must stand out. To study history is not to amass information, but
to use information in constructing a vivid picture of how and why
men did thus and so, achieved their successes and came to their
failures" (Skilbeck, 1970, p. 66). Current trends in social studies
emphasize "values clarification" and improving human relations
skills. Both of these concerns should consider their underlying
agenda as being the task of getting children to understand more and
(e.g., conservation of number) and the achievement of addition and
subtraction can be interpreted in both directions. Simply, it
raises the question of 'which came first, the chicken or the egg;'
that is, we do not clearly know whether learning of addition and
subtraction enhances conservation or whether the opposite obtains"
(p. 21)
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reason better about the importance of reciprocity in social relation-
ships. Helping children to identify causality factors--to see the
reasons behind their own actions, as well as those of others--is but
another area of logical operations whose development can be facilitated
in the classroom.
Reading literature holds enormous potential for the development
of judgment and reasoning--for seeing new relationships, and under-
standing new aspects of causality in human experience. Paul Goodman
(1971) has remarked that "literature instructs by moving, by disturb-
ing rigid or stereotyped responses" (p. 114). Analagous to Goodman's
comments about reading literature is the fact that through writing,
a student is often forced to confront inconsistent or vaguely held
ideas, and in his reconciling or clarifying them, cognitive accommo-
dation may take place. Writing also provides opportunity for role-
taking, for trying out new postures as well as new ideas. Learning
how to write clearly and persuasively is exercise in constructing
more logically consistent and integrated argument.
Finally, we should note that artistic expression also involves
logical problems of construction and organization. It has been argued
by Dewey (1934) that the experience of creating and of witnessing a
work of art is in part a process of logically perceiving pattern and
s true ture- - th e unity of form in the work--whi.ch is itself the epitome
of educative experience. "Form is a character of every experience
that is a_n experience. Art in its specific sense enacts more deliber-
ately and fully the conditions that effect this unity. Form may
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then be
.
defined as the operation of forces that carry the experience
—
an event
,
object
,
scene
,
and situation to its own integral ful-
f illment ,, (p. 137).
Problem-Solving, Creative Thinking, and Inquiry
Open classrooms' are characterized by children's individual
explorations with materials and ideas. Problem-solving experience,
however structured, is a fundamental element in Open classroom
learning. Children are especially encouraged to pose their own
questions, and to pursue problems in which they are truly interested.
For such activity to contribute to structural change, the problems
must be genuinely challenging, but not overwhelming, and must induce
some form of accommodative thinking. There is also a complementary
need for the individual to articulate and test his new insights, and
to discover other applications and extensions for them.^
In earlier chapters, I discussed the significance of cognitive
conflict in stimulating structural change. Cognitive conflict situa-
tions can provoke accommodative thinking--in effect, a problem-solving
process-- that contributes to more adequate ways of assimilating experi-
ence.^ Problem-solving as a term used by learning theorists and
educators thus gains special significance when it is regarded in this
^Pinard and Laurendeau (1969) suggest the strategy of "focusing
on one set of operations (common task) --like seriation--instead of on
one level of understanding of an operation" (pp. 158-159).
^Dewey (1938b) explained that the "indeterminate situation becomes
problematic in the very process of being subjected to inquiry" (p.
107) .
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context of equilibration and developmental theory. When Dewey used
the term, Progressive educators often did not so regard it, and one
result was a much narrower, more literal understanding of what
problem-solving meant as a pedagogical method. In Dewey's construc-
tionist scheme of the development of intelligence, the act of inquiry--
the deliberate employment of the powers of ref lection--was always set
in some kind of problem-solving context. The definition of "problem"
in this sense was a broad one; to be "conscious of problems" was to
be conscious "not simply of things to be done, but ends to be
reached, points to be worked out" (Dewey, 1899, p. 318). Dewey (1933)
haa also noted that "The word 'problem' often seems too elaborate
and dignified to denote what happens in minor cases of reflection.
But in every case where reflective activity ensues, there is a pro-
cess of intellectualizing what at first is merely an emotional quality
of the whole situation. This conversion is effected by noting more
definitely the conditions that constitute the trouble and cause the
stoppage of action" (p. 109).
Curriculum that has development as its aim must therefore des-
cribe means to provide cognitive conflict situations for the learner.
Here, developmentalists join forces with educators like Paul
Torrance who argue that problem-solving, or inquiry, should employ
creative, "divergent" thinking. Creative thinking is frequently
accommodative thinking, because, as Torrance (1965) states, it
"requires modification or rejection of previously accepted ideas,
"high motivation and persistence, taking place either over a considera-
ble span of time (continuously or intermittently) or at high intensity
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(p. 666), while involving the task of formulating the problem
itself.
Curriculum .strategies
_to facilitate creative thinking
. Creative
thinking occurs in response to a problem, and represents an alterna-
tive to the usual or conventional response an individual might be
disposed to make. It is elicited through confrontation with ambiguity
and uncertainty, or some other cognitively challenging stimulus.
Charlesworth (1964) suggests that creating situations that have the
potential to arouse cognitive conflict can be accomplished in two
ways. "We either allow the child to construct correct but incomplete
hypotheses or expectations about events before presenting him with
a new single non-conforming instance which challenges his hypothesis
to the extent that he seeks to expand it, or we allow him to pursue
misleading ideas before presenting him with a carefully selected
fact or event that will suddenly contradict and hopefully rectify
them" (pp. 90-91).
The following additional, but related, curriculum strategies
may also produce cognitive conflict situations, and the potential
for growth of logical understanding:
1) Having children estimate, predict, and anticipate^
2) Transforming or rearranging information (juxtaposing
£
apparently unrelated items)
5See Pinard and Laurendeau (1969, p. 157); also, Torrance (1970,
p. 8).
^Torrance (1970, p. 8); see also the "synectics" strategy of
"making the familiar strange" by imposing "an intentionally naive or
apparently 'out of focus' look at some aspect of the known world,
in Gordon (1971, p. 37).
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3) Providing elements of surprise, mystery, puzzlement 7
4) Encouraging synthesis of diverse elements
5) Encouraging search for solutions which take into account
the largest number of variables
6) Encouraging the formation of multiple hypotheses
7) Extending inquiry to next steps (including the testing out
of hypotheses)
.
Curriculum models
. The notion of a curriculum model for the
Open classroom might seem at first inimical to the assumptions held
about idiosyncratic learning and shared involvement in planning and
instruction. But as Dewey (1930) pointed out, "Full recognition of
the fact that subject matter must be always changing with locality,
with the situation and with the particular type of children is,
however, quite consistent with equal recognition of the fact that it
is possible to work out varied bodies of consecutive subject matter
upon which teachers may draw, each in his own way, in conducting his
own work" (p . 222).
Curriculum considered not as uniform content but in terms of
fundamental cognitive operations couched in socially useful purpose
is a legitimate organizing principle for developmental learning in
the Open classroom. Hawkins (1971b), Thelen (1972), Parker and Rubin
(1966), and Suchman (1972), among others, are essentially of common
mind when they suggest that learning be structured upon a curriculum
that focuses on inquiry and problem-solving, and that systematically
7For items #3-7, see Torrance (1970, p. 8).
t
119
enables the learner to build more comprehensive and integrated
explanatory schemes o£ reality. At the same time, such curriculum
would allow him to put his insights into practice, to experience and
understand the consequences of his actions, and to assume intellectual
and social responsibility for himself. Dewey's notion of the project
activity also represents a valuable set of criteria for a developmental
curriculum model. For Dewey (1928),
the test of a good project is whether it is sufficiently
full and complex to demand a variety of responses from
^ifferen t children and permit each to go at it and make
his contribution in a way which is characteristic of
himself. The further test or mark of a good activity,
educationally speaking, is that it have a sufficiently
long time-span so that a series of endeavors and explora-
tions are involved in it, and included in such a way that
each step opens up a new field, raises new questions,
arouses a demand for further knowledge, and suggests what
to do next on the basis of what has been accomplished and
the knowledge thereby gained. (p. 122)
(Unfortunately, through the decades of "Progressive" education, the
classroom project typically degenerated into a rather mindless
data -collecting activity, or some artistic or model-making endeavor
that more often than not represented an intellectual cul-de-sac.)
Individuated activity, extended over a period of time, constitutes
the substance of curriculum that could, when combined with a challeng-
ing and responsive environment, truly sponsor development in the
elementary classroom. Projects so considered should have particular
significance for middle and upper elementary grades, where students
have an increasing capacity to train their attention on project-type
activity. Children in Open classrooms frequently engage in deliberated
construction projects, and crafts like book-binding, and textile
weaving and dying, are also commonplace. Dewey's injunction here would
120
merely be that the teacher should be actively involved "in working
out
_the intellectual possibilities resident in various arts, crafts,
and occupations, and reorganizing the curriculum accordingly Any
underlining-?' (1933, p. 217). "Not the thing done, but the quality of
mind that goes into the doing" (p. 216) determines what potential
such activity holds for development.
For Open Education today, an occupat ions-based curriculum
would have students engaged in technological and artistic work projects
that involve creative problem-solving activity. An occupation in
this context represents exercise in invention, through a dynamic,
purposeful involvement with materials, natural and social phenomena,
and the ideas that relate them.
Dewey 1 s " occupations " curriculum . At Dewey's University of
Chicago Laboratory School, teachers developed a project activity
approach to elementary curriculum based on fundamental human occupa-
O
tions. This model evolved from Dewey's paramount concern that school
experience be socially, morally and intellectually continuous with
itself, and with the child's natural educative interests: "physical
mastery, constructive abilities, intellectual or theoretical activity
(interest in discovery), and social interest" (1913, p. 67 passim).
The idea, according to Dewey (1915), was
(1) to furnish the child with a sufficiently large amount
of personal activity in occupations, expression, conversation,
^At the Dewey laboratory school, occupations were considered as
they have emerged historically, thereby suggesting the socio-
industrial history of civilization as a basic thread linking curricula
year by year. See Wirth (1966), ch. 9: and Mayhew and Edwards (1936).
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construction, and experimentation, so that his individu-
ality, moral and intellectual, shall not be swamped by
a disproportionate amount of the experience of others
to which books introduce him; and (2) so to conduct
this more direct experience as to make the child feel
tne need of resort to and command of the traditional
social tools furnish him with motives and make his
recourse to them intelligent, an addition to his powers,
instead of a servile dependency. (pp. 112-113)
As Dewey (1915) noted, "The fundamental point in the psychology
of an occupation is that it maintains a balance between the
intellectual and the practical phases of experience" (p . 133).
Dewey's occupations-based curriculum combined opportunities for
educative peer interchange, and for social role-taking as well. 9
Within such a format of active, sustained inquiry and inventive
thinking, the child could be "continuously conditioned to responsi-
ble social participation, while at the same time the tasks that are
expected of it are adapted to its capacity" (Benedict, 1938, pp. 23-
24) . The original context of this quotation (taken from an article
entitled "Continuities and Discontinuities in Cultural Conditioning")
was an argument contrasting non-Western ways of rearing and educat-
ing children with those of an "industrial" society like contemporary
America. School curriculum that facilitates responsible social
participation, in activity conducive to total development of the
individual, could therefore have an effect on lessening the trauma
of passage into productive adulthood- -the "discontinuity" in cultural
^The recent use of simulation games in elementary school curricu-
lum marks a psychologically consistent effort, albeit sometimes rather
contrived or exotic, to structure play interests around a complicated
group problem situation.
12 ?.
conditioning-- that commonly produces in American adolescents such
symptoms as alienation and identity confusion.
For Dewey, it was this focus on social purpose that gave the
occupations curriculum its primary value. If the school exists as
a social institution, to prepare children to become efficient and
resourceful members of a "democratic and progressive society," a
child must be educated for leadership as well as for obedience.
He must have power of self-direction and power of directing others,
power of administration, ability to assume positions of responsibility"
(1909, p. 10). ^The school's ultimate function is therefore a moral
fundamental commonality existing between Dewey's position, and that
of Open Education. But as Dewey (1909) reminded, "The school cannot
be a preparation for social life excepting as it reproduces, within
itself, typical conditions of social life. ... To form habits of
social usefulness and serviceableness apart from any direct social
need and motive, apart from any existing social situation," is a
futile hope (p. 14). Dewey saw a need, then, for the development in
school children of an intellectual and pract ica
1
interest in community
welfare, and viewed subject matter "as a means of bringing the child
to realize the social sense of action" (p . 31).
How is curriculum with such long-term and comprehensive objectives
to be evaluated? Dewey (1909) contended that "Only as we interpret
school activities with reference to the larger circle or social
such a premise represents the most
Evaluation of Curriculum
activities to which they relate do we find any standard for judging
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their moral significance" (p . 13). The developmental significance
of curriculum would, of course, need to be evaluated in terms of the
growth changes in individual children. Kohlberg and Mayer (1972)
have stated that
The progressive or cognitive-developmental view
attempts to integrate both behavior and internal
states in a functional epistemology of mind. It
takes inner experience seriously by attempting to
observe thought processes rather than language
behavior and by observing valuing processes rather
than reinforced behavior.
. . . The cognitive
developmental approach stresses the need to examine
mental competence or mental structure as opposed to
examining only performance, but it employs a func-
tional rather than an introspective approach to the
observation of mental structure. (p . 461)
A functional approach to evaluating mental competence--as the measure
of educative experience derived from a school curriculum--would be
obliged to determine how adequately a learner can understand and
act upon his understanding. Competence would be indicated by
differentiation and integration in reasoning, and by the ability to
transfer knowledge when dealing with logically interrelated problems
or tasks.
A further indication would be the learner's faith in his under-
standing in the face of seemingly discrepant data (not to be con-
fused with cognitive overconfidence, which is characterized by a
tendency to ignore discrepant data). The research of Smedslund has
shown that conceptual understandings that are little more than
memorized generalizations "are more readily discarded when data are
discrepant to the concept. But when the concepts result from the
resolution of conflicts in successive accommodations as in the normal
course of conceptual growth, a conceptual structure is not easily
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given up even in the face of a heavy weight of discrepant data"
(Suchman, 1972, p. 152). Consonant with curriculum guidelines of
continuity and activity extended over a substantial time-span,
evaluation of such curriculum should also be conducted over a period
of time sufficiently broad as to measure advances in operational
thinking across a range of diverse tasks.
Chapter V has examined the implications of cognitive-developmental
theory for curriculum in the Open classroom. In the following chap-
ter, I will discuss the place of teacher intervention in develop-
mental learning, and how such topics as "the helping relationship"
and freedom and discipline" are illuminated by developmental theory.
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CHAPTER VI
IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHER INTERVENTION
IN THE OPEN CLASSROOM
Since learning is something that the pupil has to do him-
self and for himself, the initiative lies with the
learner. The teacher is a guide and director; he steers
the boat, but the energy that propels it must come from
those who are learning. The more a teacher is aware of
the past experiences of students, of their hopes, desires,
chief interests, the better will he understand the forces
at work that need to be directed and utilized for the
formation of reflective habits.
(Dewey, 1933, p. 36)
. . . a tendency toward optimum mutual activation exists
in the ego and in society.
. .
.
_/T/he concept of reality,
or so it seems to me, already implies an optimum corres-
pondence between mind and the structure of the environ-
ment. But, we may now add, he is also inactivated in
actuality; and we can help him grasp reality only to the
extent to which we, within our chosen method, become
actual to him. This, at any rate, I want to offer for
our consideration.
(Erikson, 1964, pp. 175-176)
Many of the implications cognitive-developmental theory holds
for classroom instruction have been addressed in earlier chapters.
The tasks of creating and sustaining an environment that stimulates
development, and of helping to design and extend curriculum that
engages active social and intellectual participation--these are tasks
that represent an integral part of, and overlap with, the instruc-
tional role in the Open classroom. The purpose of the present chapter,
then, is to consider this role from another dimens ion- -that of
teacher intervention in the child's activity. Specifically, I will
be attempting to set forth some prescriptions for teacher behavior
during the child's experience as inquirer and problem-solver.
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Two interrelated issues will be examined in this context: the
humanistic' educator's emphasis on the teacher's interpersonal
behavior, and how it may influence pupil development; and the issue
of teacher authority, and how it affects the learner's freedom to
function as an autonomous, self-educating individual.
Autonomy, Independence, and Development
An educational goal that developmental theorists and Open
educators both embrace is the growth of independent thinking and
intellectual resourcefulness in children. Open educators, however,
sometimes see autonomy and independence more in libertarian terms--
as a direct outgrowth of the kinds of freedom the classroom environ-
ment allows the child--than as "something men have by degrees"
(Hawkins, 1972, p. 307) to be nurtured and developed, and to be
regarded in terms of developmental schedules. They are concerned,
therefore, with defining the teacher's role in such a way that it
does not infringe upon the natural learning tendencies of children.
Both Holt (1964) and Rathbone (1971a) have argued, for instance,
that the teacher cannot force a child to learn. They each see "un-
willingness to be coercive" as an important characteristic of a good
teacher. The problem then lies in differentiating between coercive
behavior and behavior in which the teacher may legitimately direct
a child to some task, or set up standards for work done. Holt's
contention that "there is no way to coerce children without making
them afraid, or more afraid" (p. 179) could be construed, in its
context, as a statement that all teacher directives, rules, and
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standards are potentially harmful to the child, and detrimental
to learning. Rathbone's position is a more considered one, but his
statement that "each child is his own agent--a self-reliant,
independent, self-actualizing individual who is capable, on his own,
forming concepts find of learning" (1971a, p. 104) still ignores
by implication the interactionist aspect of knowledge and develop-
ment--and the necessity of an environment of significant others,
within which the child can develop role-taking skills as a means to
self-actualization.
Dewey saw the problem this way: "The ground of democratic
ideas and practices is faith in the potentialities of individuals,
faith in the capacity for positive developments if proper conditions
are provided. The weakness of the philosophy originally advanced to
justify the democratic movement was that it took individuality to
be something given ready-made; that is, in abstraction from time
instead of as a power to develop" (1938c, p. 242). Thus, "it is the
danger of the 'new education' that it regard the child's present
powers and interests as something finally significant in themselves.
... It will do harm if child-study leave in the popular mind the
impression that a child of a given age has a positive equipment of
purposes and interests to be cultivated just as they stand. Inter-
ests in reality are but attitudes toward possible experiences, they
are not achievements; their worth is in the leverage they afford, not
in the accomplishment they represent" (1902, p. 15).
Cognitive-developmental psychology charts development towaras
independence and appreciation of the reciprocal nature of human
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relationships in terms of "decentration," or movement away from an ego-
centric understanding of the world. "In the degree that the individu-
al is self-centred," states Piaget (19/3), "he creates an obstacle by
his moral or intellectual egocentrism to the inherent relations of
reciprocity that all evolved social living contains" (p. 90). Thus,
education "'directed to the full development of the human personality
and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms is really to create individuals capable of intellectual and
moral autonomy and of respecting this autonomy in others by applying
the rule of reciprocity that makes it legitimate for themselves" (p. 91).
Development of intellectual and moral autonomy describes a
decreasing dependency upon understandings that are logically unsophis-
ticated and not always reliable or adequate, and upon rules and sanc-
tions which are too confining and inflexible. A characteristic of
the cognitive functioning of elementary school children is that it
is still largely dependent upon more advanced intellectual and moral
authorities. Thus, while we posit that development is preeminently
an active process, and that children need to role-take, to experiment,
to explore, to form their own questions and make their own mistakes,
it does not necessarily follow (in the context of this theory) that
children learn to be independent and autonomous simply by practicing
such behavior. In a revealing study of the factors that contribute
to the formation of self-esteem, Coopersmith (1968) bears out these
developmental contentions. His findings "indicate that children
develop self-trust, venturesomeness and the ability to deal with
1 See Kohlberg (1969), pp. 376-389.
V129
adversity if they are treated with respect and are provided with
well-defined standards of values, demands for competence and guidance
toward solutions of problems. It appears that the development of
independence and self-reliance is fostered by a well-structured,
demanding environment rather than by largely unlimited permissiveness
and freedom to explore in an unfocused way" (p. 106).
The Teacher as Authority
In the Open Classroom
Developmental theory suggests several approaches for legitimiz-
ing the authority of the teacher with respect to the classroom learn-
ing process. Dewey (1928) observed that "the teacher, as the member
of the group having the riper and fuller experience and the greater
insight into the possibilities of continuous development found in
any suggested project, has not only the right but the duty to suggest
lines of activity" (p. 124). The teacher can also provide freedom
for the child to act by suggesting a field of alternatives from
which to choose, without, of course, so limiting and "processing"
the field as to deny the opportunity to construct his choice in a way
that is intellectually significant for him. Teacher intervention in
this sense is directed to maximize the developmental potential of
the child’s freedom to explore and to grow in understanding.
Dewey (1936) has stated that "The issue that requires constant
attention is the intimate and organic union of the two things: of
authority and freedom. . . . The idea of attaining a solution by
separation instead of by union misleads and thwarts endeavor whenever
it is acted upon" (p. 94). Seen in this light, the authority of the
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teacher need not be defined in apposition to the learner's freedom
to develop, but rather in support of it. The teacher's authority in
effect becomes part of the climate that encourages active inquiry,
and as a potential consequence, cognitive-structural change.
When the teacher intervenes in the learning process, he may also
be serving developmental needs indirectly by virtue of his providing
a model for children's inquiry and role-taking activity. Establishing
precedents for inquiry behavior can in fact be a mutual affair,
involving a joint teacher-child dialogue over some element of "subject
matter"--what David Hawkins calls the "It" in his "I-Thcu-It" triad.
"The teacher," claims Hawkins (1971a), makes possible this relation
between the child and 'It,' just by having 'It' in the room; for the
child even this brings the teacher as a person, a 'Thou,' into the
picture. For the child this is ... a basis for communication with
the teacher on a new level and with a new dignity" (p . 92).
The teacher who recognizes and respects the fact that the child
comprehends reality with his own peculiar system of logic may in turn
be perceived as a person who makes an effort to understand another's
point of view. "To show lack of respect for persons, is, for instance,
to ignore his point of view when we use him purely for our own pur-
poses or to settle his destiny for him without taking account of his
views about it, or to treat him purely as the occupant of a role by
ignoring his more general status as a rational being" (Hirst and
Peters, 197 J., p. 92). Finally, in a climate of collaborative inquiry,
the teacher would demonstrate and communicate that his authority in
instruction is not really vested in his "official" position per se,
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but in the intellectual skills, emotional attitudes, and the fair-
ness in judgment he brings to problem-solving, including those
problems he can't himself solve. Hawkins (1971a) comments that "The
importance of the I-Thou' relationship between the teacher and
the child is that the child learns something about the adult, which
can be described with words like 'confidence,' 'trust,' and 'respect'"
(p- 90).
The child can also feel a greater sense of self-respect when
he knows that significant recognition is not so much a measure of
achievement, but of his efforts in a role that seems meaningful and
responsible to him. For the child, it is of paramount importance
"that he be responded to and given function and status as a person
whose gradual growth and transformation make sense to those who begin
to make sense to him" (Erikson, 1968, p. 156). On the teacher's
part, respect for individual children therefore involves considera-
tion not only of their feelings, but of the logical bases for their
motives and intentions, and for their judgments and opinions as well.
This is of course consistent with the diagnostic and instructional
responsibilities of a teacher whose aim is to facilitate development.
"Humaneness" and the Helping Relationship
Walberg and Thomas (1971) state that the intervention of Open
teachers is characterized by qualities of humaneness: respect, open-
ness, and warmth (pp. d 7-8). Carl Rogers, whose ideas have contri-
buted heavily to determining this aspect of the role of the Open
classroom teacher, defines such humaneness in operational terms
as
"the helping relationship." For Rogers "the facilitation of
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significant learning rests upon certain attitudinal qualities which
exist in the personal relationship between the facilitator and the
learner (1969, p. 106). Such qualities would include realness, or
genuineness; prizing, accepting, and trusting; and empathic under-
standing (pp. 106-112). Their function would be to help create
conditions of psychological safety" and "psychological freedom" for
the learner (1970, pp. 356-359).
From a cognitive-developmental perspective, a human relations
climate that supports active confrontation with intellectually
challenging situations and the opportunity for role-taking activity
would help facilitate development. Developmental theory posits that
for cognitive structures to change, the s ine qua non is not a set of
protective, supportive, personal relationship factors, but the
occurrence of cognitive conflict--of a need for accommodative think-
ing. To be sure, the learner must feel psychologically secure and
willing enough to acknowledge, and then deal with discrepant data,
or with higher-level examples of reasoning. As Holt (1964) has aptly
i
stated, two basic tasks for teachers are "to stop children from being
afraid, and then to break them of the bad thinking habits into which
their fears have driven them" (p. 49). But I would argue, from a
development a list position, that these are not so much psycho-
therapeutic tasks as they are the responsibility of a coherent approach
to curriculum, instruction, and organizat ion--an approach whose theo-
retical foundations I have attempted to sketch in these chapters.
A Rogerian definition for the teacher's human relations strategies
in the classroom is a valuable complement to a developmental
philosophy
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of pedagogy, so long as it does not obscure the cognitive aspect of
development, and the importance of conflict, both cognitive and
emotional, in human growth. Furthermore, the teacher's personal
attitudes need not be uniformly warm, accepting, and affectionate,
nor should he always try to foster such attitudes within the class-
room. Hunt (1971a) has reported that in working to improve moral
reasoning capacities in adjudicated delinquents, a "differential-
treatment model" that varied treatment worker characteristics accord-
ing to the interpersonal maturity level of the client, made effec-
tive use of qualities ranging from tolerance and protectiveness, to
firmness and willingness to punish, to warmth and understanding (pp.
247-248) . Similarly, Kohlberg (1971) has argued that
The environment which provides role-taking opportunities
is not necessarily a warm, loving, identification-
inducing environment, and an environment deprived in
role-taking opportunities is not necessarily cold or
rejecting. A certain minimum amount of warmth in face-
to-face groups or institutions is required if a child
or adolescent is to feel a sense of participation and
membership in the group. However, the conditions for a
child' s_maximal participation and role-taking in a group
is /sic/ not that he receive maximal affection from the
group, or that the group be organized on communal affilia-
tion lines. At the extreme negative end, impersonal
cold environments are also deficient in role-taking
opportunities. (p . 191)
Sympathy and openness can indeed enhance the quality of inter-
personal relationships, and increase the potential for teachers to
sensitively diagnose and provide for learners. Rogers and the
"humanistic psychologists" have done a considerable service by pro-
viding guidelines for the teacher as a facilitator of psycho-emotional
health and self-actualization. On the other hand, it would
be a
134
mistake not to recognize the resemblance of the psychotherapeutic
evangelism of humanistic educators (those for whom positive self-
image and being in touch with one’s feelings" are the primary
objectives for the classroom teacher/facilitator) to the ersatz
Freudianism that characterized much of the later Progressive Movement's
self-promotional efforts. (The libertarian evangelism of the free
school advocates has similar historical precedents, and frequently
couches its argument in the language of humanistic psychology also.)
Finally, we should be alert to any drift in humanistic education
towards a technology of the spontaneous in interpersonal behavior--
an orthodoxy of human relations for the classroom, cast as a grammar
of motives and actions.
Teacher Intervention
Rathbone (1971a) has stated that "To the proponent of open
education who holds each child to be an agent, much of the job of
teaching entails trying to convince the child to see himself from the
same perspective" (p. 112). Carl Rogers' suggestions for establishing
a helping relationship certainly speak to this charge from a psycho-
emotional angle (1970, pp. 39-57). But from the standpoint of
cognitive development, the task presents a somewhat paradoxical
problem. For while the teacher wants on the one hand to refrain from
2See Cremin (1961), pp. 209-215. Cremin notes that for some,
"Freudianism seemed to shift the focus of the school amost entirely
to nonintellectual, or indeed, anti-intellectual, concerns. For
these
people oreoccupat ion with repression became a denial of authority,
preoccupation with the emotions, a denial of rationality. Once
again
license began to pass for liberty . . •" (p • 210).
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interrupting the child's process of assimilating reality for himself,
there is a parallel need to stay in close contact with the child's
activity, so as to guide it towards truly educative ends. As Dewey
(1938a) noted, informal approaches to instruction "may mean more
multiplied and more intimate contacts" between teacher and child.
The problem, then, is: how these contacts can be established
without violating the principle of learning through personal experi-
ence" (p. 21).
Intervention seems both legitimate and necessary for diagnostic
purposes, to encourage inquiry, and to provide the procedures and
information that might be crucial to further inquiry. Walberg and
Thomas (1971) characterize the Open teacher as one who "amplifies
and extends the possibilities of activities children have chosen,
through conversation, introduction of related materials, direct
instruction when warranted, and assignments appropriate to individual
needs" (p . D 3) . To foster development, such extension of children's
activities would aim to consolidate their present understanding
through contact with parallel or related intellectual operations,
and to challenge the limits of that understanding by directing it
to more complex problems. In general, such teacher intervention pro
vides an organizational function by attaching the child's natural
exploratory and inquiry behavior "to ends that are more remote, that
require finding and inserting intermediate acts, objects, and ideas"
(Dewey, 1933, p. 39).
One role of teacher intervention that is usually
overlooked in
the statements characterizing instruction in the
Open classroom is
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that relating to the actual initiation of students' activity. Probably
because it chooses to see itself primarily in contrast to traditional
"teacher-directed" schooling, Open Education typically avoids des-
cribing the teacher's role in ways that might seem to contradict
the premise that "activities arise from children's interests and
responses to materials." Nonetheless, teachers always indirectly
initiate specific activities through the environmental setting and
curricula they help create. And as Hawkins (1971a) comments, "the
real importance of teacher intervention comes out in situations where
a child is not involved in very many things, is not responsive to
anything provided" (p . 90).
Depending on the kind of learning outcome that is foreseen (re.
Eisner's three types of curriculum objectives), and assuming that we
can, according to Hawkins (1971b), describe at least three basic
patterns of classroom learning activity that are "different from each
other in the relations they induce between children, materials of
study, and teachers" (p. 59), we might consider teacher interven-
tion, exclusive of diagnostic intention and the giving of directives,
to employ these several strategies: questioning, direct
instruction,
and feedback. Each of these strategies can occur
spontaneously; that
is, in response to some student activity with which
the teacher comes
into contact, or as a planned, programmatic
intervention wherein the
teacher assumes a more predetermined^ directive role.
Questioning . The teacher in an Open classroom probably
devotes
a good portion of his spontaneous intervention
Questioning can communicate real
to asking questions
interest in the substance
of students.
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of the student's activity, while serving to model "an attitude of
inquiry and investigation toward all events in the environment"
(Resnick, 1971, p. 13). Furthermore, the use of questions fulfills
a management function in the classroom, contributing "to a sense
that children must make choices--and commitments--concerning both
the content and manner of their work" (p. 13).
Extended questioning as a means of leading the child to consider
and articulate the reasons underlying his understanding and behavior
is a proper intervention tactic for inducing some potentially
accommodative thinking. The "clinical interview," used by Piaget
and Kohlberg to gather psychological data, is really a sequence of
responsive, yet leading, questions that probes for level of struc-
tural organization in the child's understanding. It represents a
skilled technique that can clearly have educative as well as diag-
nostic value. Teachers need to build similar plans for batteries
of related questions that can help extend the child's inquiry and
amplify his ideas within given areas of operational thinking. Robert
Davis (1964)
,
in a discussion of instructional strategies to imple-
ment mathematical learning, contends that an effective teacher must
possess "the ability to construct quickly, in his head, a kind of
programmed sequence of questions that builds carefully from one idea
to the next. He is also attentive to cues from the class which
indicate when to abandon his present sequence of questions, and to
replace it, or supplement it, with a new programmed sequence of
questions . • (p* 134).
Direct instruction. David Hawkins (1965) has advised
that 'We
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must learn better to Instruct children when, after absorption in
subject matter, they communicate by their behavior those directions
which they are prepared to find meaningful because they themselves
have begun to define and seek them. And then there is the opposite
transition, when formal instruction has brought children to new levels
of understanding and interpretation: to open again the door to less
directed probing and testing at these new levels--and thus to
consolidate what has been learned, to use it for further learning"
(pp. 551-552). In this view, direct instruction would be scheduled
according to interest and developmental readiness, and set in the
continuum of active inquiry behavior. As procedure, direct instruc-
tion could be either informal, brought forth as immediate response
to a child s question or uncertainty, or programmatic--a lecture, or
part of a planned discussion. This notion of direct instruction
coming in response to indications of children's curiosity or need
is basically consistent with the position that growth in understanding
is dependent upon factors of cognitive conflict and cognitive match.
It also recognizes that children can assimilate verbal information
only if there is prior concrete experience to serve as referent, and
if the information is comprehensible within the child's present cogni-
tive structural organization.
If Hawkins' statement is read to mean, however, that formal
instruction on a given topic or skill must wait until the child's
individual inquiry experiences lead him to request it, then the impera-
tive to develop understanding in areas that reflect culturally rele-
vant skills and abilities might not always be well-served. It is both
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unfeasible and unnecessary, for example, to wait for the child to
invent explanations for all the phenomena that inform significant
scientific and technological concepts. Atkin and Karplus (1962)
argue that the teacher must intervene, for reasons of expediency,
to introduce certain conceptual understandings--to "invent" them
for the child when he feels the child can assimilate them. "During
this introduction," they note, "the teacher must make clear which
previous observations of the children can be interpreted (or perhaps
reinterpreted) by using a concept. Further, he must follow the intro-
duction with opportunities for the children to discover that new
observations can also be interpreted by using a concept" (p. 47).
Implicit in these prescriptions, of course, is the acknowledgement
that 'hn invention is not complete and static, but it is the germ of
a concept that is developed to greater significance by the subse-
quent discoveries. When an invention is made, its full significance
is not evident. Still, the concept must be introduced and the
invention must be made, if it is to grow in meaning" (p. 45). Open
pedagogy is obliged to recognize and incorporate this position on
instruction for children in the middle and upper elementary grades
who are capable, in varying degrees, of operating on the verbal
content of direct instruction as well as on concrete experience.
feedback. Like questioning, feedback is an aspect of interven-
tion that is more likely to occur spontaneously in the Open classroom.
The teacher who seeks to extend and redirect inquiry activity will
want to make an appropriate communication to the child (or children)
who calls upon him for comment, or who indicates a need for some
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evaluative response. Feedback thus conceived can contribute to
the child’s self-diagnostic efforts, or may serve to help the child
continue, or complete, the activity he is engaged in at a given
moment. As teacher behavior, substantive feedback can constitute
questioning, criticizing, summarizing, etc.
The functions of feedback that facilitate developmental learning
include helping the child recognize and deal with "mistakes." It is
a developmental premise that "The mistakes that the child perceives
are dependent upon his own cognitive level and not upon the level
projected by the teacher" (Voyat, 1973, p. 165). During the course
of his classroom learning, the child will naturally recognize and
act upon some of his explanations that are inadequate inthe face
of new data, or his solutions that don't check out, or his construc-
tions that don’t "work." The teacher may intervene on occasions
when the child fails to notice or acknowledge logical discrepancies,
or examples of inadequate reasoning and judgment, but his tactic
should be, so far as possible, merely to call attention to such
instances, without forcing the issue.
It is a common tendency for teachers, upon discovering that a
child cannot adequately cope with a given task because he fails to
take into account a certain vital factor, to think that i_hey can
readily lead him to perceive and incorporate that factor into his
understanding of the problem. In an experiment designed to discover
how a child makes use of substantive feedback, Voyat (1973) found
that "even if one can provide the child with information that he
can
use with a given context such as seriation, he is not going
to surpass
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performance
,
rather, he /the teacher/ must wait for the child's
operatory structure to develop to observe incidence of other modalities
of learning.
.
.
. Merely providing feedback is not sufficient to
change the ability of a child to integrate information" (p . 166).
Under less informal, or incidental, circumstances, the teacher
can provide feedback that may implement more adequate understanding
by taking part in group discussion or argument. Newman and Oliver
(1971) argue that "Given the objective of open dialogue aimed toward
developing complex individual positions, we should adopt whatever
posture seems likely to achieve this objective. In general this would
imply a combination of neutral summarizer and devil's advocate.
In special cases, on certain issues, to meet one's moral responsi-
bilities as a citizen, it is necessary to take a firm stand and
even to try to persuade students that a view is most reasonable
(implying the commited advocate posture)" (p . 57).
In this chapter I have suggested that teacher intervention,
for purposes of diagnosis, instruction, and constructive evaluation
needs to reflect an awareness of genetic epistemology and develop-
mental psychology. The next, and last, chapter will offer a summary
statement of the dissertation, along with some directions for further
research--and for the professional development of teachers.
chapter VII
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
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The machine teacher,
sion,
.
.
. becomes
ence in his surround
tradesman, and makes
like the empiric in every profes-
a stupefying and corrupting influ-
ings; he himself becomes a mere
his school a mere machine shop.
(Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 201)
•
. it is by and through research that the teacher'sprofession ceases to be merely a trade
(Piaget, 1972, p. 130)
* ' lf they do not intellectually organize their own
work, while they may do much in making the lives of the
children committed to them more joyous and more vital,
they contribute only incidental scraps to the science*
of education.
(Dewey, 1928, p. 120)
• • * by far the m°st progress has been made in those
cities where the teachers themselves are the most students.
(Rice, 1893, p. 18)
SUMMARY
The dissertation first identified a major problem for Open Educa
tion and its efforts to establish viable theory for curriculum and
instruction. This is the tendency to advocate, and to articulate
guidelines for, educational change primarily in ideological terms.
While an educational reform movement may be carried along initially
by the efforts of persuasive critics writing in times of social fer-
ment, and by the examples of a few conspicuously successful experi-
ments in progressive schooling, it must ultimately define itself
through its manifest ability to sponsor total development in individu
al children, and in particular, the development of an active and
resourceful intelligence.
This charge necessitates an informed understanding of what
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intelligence is, and how it develoos Th Pci p . e basic assumptions Open
educators hold with respect to learning and development are avowedly
derived from the research of Jean Piaget, and of cognitive-
developmental psychology. No less a factor in the evolution of
informal pedagogy has been the influence of John Dewey. By combin-
ing the insights of their two essentially similar positions on know-
ledge, intelligence, and development as the aim of education, a
theoretical framework from which prescriptions for practice could be
inferred was set forth.
The dissertation then attempted to systematically sketch out
implications of a developmental theory for creating an environment
for learning, for building curriculum, and for establishing guide-
lines for instruction and teacher intervention. It was argued that
the Open teacher's role as diagnostician needs to be more knowledgeably
articulated, and that instruction and curriculum must be informed
by developmental notions of cognitive conflict and optimal match.
Subject matter needs to be increasingly thought of in terms of the
kinds of logical thinking it involves, or evokes, while teacher inter-
vention should emphasize questioning strategies to stimulate and
extend thinking, and the growth of understanding.
Directions for Further Research
And Development of Theory
These implications for improving Open classroom practice sug-
gest some specific directions for further research and development.
Probably the greatest need is in the area of diagnosing for optimal
match. Psychologists and educators must develop procedures for
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diagnosing thinking ability and level of reasoning in a variety of
contexts, that are feasible for use in the classroom without disrupt-
ing the learning activity of the child. The continued research of
Kohlberg and his colleagues in the area of determining an "open
period" for development seems particularly crucial here. Likewise,
psychologists and curriculum developers need to increase our under-
standing of the logical operations inherent in subject matter, so as
to help the teacher map out the logical interrelationships in diverse
skills and activities, and plan for instruction accordingly, within
a given range of cognitive sophistication. The work of developmental-
ists like Piaget and Kohlberg in establishing protocols for inter-
viewing and observing, has, as I noted earlier, significant potential
for instructional strategies as well as for diagnosis. Educators
need to maintain a regular dialogue with cognitive-developmental
researchers who are refining and testing out procedures for influenc-
ing stage advance.
Open educators need also, however, to be cautioned against over-
estimating the significance of any paradigm of development with
respect to dictating strategies for individualizing instruction. As
Dewey (1928) noted, "certainly in such an undertaking as education,
we must employ the word 'science' modestly and humbly; there is no
subject in which the claim to be strictly scientific is more likely
to suffer from pretence, and none in which it is more dangerous to
set up a rigid orthodoxy, a standardized set of beliefs to be accepted
by all" (p. 116). The implications of Piaget's theory for assessing
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intellectual competence, and for designing and sequencing subject
matter in a curriculum, need to be clarified considerably before
teachers can apply them effectively and reliably. Sullivan (1967)
has rightly called our attention to the tendency for "uncritical
extrapolation of Piaget's observations on development, especially
as they are used to justify discovery learning notions that preclude
direct instruction, or behavior modification approaches.
Behavior modification and operant conditioning techniques have
been widely employed in elementary education. Piaget (1972) has
argued that these techniques do not produce learning outcomes that
are transferable and reversible, and therefore they carry no develop-
mental significance (pp . 75-80). Questions like "How do these train-
ing techniques contribute to development?" and "How should teachers
employ them within an overall strategy of implementing individual
inquiry?" might suggest directions for some particularly useful
research.
I have reiterated in this dissertation that Open Education has
been primarily a lower elementary grade concern. While there have
been some seemingly related innovations for the more advanced grades
(e.g., "schools without walls," open-space schools), there are no
well-established theoretical directions for extending the ideas that
%
inform Open practice into the upper grades. Work needs to be done,
therefore, that would explore the implications that developmental
theory holds for learning in these grades. Specifically, such studies
would consider how an Open classroom approach might best accommodate
the learning styles of older children and adolescents, who are
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increasingly able to function intellectually at a level of formal
abstract reasoning. Questions like "How important is concrete
experience to adolescent learning?'' might be addressed here.
Equally important would be a consideration of what Open Educa-
tion might mean for more socially mature students (with their own
peculiar identity problems)
,
and how it could develop curriculum
that reflects appropriate opportunities for role-taking and purpose-
ful social interaction. Case studies of development and evaluations
of learning achievement need to be undertaken in those middle and
high schools where attempts at mounting an Open classroom approach
have been made.
In general, Open Education that holds development for its aim
requires more appropriate means for program evaluation than those
instruments which only measure skill-specific achievement. The
results of a current study on evaluation methods for the Open class-
room, conducted by the Educational Confederation of St. Louis, Mo.,
should make an important contribution to this problem. This is still
a wide-open area for research and development, since Open Education,
by its definition of multiple objectives for schooling, needs new
instruments for evaluating process and "product," as well as some
cumulative data to assess and redirect its own development.
On a broader front, cognitive-developmental theory needs to be
more effectively linked with ego development. Research like that of
Loevinger and Wessler (1970) might delve further into questions like
"How does cognitive stage theory parallel Erikson's stage theory of
identity development?" or "How do identity 'problems' affect the
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dynamics of cognitive equilibration?" The work of psychologists
like Hauser (1971) on identity formation, and on the phenomenon of
identity foreclosure" (p . 30), begs some correlation with research
in the development of moral reasoning, and the factors that retard
cognitive stage advance. It would also be useful to explore how
cognitive development is contingent upon the student's capacity to
accept, confront, and function in social realities, and to deal with
anxiety. An anthropological perspective on the effects of socializa-
tion tendencies (e.g.. peer conformity, grouping) upon development
in the Open classroom would also be a valuable addition to the
1
research
.
Open educators speak of their commitment to meeting the emotional
needs and the intellectual interests of children. Cognitive and
ego development psychologists have provided some considerable
insights into what the terms "emotional needs" and "intellectual
interests" might signify, and how they might be more strictly defined
for educational purposes. Open educators need to accept this charge
to make their assumptions regarding needs and interests psychologically
informed, and logically correct. Some interesting studies could be
undertaken to ascertain correlations between teacher beliefs and
teacher behavior in the Open classroom, as well as between teacher
expectations and student behavior. Such studies might suggest ways
^-One such contribution should be Jack Fagin's field study on the
effects the different opportunities for social interchange in
an Open
classroom have on learning behavior (to be published as a
dissertation
at the University of Massachusetts, School of Education).
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to bring into more critical perspective the validity of Open
Education's philosophical premises regarding children and learning.
Directions for Further Research
in Progressive Innovation
In Chapter II I -discussed at some length those factors in
progressive educational reform that serve to impede and militate
against successful change in the schools. Among these factors, that
of alleged class bias on the part of reformers and advocates of
reform (as pointed out by Featherstone /_1971a_/, for example) is
especially trenchant for Open Education, and needs to be examined
in some depth. Part of the issue is the question of how appropriate
it is to prepare children to become creative, autonomously-thinking
individuals in a society that functions according to bureaucratic,
hierarchical organization. Are Open classrooms really feasible (both
psychologically and sociologically--in the sense that education is
a key to upward social mobility) for, say, a factory community?
Have there been attempts to "open up" classrooms in such communities,
and if so, what has happened? What about rural communities? Can
Open Education really prepare all American children adequately for
a variety of job lives?
Open Education has so far most notably taken hold in three
distinctly different settings: in private schools like the
Prospect
School in Bennington, Vt.
,
and in some wealthy suburban public
schools; in a rural state like North Dakota, where
multi-age class-
room groupings were a logistic necessity; and in
selected urban public
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;re
schools like those ln Lillian Weber’s Open Corridor Program, „he ,
the typical school population Is racially and economically mixed.
Some extremely valuable comparative studies could be undertaken to
document how these various operations demonstrate similar, or
different, problems In getting started, maintaining themselves, and
growing and changing.
Another self-defeating characteristic of progressive innovation
discussed in Chapter II was that of general ineptitude in husbanding
change in the schools. Barth's essay (1972) on an abortive attempt
to open up a school in New Haven, Conn., is a fine case study of this
problem, but more need to come forth to document not only the failures
but the successes too. Such studies could yield helpful insights
to questions like "How, and under what conditions, can an Open
classroom approach be instituted on a scale that makes it clearly
visible to the community; what political considerations need to be
made; what strategies might be employed to inform and persuade
appropriate pressure groups; what levels of public school personnel
need to be involved, and in what ways can their involvement be
optimally manifested?"
Another area for potential study is the role of "outside"
institutions--e
.
g.
,
universities, the federal and state governmental
agencies, and private foundations--in sponsoring the development
of Open Education in the schools. In what ways have they been (and
can they be) most helpful in aiding local school districts, or
individual schools, in engineering significant change. In what ways
do they sabotage such efforts by creating a "carpet bagger" image for
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Open Education! What has the reUtlonshlp bet_ n ^ e£forts
to establish teacher centers in America, and efforts to provide on-
going support to teachers trying to informal^ classrooms and reorient
their room environments! A further contribution to an understanding
of how progressive educational change is effected in this country
would be a study of how innovation expressed in terms of philosophi-
cal and ideological convictions is coopted by the education industry
how ideas get translated into marketable curricula, and how this
phenomenon affects reform trends in general.
Implications for Teacher Training
and Professional Growth
Open teachers have been characterized by Walberg and Thomas
(1971) as "seeking opportunity to promote /their own/ growth"
(p. D 8). This quality of professionalism is a crucial one for
American teachers, and needs to be instilled and cultivated from
the very outset of pre-service teacher training. The teacher himself
needs to develop the habits and skills of a researcher if he is to
effectively provide for the development of children. He also needs
to become a sensitive and knowledgeable observer of children.
Interestingly, Dewey had several times suggested that teacher
training programs be founded on developing habits of scientific
observation of children and classroom life, while Piaget advocates
that prospective teachers be given instruction and continuous practice
2in clinical observation and diagnostic interviewing procedures.
^See, for example, Dewey (1904), and Piaget (1964b), p. 40.
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Furthermore, the teacher's comment to studying the ways of chil-
dren should be complemented by a self-monitoring process, wherein
he undertakes to maintain a conscious awareness of "the self as
instrument" in the educative process of child acting on subject
matter. Essentially, the task of the Open teacher interested in
facilitating development is to provide for an optimal match between
learner and subject matter in such ways as might conduce to structural
change. If the beginning teacher, or the experienced teacher, is to
assume this responsibility, he must be helped to "perceive both the
existence of a poor match and the organizational possibility for a
better one" (Weber, 1972, p. 66). This suggests that the learning
psychology component of a teacher training program would optimally
be "built into"--or at least strongly coordinated with--the methods
component, so that apprentice teachers are continuously aware of the
potential for building curriculum along lines of developmental
schedules, and become increasingly competent in viewing curriculum
in terms of logical operations. Some interesting comparison studies
might be made on the effects upon the attitudes and competencies of
teachers of pre- and in-service training that emphasizes these
p riorities
.
We might also expect, from the teacher who holds that develop-
ment is continuous and gradual, and is predicated upon an active,
questioning, inquisitive approach to experience, that his own behavior
would illustrate a similar disposition. Voyat (1973) has stated that
"the teacher should be convinced that his work holds out the possi-
bility of continuous self-reorganization, new construction, and
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discover, and that hls discipUne contains m infinite number o£
possibilities for theoretical deepening and technical improvement"
(P- 171). This comment needs to be understood as a mandate for
teachers to become more self-directive by assuming the intellectual
autonomy necessary to adequately meet the developmental needs of
children in their classrooms. The teacher, as Dewey always argued,
requires a sound, working knowledge of those psychological principles
that justify the ethical beliefs of progressive education. With this
knowledge, the teacher need not be "at the mercy of every sort of
doctrine or device, but may have his own standards by which to test
the many methods and expedients constantly urged upon him ..."
(Dewey and McLellan, 1895, p. 202). Lillian Weber (1971) reinforces
this contention when she remarks that "Without connection to a
coherent, nexus of constantly reexamined idea and examples of applica-
tions that extend idea, the teacher has adapted to the systematization
of the American school, and the teacher as an individual feels
helpless to produce change" (p. 235). We should note that this point
applies equally to Open classroom teachers: the problem of articulat-
ing a vital, thorough-going Open pedagogy that can be widely adapted--
without becoming just another educational orthodoxy--is a problem of
individual educators evolving a common yet varied practice informed
by theory.
Speaking in 1928, after three decades of Progressive Education,
John Dewey observed that "we already have the elements of a distinctive
contribution to the body of educational theory: respect for individual
capacities, interests and experience; enough external freedom and
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informality at least to enable teachers to become acquainted with
children as they really are; respect for self-initiated and self-
conducted learning; respect for activity as the stimulus and centre
of learning; and perhaps above all belief in social contact, communi-
cation, and cooperation upon a normal human plane as an all-enveloping
medium (pp. 115-116). These statements represented Dewey' s most
charitable assessment of the progress of Progressive pedagogy. They
might also serve to denote the extent to which pedagogical thinking
for Open Education has evolved. In this dissertation I have argued
that the next step for proponents and practitioners of Open Education
IS to consolidate, and further elaborate these "elements," so that
Open practice may be developed and extended on the basis of sound,
coherent psychological and philosophical principles.
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